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A B S T R A C T
Modern life relies on the internet for everything from communicating
and shopping to banking and seeking medical advice. However, this
growth of internet-based services also leads to a higher risk of security
and privacy issues. Finding and remediating these issues is an impor-
tant challenge which cannot be addressed through purely technical
means, as legal, economic, and psychological factors can also play a
role in how these issues are created and resolved. This dissertation
approaches this challenge from two sides: we discuss how to collect
data and detect issues in the web and email ecosystems, and how the
operators of affected systems can be convinced to address them.
Today, efforts to understand internet ecosystems frequently rely on
automated large-scale scans. These can efficiently investigate large
numbers of systems, but cannot access some ecosystems that require
manual actions (e.g., signing up for a newsletter or account). To gather
research data and gain access to new ecosystems, we propose and
develop two public transparency platforms for use by internet users
which collect information about security and privacy issues in the web
and email ecosystems using a crowdsourcing approach. We consult
with legal experts to ensure the adherence of our platforms to the
relevant legislation. Over the 4 years of operation the platforms col-
lected over 3 million scan results, which can serve as a basis for future
research.
Our platforms also revealed a number of privacy, security and com-
pliance issues, which should be addressed by the operators of the
affected systems. Past research has shown that notifying operators
about issues and convincing them to make changes is a challenging
problem and frequently results in unsatisfactory remediation rates.
We thus investigate the factors influencing the success of large-scale
notification campaigns. For this purpose, we conduct three notification
studies that evaluate different methods to incentivize system operators
to address the issues, like inducing a competitive pressure (leveraging
our existing public platform), highlighting the security threat an issue
poses, or informing the operators that their systems are not compliant
with relevant legislation. We also evaluate the choice of the message
medium and the sender as factors in the success of a notification
campaign. We collaborate with researchers from economics, law, and
psychology to gain additional insights into the behavior of organiza-
tions and individual operators. Finally, we derive organizational and
methodological recommendations for future notification campaigns
based on our experience.
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Z U S A M M E N FA S S U N G
In unserem täglichen Leben nutzen wir das Internet für viele Zwecke,
von der Kommunikation über den Einkauf bis zum Banking und der
Suche nach medizinischem Rat. Die zentrale Rolle die das Internet für
uns spielt bedeutet auch, dass es ein hohes Potential für Sicherheits-
und Privatheitsprobleme hat. Diese zu finden und zu beheben ist eine
wichtige Aufgabe, die nicht rein technischen addressiert werden kann:
auch juristische, wirtschaftliche und psychologische Faktoren spielen
eine Rolle darin, wie diese Probleme entstehen und behoben werden.
Die vorliegende Dissertation betrachtet dieses Themengebiet von zwei
Seiten: wir betrachten die Datensammlung und das automatische
Auffinden von Problemen für Webseiten und Email-Newsletter, und
wir prüfen, wie die Betreiber*innen dieser Systeme dazu gebracht
werden können, die gefundenen Probleme zu beheben.
Versuche, den aktuellen Zustand verschiedener Internet-Ökosysteme
zu verstehen, basieren häufig auf groß angelegten automatischen
Scans. Solche Scans ermöglichen es, schnell eine große Anzahl von
Zielen zu untersuchen, scheitern aber an Systemen die eine vorherige
Anmeldung benötigen, wie beispielsweise E-Mail Newsletters. Daher
entwickeln und beschreiben wir in dieser Dissertation zwei öffentliche
Transparenz-Systeme, die mittels Crowdsourcing Sicherheits- und Pri-
vatheitsprobleme in Webseiten und E-Mail-Newsletters identifizieren.
Die Ergebnisse werden anschließend aufbereitet und auf einer Web-
seite öffentlich angezeigt. Dabei stellen wir in Zusammenarbeit mit
juristischen Expert*innen sicher dass der Betrieb dieser Plattformen
mit geltendem Recht verinbar ist. In den letzten vier Jahren haben
Nutzer*innen über diese Plattformen über 3 Millionen Untersuchun-
gen angestoßen und damit einen wertvollen Datensatz für zukünftige
Forschungsvorhaben gesammelt.
Durch diese Plattformen ist es uns ebenfalls gelungen, einen Da-
tensatz von Privatheits-, Sicherheits- und Konformitätsprobleme auf
Webseiten zu sammeln. Bisherige Forschungsergebnisse haben gezeigt
dass ein einfacher Hinweis an die Betreiber*innen häufig nicht aus-
reichend ist, um die Probleme beheben zu lassen. Daher untersuchen
wir Faktoren die den Erfolg oder Misserfolg einer solchen Benach-
richtigungskampagne beeinflussen können. Insgesamt führen wir drei
Benachrichtigungsstudien durch, mit denen wir verschiedene Metho-
den untersuchen, Betreiber*innen dazu zu bewegen, die Probleme zu
lösen. Zu diesen Faktoren gehören unter anderem der Wettbewerb
mit anderen Webseiten, eine detaillierte Information über die Risiken
eines Sicherheitsproblems, oder der Hinweis auf geltendes Recht, wel-
ches die Webseite aktuell verletzt. Desweiteren betrachten wir den
Einfluss, den das Medium und der Absender einer Nachricht haben.
iv
Diese Studien entstehen in Zusammenarbeit mit Forscher*innen aus
der Wirtschaftsinformatik, Jura und Psychologie, um die Reaktionen
aus der Perspektive der jeweiligen Disziplinen zu untersuchen. Wir
schließen diese Dissertation mit einer Reihe organisatorischer und me-
thodischer Empfehlungen für zukünftige Benachrichtigungsstudien,
die wir aus unseren Erfahrungen ableiten.
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C O L L A B O R AT I O N S A N D M Y C O N T R I B U T I O N
In the following, I detail the contributions of my co-authors and myself
per chapter. In addition, I follow the regulations of the Department
of Computer Science at Technische Universität Darmstadt and give
an account of the parts that include verbatim or revised fragments of
previous publications that form this dissertation as indicated in the
preceding list of publications.1
Chapter 1 and 2 summarize the contributions, background and
related work of the core papers of this dissertation [6, 7, 9–12].
Chapter 3 is based on joint work with Dominik Herrmann, Henning
Pridöhl, Pascal Wichmann and Anne Laubach [7, 12]. The underlying
platform was written by Dominik Herrmann, Henning Pridöhl, Pascal
Wichmann and myself, and has since been expanded and partially
rewritten by Pascal Wichmann and Henning Pridöhl. My focus was
on the data analysis aspects of the platform. The legal expertise in
[7] was provided by Anne Laubach. Everyone contributed equally to
writing the papers.
Chapter 4 is based on joint work with Stephan Schwär [9], who
wrote significant parts of the backend as part of his Master thesis,
and Jonathan Schad, Chi Viet Vu and Jan Klinkmann, who rewrote
parts of front- and backend later. I participated in coming up with the
system design, and wrote the frontend for the first prototype version,
which has since been rewritten as part of Jonathan Schad’s Bachelor
thesis and a later lab project by Jonathan Schad, Chi Viet Vu and Jan
Klinkmann. I wrote significant parts of the paper. Parts of the chapter,
primarily between Section 4.1 and Section 4.3, are adapted verbatim
or with small changes from the original paper.
Chapter 5 is based on joint work with Nicolas Walter, Dominik Her-
rmann, and Nora Wessels [11]. Nicolas Walter conducted the study
and the first evaluation of the data as part of his Master thesis, co-
supervised by Nora Wessels and myself. I subsequently re-evaluated
the data with new techniques and wrote the paper jointly with Do-
minik Herrmann and Nicolas Walter. Parts of the chapter, primarily
between Section 5.3.3 and Section 5.6 as well as all figures and tables,
are adapted verbatim or with small changes from the original paper.
Chapter 6 is based on joint work with Marc-Pascal Clement [6], who
conducted the study and the first version of the evaluation as part
of his Bachelor thesis. Once again, I re-evaluated the data using new
techniques and wrote significant parts of the paper, with input from
Marc-Pascal Clement. The figures and tables are adapted verbatim or
with small changes from the paper. The descriptions from Appendix
1 References in this chapter refer to my list of publications given on Pages xvii to xix.
xxi
xxii collaborations and my contribution
B are partially adapted with changes from Marc-Pascal Clement’s
Bachelor thesis.
Chapter 7 is based on a collaboration with Alina Stöver, Henning
Pridöhl, Sebastian Bretthauer, Dominik Herrmann, and Indra Spiecker
[10], based on an idea primarily developed by Dominik Herrmann,
Henning Pridöhl and myself. Henning Pridöhl developed the scanning
infrastructure and self-service tool used in the study, and wrote the
evaluation of the tool. Alina Stöver designed, conducted and evaluated
the survey and worked with me to evaluate the received messages.
Sebastian Bretthauer and Indra Spiecker provided legal expertise and
fielded phone calls as part of the study. I prepared and sent the
messages, responded to questions from recipients, and performed the
survival analysis and literature work. We jointly wrote the paper, with
each person writing the parts that fell inside their area of expertise.
The figures and tables as well as parts of Appendix C were adapted
verbatim or with small changes from the paper or its supplementary
material.
Chapter 8 is based on experiences made in the previous three studies.
It was written by me, with input from Henning Pridöhl and Dominik
Herrmann. It was later used as a basis for a paper with the same
authors [8].
Part I
I N T R O D U C T I O N
We begin this dissertation with an introduction to two
internet ecosystems and the problems they face. We then
give an overview of the pertinent literature from computer
science and other relevant fields.

1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
In the last 30 years, the internet has seen an explosive growth in the
number of connected devices, websites, services and business models.
Services that were unthinkable 20 years ago are a routine part of the
lives of millions of people today, and more and more of our lives is
conducted online. However, this is not without risk.
1.1 motivation
Ensuring that the infrastructures powering our lives are secure, trust-
worthy, and respecting our privacy has become a critical task. Unfortu-
nately, this goal has proven hard to achieve in practice. To understand Security and privacy
are difficult to
ensure.
the issues, we highlight three different perspectives on the ecosystems
that make up the internet: that of the end users using its services, of
the operators that build and maintain them, and of the researchers that
want to understand the current state of the ecosystems.
end users End users are by far the weakest participants in the
system, lacking any direct way to influence the security and trust-
worthiness of the services they are using, while having to trust them
with their data, knowingly or unknowingly. The slew of successful The security and
privacy of end users’
data is threatened by
insecure services.
attacks on major companies and vendors ranging from credit scoring1
to social networks2 have demonstrated that many companies are far
from achieving the necessary level of security to warrant this trust.
Instead, data breaches exposing the information of millions of users
have become so commonplace that they hardly generate sustained
attention, except in the most egregious cases.
At the same time, these companies threaten the privacy and security
of their users through their use of third-party services. The most well- Their privacy is also
under threat from
tracking companies.
known of these are the advertising and profiling companies, which
routinely collect and trade information about hundreds of millions
of users, profile them for targeted advertising, and sell access to the
resulting profiles, which are in turn exploited for (sometimes deceptive
or manipulative) advertising [20].
Most of these issues are invisible to the users, who frequently do not
know how many tracking and advertising companies are present on a
1 See https://arstechnica.com/?post_type=post&p=1166391, last accessed 2021-01-
20.
2 See https://www.cbsnews.com/news/linkedin-2012-data-breach-hack-much-
worse-than-we-thought-passwords-emails/, last accessed 2021-01-20.
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website. This lack of transparency leads to system operators3 suffering
no ill effects (in terms of reputation loss or competitive disadvantages)Tracking and
security issues are
invisible to the user.
from violating the privacy of their users, as these are unlikely to “vote
with their feet” and take their business to more privacy-conscious
competitors if they cannot easily compare them [57].
It may be tempting to lay the blame for these practices at the feet
of the system operators. However, we will see that they also face a
number of constraints.
system operators Modern websites are complex systems with
many moving parts and external dependencies, ranging from web
frameworks or Content Management Systems (CMSs) to libraries
providing specific functions, cloud/hosting providers, and firewall







introducing threats to the availability and security of the system. Even
worse, these external dependencies may in turn have their own exter-
nal dependencies, further increasing the exposure to these problems.
Keeping track of this expanding web of dependencies is a significant
challenge, leading to issues such as the use of outdated and vulner-
able software, incompatibilities, and misconfigurations. The system
may also end up violating relevant regulations like the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), exposing its operators to legal liability.
Many services’ business models rely, at least in part, on advertising,
either by showing ads themselves or by using advertising to attract




and advertising systems (in websites, apps, or even email newsletters)
is often the economically correct decision, as the externalities are
shouldered by the users. If this calculation is to be changed, the cost of
using invasive tracking and advertising services must outweigh their
benefit — and where this cannot be ensured by users or competitors,
it may be achievable by regulation. But to understand in which areas
regulation may be required, regulators need to understand the current
practices and problems of internet ecosystems. Here, researchers may
be able to provide valuable data.
researchers In the last 10 years, great steps have been made in




ZMap4 [33] allow scanning the entire IPv4 address space for a specific
open port in less than an hour, and systems like Shodan5 have large
databases of internet services and their fingerprints. Researchers have
also performed large-scale scans of websites [1, 2, 27, 38, 39, 42, 62,
3 For the purpose of this dissertation, we use the umbrella term “system operator”
for both the technical (i.e., administrators) and legal operators (i.e., owners of the
company).
4 See https://zmap.io, last accessed 2021-01-20.
5 See https://shodan.io, last accessed 2021-01-20.
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114], and similar datasets exist for Android apps [52, 90, 95], among
other areas.
Given this wealth of data and technology, detecting vulnerabilities
and misconfigurations at scale seems to be simple. However, such Large-scale datasets
face issues of validity
and may neglect
some ecosystems.
large datasets come with their own problems. For example, some
question the validity of using common lists of popular websites (most
commonly the Alexa Top Million) as datasets for such scans, citing
issues in replicability and the large churn of these lists [64, 94]. It
also leads to research favoring ecosystems that can be automatically
analyzed with relative ease, which leads to less attention being paid
to other ecosystems that are more challenging to investigate.
Collecting such large datasets also raises a challenging question:
what should be done if the scans reveal systems that are vulnerable




ing all affected system operators results in a large workload for the
researchers, not notifying them is ethically questionable. In practice,
notifications often end up being undeliverable [17, 18, 34, 68, 98, 99],
and the researchers are sometimes faced with hostile responses and
even legal threats [17] if they send notifications, further complicating
this decision.
1.2 challenges and goals
In this dissertation, we seek to understand the current state of different
internet ecosystems and determine how to influence operators to






seemingly simple goals hide a high degree of complexity that can pose
formidable challenges. Entire dissertations have been written about
just a single facet of these issues [36, 67]. We thus begin by discussing
the challenges and goals that we investigate in this dissertation, before
highlighting our concrete contributions in the next section.
1.2.1 Understanding Ecosystems
While large-scale internet scans can provide valuable insights, they




is not made available in an easily accessible way, as it may require
payment or a manual sign-up (e.g., email newsletters). In these cases,
manual work and/or spending money is required, which limits the
scalability of the analysis. In some cases, it may also be difficult to
find a representative sample of systems for the analysis.
public transparency tools We may be able to mitigate these
issues by creating public transparency tools that are geared towards
both system operators and end users. Such tools can be used to collect
a different type of dataset compared to the one-time large-scale scans.
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By collecting data about systems specifically requested by end users,Public scanning
tools can help with
data collection and
serve as a basis for
future studies.
such tools are no longer bound to the commonly used sources of
target systems, and can thus avoid reproducing the same structural
biases.6 They can also be used to outsource manual work involved in
data collection (e.g., signing up for newsletters) to the end user, which
reduces the required time investment for the researcher. Finally, such
platforms can build their own user bases, which may be helpful for
follow-up studies (e.g., user studies or any study that relies on having
a well-known platform in the background).
new ecosystems Much of the previous research has focused on
the web [1, 2, 27, 38, 39, 42, 62, 114] or mobile app [52, 90, 95] ecosys-






and some have little to no tool support for users or operators. Closing
this gap can allow any tools developed by researchers to attract users
and collect unique datasets that can help advance our understanding
of these ecosystems.
1.2.2 Changing Ecosystems
While automated tools can reveal issues, remediating them requires





first, the system operators need to be successfully contacted so that
awareness about the issue can be raised. Secondly, they need to actually
remediate the issue by implementing changes to the systems under
their control.
reaching system operators Although finding contact infor-
mation for the operators of a website can usually be achieved within
a minute of browsing the website, this approach does not scale to
the thousands or tens of thousands of websites that are routinely
found to be vulnerable on the internet. However, no repository ofIt is difficult to find
contact information
for system operators
and gain their trust.
contact information for all websites exists, which leads to high rates
of undeliverable messages [17, 18, 34, 68, 98, 99], especially after many
Top-Level Domains (TLDs) removed address information from their
automated WHOIS interfaces in response to the GDPR [70]. And
even if a valid email address can be correctly guessed [96], recipients
(rightly) distrust unsolicited messages [15, 16, 98, 117]. Thus, gaining
enough trust to have the message taken seriously is another challenge
that has to be overcome.
factors influencing remediation Once a message has been
received, read, and not dismissed out of hand, one might be tempted
to assume that the problem will be addressed. However, a final chal-
6 Of course, any dataset created by such a tool carries its own biases based on the user
base, which need to be considered in any evaluation of the data.
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lenge remains: ensuring that the system operator will actually take
action. Several studies have shown that awareness of a problem is not Even if the operators





necessarily sufficient to ensure that remediation will be attempted,
or completed successfully [17, 34, 68]. This can have several reasons,
including a lack of understanding about the severity of the reported
issue, lack of time to implement a fix, or even disagreeing with the
premise that it actually constitutes a problem worth addressing [68].
Thus, it is important to determine which factors influence the will-
ingness of system operators to attempt remediating an issue. At the
same time, even if remediation is attempted, it may not be successful.
System operators thus also need to be supported in validating the
success of their remediation attempts.
1.3 contributions
To address these challenges, we make three contributions: (1) we de- This thesis makes
contributions in
three areas.
sign automated public transparency tools for two internet ecosystems,
(2) we evaluate factors that influence operators’ willingness to make
changes to their systems in response to outside notifications, while
(3) sharing expertise and collaborating with researchers from other
disciplines.
1.3.1 Automated Transparency Tools for Two Ecosystems
To allow for the collection of different datasets and serve as a basis for
further research, we develop two public transparency tools: Privacy-
Score.org and PrivacyMail.info. These tools cover the web and email We develop public




ecosystems, respectively. PrivacyScore considers privacy and security
issues, and is being widely used (between 250 and 500 visitors per day
as of May 2021, with over 2.9 million scans performed). The data it
collects has also been used in subsequent studies [82, 93, 97], both ours
and from other institutions. PrivacyMail.info scans email newsletters
for tracking technologies. It is a younger platform and thus has fewer
users (50-150 users per day, with over 350 000 emails analyzed) and
follow-up research, but it fills a gap that no other public platform
has addressed before: a long-term dataset of commercial newsletters
which can be analyzed for privacy-invasive technologies. At the time
of writing, the latter dataset has been shared with two other research
projects, one of which resulted in a publication [54].
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We design and build PrivacyScore.org, an open source7 trans-
parency system that detects privacy and security issues on web-
sites (Chapter 3).
7 See https://github.com/privacyscore/privacyscore, last accessed 2021-03-01.
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• We design and build PrivacyMail.info, an open source8 trans-
parency system that evaluates email newsletters for trackers and
other privacy issues (Chapter 4).
• We operate both as public services and share data from both
platforms with other researchers to enable further research (Sec-
tion 3.5 and 4.5).
1.3.2 Changing Ecosystems
To investigate the factors that influence if operators will change their





fication studies in which we evaluate different incentives and other
factors that influence system operators’ willingness to make changes
to their websites. These factors include the contact medium, the mes-
sage sender, and the content of the message. We also synthesize the
procedural and technical lessons we have learned while conducting
these studies into a set of best practices and recommendations for
future studies.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We conduct a notification study to evaluate whether competition
can serve as an incentive to improve online privacy in a notifica-
tion study with 152 health insurance companies (Chapter 5).
• In a second notification study with 1359 website operators, we
investigate the influence of providing more explicit descriptions
of attacks enabled by detected security issues (Chapter 6).
• We perform a third notification study with 4594 website oper-
ators to investigate the effect of different senders and compare
the remediation rates of a legal (compliance) argument with a
baseline privacy argument (Chapter 7).
• We also use the latter two studies to compare the effectiveness
of postal notifications with email notifications (Chapter 6 and 7).
• To facilitate future research, we collect the lessons we learned
while conducting these studies and derive a set of best practices
for future notification studies (Chapter 8).
1.3.3 An Interdisciplinary Approach




group “Privacy and Trust for Mobile Users”, this dissertation benefits
from collaborations and discussions with a large group of researchers
8 See https://github.com/privacymail/privacymail, last accessed 2021-03-01.
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from diverse disciplines, ranging from law and economics to psychol-
ogy and sociology. Discussions with the other PhD students as well as
the postdocs and professors inform this work in many areas, and have
resulted in several collaborations which allow us to provide a more
holistic view of the topic areas discussed in this dissertation.
The following areas particularly benefit from these collaborations:
• We consult with researchers from the field of Information Sys-
tems to understand the perspectives of companies on privacy
and security issues (Section 2.4) and evaluate competition as a
factor in driving change to websites (Chapter 5).
• We work with law researchers to evaluate the legal questions
surrounding the operation of our transparency systems (Sec-
tion 3.4).
• We collaborate with a different legal research group to construct
and evaluate a compliance argument and use their chair as one
sender in our compliance notification study (Chapter 7).
• We work with researchers from psychology to analyze the re-
sponses of notification recipients in our compliance study (Chap-
ter 7).
1.4 outline
The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows: first, we provide We summarize the
structure of the
dissertation.
required background information and an overview of related work in
Chapter 2. In Part ii we describe the two automated transparency sys-
tems we developed, PrivacyScore.org (Chapter 3) and PrivacyMail.info
(Chapter 4). We then utilize the developed technology for three notifi-
cation studies in Part iii, discussing the use of competition (Chapter 5),
alternative contact channels (Chapter 6), and alternative senders and
non-technical arguments (Chapter 7) as potential factors that may
influence remediation. We conclude the dissertation in Part iv by dis-
cussing the organizational and methodological lessons we learned
from our notification studies in Chapter 8 before summarizing the
high-level takeaways in Chapter 9.

2
B A C K G R O U N D A N D R E L AT E D W O R K
In this chapter, we give a background on different internet ecosystems
and how they can be analyzed for issues. We then discuss the prior This chapter gives an
overview of relevant
prior research.
research on large-scale notification studies that sought to reach system
operators and inform them about issues with their systems so that
these can be remediated. Finally, we consider some basic theories
from the field of economics that can help us to understand the view
of organizations on security and privacy issues, and the role that
transparency can play in changing their calculus.
2.1 internet ecosystems
The internet consists of a large combination of different ecosystems,
including websites, apps, email, messengers, and many others. For We begin by
considering two
internet ecosystems:
The web and email.
the purpose of this dissertation, we consider two different ecosystems:
Websites (or, shorter, “the web”) and email. We thus briefly introduce
these two ecosystems and the challenges they face.
2.1.1 The Web Ecosystem
The web has become a central part of the lives of many people. It
mediates our contact with friends (via social networks), financial trans-
actions, entertainment, the search for information, and increasingly




websites and services, run by countless small and large companies,
individuals, and non-profit organizations. This decentralized nature al-
lows the web to be a dynamic environment, quick to react to changes,
but it also leads to a distribution of responsibilities and risks. We
highlight two of these risks in more detail below.
2.1.1.1 Security
Modern websites are frequently built with either pre-made CMSs or
built on top of web frameworks like Express.js and Django, using
popular libraries like Bootstrap, jQuery, and React. They also out- Websites rely on
common frameworks
and a variety of
services provided by
external actors,
which can prove a
security risk.
source complex functions like customer help chats, media playback,
newsletter subscriptions, analytics and advertising to external compa-
nies. The website is then hosted, often with a large hosting company
that operates powerful Content Distribution Networks (CDNs). This
structure leads to several potential security issues.
11
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centralized vulnerabilities Using a common CMS or frame-
work allows rapid development of websites using an existing ecosys-
tem of extensions and documentation and makes it likely that a website
can be kept compatible with modern browsers and features with a
comparatively small effort. However, this benefit comes at the cost ofCommon frameworks
lead to common
vulnerabilities.
creating large numbers of websites running the same code and thus
being affected by the same bugs and vulnerabilities. If a vulnerability
is found that can be automatically exploited at scale, it can put the
entire ecosystem at risk. This makes the timely installation of software
updates critical.
external dependencies Using external services to provide func-




to the website loading (and implicitly trusting) code developed by
outside parties. If such a company is compromised, this can in turn
compromise all websites that use their services.1 Alternatively, the
company may go out of business, which can lead to their domain
becoming available again. If criminals subsequently register the same
domain, they can begin distributing malware or other harmful content
to all websites that still embed content from the domain.2
misconfigurations Even if the code running on a website is






tive data like internal configuration details, Version-Control System
(VCS) repositories3, and even database backups [98]. Such misconfigu-
rations can be found through automated scans and easily exploited
at scale, and can stay hidden from the operator unless they perform
vulnerability scans of their own website.
insecure infrastructure Finally, even if the code is secure
and the configuration is correct, the website may still be exposed to
vulnerabilities in the web server, like the infamous Heartbleed attack






to remediate, as is the case with insecure Domain Name System (DNS)
servers [17] or cache services4. Such issues may put the website and
its users at significant risk, and are usually impossible to predict in
advance.
1 See, for example, https://scotthelme.co.uk/hardening-payment-forms-with-
csp/, last accessed 2021-02-02.
2 See https://0xpatrik.com/subdomain-takeover-basics/, last accessed 2021-01-14.
3 See https://en.internetwache.org/dont-publicly-expose-git-or-how-we-
downloaded-your-websites-sourcecode-an-analysis-of-alexas-1m-28-07-
2015/, last accessed 2021-04-01.
4 See https://blog.cloudflare.com/incident-report-on-memory-leak-caused-by-
cloudflare-parser-bug/, last accessed 2021-02-02.
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2.1.1.2 Privacy
Security issues like those mentioned above usually have the interests Operators and users
have different
interests in the area
of privacy.
of users and operators aligned, as both would prefer the website to be
secure. In the area of privacy, this is not necessarily the case. Here, the
interest of the website operator may clash with the desire for privacy
by the users.
tracking Many websites are operated with the goal of selling




determine how the visitors use the websites, as this allows website
operators to determine which routes through the website the users
take, and thus also gain insight into which aspects of the website
drive purchases and which detract from the overall performance. Such
analytics features are offered as a service by many companies, the
most well-known of which is Google with its Google Analytics service.
These systems collect significant amounts of data about the behavior
of the users, in some cases collecting all of their actions down to mouse
movements and keystrokes for later playback [1].
advertising and profiling Closely related is the issue of ad-
vertising and profiling: some websites earn money not through the Advertising can keep




sale of products, but by using free content or services to attract users
and then placing advertisements to monetize the attention. The online
advertising ecosystem relies heavily on privacy-invasive profiling [20]
to determine which ads to show to which user, and uses tracking to
determine the effectiveness of an advertising campaign. This func-
tionality is provided by dedicated third-party services that aggregate
information about the behavior of the user from many websites to
construct detailed profiles.
regulation and compliance The extensive data collection of
advertising and tracking companies has led to a pushback, most no-
tably in the form of new regulations that limit the collection and use of





of these regulations is the GDPR.5 Companies must comply with these
regulations or face significant fines. However, many companies either
struggle with compliance due to unclear and conflicting information
about the legality of certain practices, or seek to circumvent the rules
through psychological tricks like dark patterns that aim to obtain “in-
formed consent” from the user by making the withholding of consent
5 While the EU ePrivacy directive, Digital Services Act, and Digital Markets Act promise
to introduce further changes, none of them has been passed by the EU legislature at
the time of writing.
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difficult. This practice has been challenged in court6, but no binding
final ruling of the European courts has been made yet.
2.1.2 The Email Ecosystem
Where the web ecosystem provides a large variety of services, emails
are more limited. They are mostly used for personal or professionalThe email ecosystem
has a different threat
model than the web.
communication, automated confirmations of orders, and newsletters.
Both sender and recipient(s) presumably have an interest in keeping
the message confidential. However, the question is: confidential against
whom? Depending on the answer, different threats and technologies
become relevant.
2.1.2.1 Confidentiality against Network Providers
The first and most simple case is that user and sender want to keep
the content of their message confidential from the network it travels




encryption, but it is
frequently disabled.
In these cases, emails can be protected in transit using a transport
encryption technology like Transport Layer Security (TLS). However,
in practice, even this simple form of protection is surprisingly rare
[32, 55, 77], exposing many emails to snooping by anyone with access
to the network traffic while they are being transmitted between mail
servers.
2.1.2.2 Confidentiality against Mail Providers





against inspection by the operator of the sending and receiving email
accounts. In this case, the encryption needs to be performed on the
device of the sender, with the message being decrypted by the recipient
(end-to-end encryption), using a technology like PGP or S/MIME. This
requires special software for both parties, making its use rare in the
general population.
2.1.2.3 Confidentiality against Sender
Finally and perhaps counterintuitively, the recipient may want to
protect themselves against the sender. The sender may want to knowThe message sender
may also attempt to
track the recipient.
if and when the recipient opened the email and if they clicked any of
the embedded links. As emails are often sent in the Hypertext Markup
Language (HTML) format, they can load remote content (like images
hosted on external servers). Such an image load can be detected by the
server. Thus, embedding a personalized image link into each email can
6 See https://www.hiddemann.de/allgemein/lg-rostock-bejaht-
unterlassungsanspruch-bei-nudging-ueber-cookie-banner/ for a German
description of such a case. Last accessed 2021-02-02.
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allow the sender to know when the email was read, and personalized
links can be used to detect when a link was clicked. Both techniques
are commonly used in commercial mailings [37, 46, 50, 54, 113].
Email tracking is arguably even more powerful than website-based






that will change only very rarely — their email address — which
allows tracking their behavior over long timeframes. It also permits
advertisers to easily link the behavior from multiple newsletters in a
single profile, further increasing the value of the data. If users click a
tracked link from within an email, the newsletter-based profile can be
linked with a web-based profile identified by browser cookies. Email
is also frequently used from more than one device (i.e., laptop, phone
and tablet). Thus, if links are clicked from more than one device, the
profiles collected from the two devices can also be linked to the same
person [37].
There are also significantly fewer options for users to defend them-
selves from tracking — if they are even aware that email tracking
exists, which they frequently aren’t [113]. Dedicated email clients only No good defenses
against email
tracking exist.
rarely offer ad-blockers, and even if they are installed, the block lists
are frequently insufficient [37, 54, 113]. And even though tracking
through remote content can be avoided by not loading this content,
this frequently renders the email newsletter unreadable due to missing
design elements. Finally, tracked links are also impossible to avoid,
unless the user wants to manually search for the linked article or prod-
uct on the website, further reducing the convenience of the newsletter.
Thus, email tracking is a powerful and hard-to-defeat threat to the
privacy of users.
2.2 automated ecosystem analysis
In order to determine how wide-spread specific privacy and security
issues are, automated analyses can prove helpful. Ecosystems can be We discuss two
approaches for
ecosystem analysis.
analyzed using two methods: automated large-scale scans can give a
view of the overall state of the environment, while public transparency
tools can provide more targeted information about individual sys-
tems (while potentially still collecting a high-level picture from the
aggregated scans). We discuss both types in more detail below before
considering their relative strengths and weaknesses.
2.2.1 Large-Scale Automated Scanning
Large-scale scanning systems rely on easily automated and scalable
processes. Their intent is not to investigate or promote changes to Large-scale scans
provide an overview
of an ecosystem.
a specific system, but rather to gain a high-level overview of the
current state of the ecosystem, looking for aggregate results and trends
without special consideration for individual systems. This information
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can then be used to determine how prevalent specific issues are, inform
policy decisions, or serve as a baseline for more detailed investigations.
In this section, we briefly consider the use of large-scale scans in two
ecosystems which are of interest for this dissertation — the web and




other areas, with services like Shodan7 or software like ZMap8 [33]
providing the infrastructure for detailed scans of non-HTTP internet
services.
2.2.1.1 The Web Ecosystem
Large-scale Web scans have become so accessible that they can beLarge-scale scans are
commonly used in
the web.
conducted with relative ease, even by small teams or individuals.
Thus, both the security and privacy aspects of the web have been
analyzed with large-scale scans.
security In the area of security, scans are used to detect issues as
diverse as outdated software [62], information leaks9, or (mis)use of
TLS [49]. Services like Censys10 [31] or Crawler.ninja11 collect regularSecurity scans have
revealed many issues




scans of large swaths of the internet, with results detailing the use of
TLS, Security Headers or certification information. This allows even
those without the ability to perform such scans to work with the
results and perform analyses.






by the fact that many privacy-relevant issues can only be detected
by using a fully functional browser (instead of simple scripted HTTP
requests) to load and execute the JavaScript of the website and cap-
ture all connections it establishes. This leads to significantly increased
resource requirements to perform such scans at scale. Tools like Open-
WPM [38] package a full browser with instrumentation code that
allows remotely controlling its actions. Such tools can then be used to
conduct studies about web tracking [1, 38], the use of cookies [39], or
the prevalence of dark patterns [76].
2.2.1.2 The Email Ecosystem
In the email ecosystem, large-scale scans are less common — some as-The email ecosystem
is less suited for
large-scale scans.
pects can be evaluated easily, while others require the semi-automated
collection of a large corpus of emails, which can prove challenging. We
7 See https://shodan.io, last accessed 2021-01-20.
8 See https://zmap.io, last accessed 2021-01-20.
9 See https://en.internetwache.org/dont-publicly-expose-git-or-how-we-
downloaded-your-websites-sourcecode-an-analysis-of-alexas-1m-28-07-
2015/, last accessed 2021-04-01.
10 See https://censys.io/, last accessed 2021-01-20.
11 See https://crawler.ninja/, last accessed 2020-01-26.
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thus discuss large-scale scans divided by the three different protection
goals discussed above.
confidentiality against network providers The availabil-




that probe common email-related ports. Thus, several studies exist
that investigate this question [32, 55, 77] and usually come to sober-
ing results: even though it is reasonably easy to deploy, many email
servers still do not support transport encryption.
confidentiality against mail providers Due to the decen-
tralized nature of email encryption systems, there is no feasible way




public PGP keyservers to perform basic analyses of the web of trust
[107] or types of users [11] (using the keyservers as a directory of users
that they contacted for a survey). The latter study shows that the users
skew towards a male (94.9 % of respondents) and young population
(almost 50 % below 35 years old), living in Europe or North America
(combined 90 %) and working in IT or education (combined 78.1 %)
[11]. This shows that usage of PGP (as measured by this study) is
limited to a very specific demographic.
confidentiality against the sender Researching the pres-
ence of tracking in emails requires having access to a large corpus
of messages, which can be obtained from different sources. Previous Scanning emails for
tracking requires
access to a large
corpus of messages,
which can be difficult
to collect.
studies used data collected from personal email accounts [113], dispos-
able email services [50], or from commercial newsletters to which they
signed up using an automated crawler [37]. This diversity of method-
ologies also highlights a major challenge of the field: unlike websites,
email newsletters cannot be easily crawled, and their collection cannot
be arbitrarily sped up through parallelization, as they depend on the
frequency with which a publisher is sending their newsletters. Thus,
large-scale studies ideally require large, diverse datasets that have
been collected over long timeframes — a goal that may be easier to
achieve through crowdsourcing using a public tool.
2.2.2 Public Transparency Platforms






being useful to its
users.
platforms rely on the interest of end-users to guide their scanning.
Aside from their uses in large-scale ecosystem analysis through the
aggregation of scan results, these platforms also provide a useful
service to their users, which may be system operators or interested end
users investigating the security or privacy of their favorite websites.
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2.2.2.1 The Web Ecosystem
Many scanning platforms for websites exist. Instead of giving anWe list a small
sample of tools for
the web.
exhaustive overview, which would be out of scope for this dissertation,
we briefly highlight a few different systems from the areas of security
and privacy as illustrative examples.
security A large number of different scanners offer different types
of security audits for websites. They range from specialized scannersSecurity scanners
are a common service




for specific issues or systems (TLS security12, HTTP security headers13,
etc.) to meta-scanners that consider several issues at once, like the
Mozilla Observatory14 or Immuniweb15 scanners. While some of these
scanners are run as non-profit services, many are operated by for-profit
companies that use them to advertise their own products or services.
This also means that most of the scanners target system operators
instead of end users as their audience, and thus lack explanations of
the results that would be understandable to a non-technical audience.
This increases their usefulness to system operators, but significantly
reduces it for end users.






usually operated by non-profits (as is the case for the Webbkoll16
platform [4]) or journalists (in the case of Blacklight17, which is run by
The Markup). More popular than these services are browser addons
like PrivacyBadger18, Ghostery19, Disconnect20, TrackingObserver21
[92, Sect. 2.6] and Lightbeam22 that can detect third-party tracking and
block and/or visualize it for the users. Finally, some companies offer
automated scans that check for compliance with the GDPR. However,
these are usually paid services that are geared towards commercial
customers and not end users.
2.2.2.2 The Email Ecosystem
In the email ecosystem, only comparatively few tools exist, which areThe email ecosystem
is less well supported
with tools.
almost exclusively geared towards system administrators. Most are
12 See https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest, last accessed 2021-01-26.
13 See https://securityheaders.com, last accessed 2021-01-26.
14 See https://observatory.mozilla.org, last accessed 2021-01-26.
15 See https://www.immuniweb.com/websec, last accessed 2021-01-26.
16 See https://webbkoll.dataskydd.net, last accessed 2021-01-26.
17 See https://themarkup.org/blacklight, last accessed 2021-01-26.
18 See https://privacybadger.org, last accessed 2021-01-26.
19 See https://www.ghostery.com, last accessed 2021-01-26.
20 See https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/disconnect/, last ac-
cessed 2021-01-26.
21 See https://trackingobserver.cs.washington.edu/, last accessed 2021-01-26.
22 See https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/lightbeam-3-0/, last ac-
cessed 2021-01-26.
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focused on protecting mail traffic against the network providers, and
almost none focus on the mail provider or sender.
confidentiality against network providers The scanners Scanners for
transport encryption





from SSL-Tools.net23 or Immuniweb24 can perform automated scans
of arbitrary mail servers. However, they are geared towards system ad-
ministrators and do not offer explanations for end users. Additionally,
they rely on establishing many connections to the mail server to test
different TLS configurations, which can lead to mail servers slowing
down or even blocking their connections (tarpitting25).
One exception is the My Email Communications Security Assess-
ment (MECSA) platform26, operated by the Joint Research Center




provide a basic interpretations of its results that is understandable to
end users without a technical background. At the same time, it has
also been used to collect crowd-sourced research data [55]. Finally,
two extensions for the email client Thunderbird seek to visualize the
transport encryption status27 and the jurisdictions an email crossed in
its path to the recipients28, respectively.
confidentiality against mail providers As email encryp-




PGP and S/MIME), no tools exist that can reliably determine if a
specific recipient is using it. The closest to such a tool are keyservers29
where keys can be published, or standards like AutoCrypt30 that
embed information about the availability of encryption keys in emails.







edge, only two tools exist that can detect email tracking and warn
users about it: UglyEmail31 and PixelBlock32. Both are built as browser
add-ons, and only work for the Google Mail webmail system. This
leaves significant portions of email users (i.e., everyone who is not
using GMail or prefers to use a dedicated email client instead of
webmail) with no tools to detect and block tracking in emails.
23 See https://ssl-tools.net/mailservers, last accessed 2021-02-01.
24 See https://www.immuniweb.com/ssl/, last accessed 2021-02-01.
25 See https://www.techopedia.com/definition/1722/tarpitting, last accessed 2021-
02-01.
26 See https://mecsa.jrc.ec.europa.eu/, last accessed 2021-02-01.
27 See https://addons.thunderbird.net/en-US/thunderbird/addon/paranoia/, last
accessed 2021-02-01.
28 See https://tracemail.eu, last accessed 2021-02-01.
29 See http://pool.sks-keyservers.net/, last accessed 2021-02-01.
30 See https://autocrypt.org, last accessed 2021-02-01.
31 See https://uglyemail.com, last accessed 2021-02-01.
32 See https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/pixelblock/
jmpmfcjnflbcoidlgapblgpgbilinlem?hl=en, last accessed 2021-02-01.
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2.2.3 Comparison
After discussing the different paradigms for ecosystem analysis, weWe compare the two
described scanning
paradigms.
now discuss their relative advantages and drawbacks to highlight at
which tasks they excel and for which the alternative would be better
suited.
2.2.3.1 Large-Scale Automated Scans
Large-scale scans have three core advantages compared to user-facing
scanning platforms: They are fast, with their runtime (aided by almostLarge-scale scanning
is fast, cheap, and
does not rely on
having a large user
base.
unlimited potential for parallelization) measured in hours or days
instead of months or years. They are cheap(er) to develop and operate,
as they can focus on making their scans efficient and do not have to
consider other issues like building a user interface. Finally, they do
not require a large user base to generate their datasets.
These advantages come at a cost. First, large-scale scans can only in-
vestigate systems that are publicly accessible and encounter challenges
when applied to areas like email, where the content is not public.









provided by their operators, they often consider a limited class of
systems: those that are popular enough to show up in internet toplists
like the Alexa Top Million. These lists have some structural issues [64,
94] and it is unclear if results obtained on them are representative for
the long tail of less popular websites and systems.33 Third, a single scan
only gives a snapshot view of the question, with no information about
how the results change over time. Fourth, Vekaria et al. have shown
that the home page of a website may contain different trackers than
sub-pages of the same website [109], which can lead to incomplete
information being collected when scanning only the home page of
a website. Finally, while a large-scale scan can generate a large list
of systems that have (sometimes critical) issues, they do not offer an
integrated way to inform the operators of these systems, leading to
complex and costly large-scale notification campaigns (cf. Section 2.3).
2.2.3.2 Public Transparency Platforms
Public transparency / scanning platforms can solve many of thesePublic tools can rely
on users to perform
manual actions, may
collect a more diverse




issues. As the targets of their scans are specified by users, more manual
work can be performed (like asking users to send an email in the case
of the MECSA platform [55]), which can increase the quality of the data
(or make the collection possible in the first place). This crowdsourcing
can also lead to a more diverse dataset that also contains samples of
the long tail of less-popular websites. If the platform is used by the
33 In fact, a previous study by Englehardt and Narayanan showed that even within the
top-million sites, the results differ significantly depending on the popularity of the
website [38].
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operator of a system, it can also directly offer instructions on how
an issue can be remediated, thereby removing the need for complex
notification campaigns later down the line.
From a research perspective, operating a platform also offers possi- They also have
research applications.bilities for further research, including user studies about how specific
issues are perceived or how scan results can be best communicated.
The technical basis and infrastructure of the platform can also often
be repurposed for large-scale scans if more data should be collected
on a specific issue.
However, in return for these advantages, scanning platforms suffer
from a number of drawbacks. As they rely on input from their users, However, they rely
on having an active
user base and may
have different biases
in the data.
the data collection is frequently much slower, and they run the risk
that the platform never reaches a critical mass of users that would
suffice for data collection. The crowdsourcing approach also leads
to a dataset that, while it does not suffer from the biases of internet
toplists, likely contains other and harder to quantify biases based on
who is using the platform. This may include a bias towards specific
types of websites, or geographic biases in the user population.
The data collected by such a platform also poses some challenges in
the evaluation. If the platform is developed over time, older results They also encounter
technical challenges
in the evaulation and
operation.
may use a different methodology than more recent ones, making it
impossible to compare them directly. It also means that the results
are collected over a longer stretch of time, which means that results
for some systems may no longer be accurate. These factors have to be
considered during the evaluation, further increasing its complexity.
Finally, building and maintaining a platform is more costly than a
one-off large-scale scan: in addition to the scanning infrastructure, the
platform requires a front-end for users and needs to be maintained
for longer timeframes, increasing maintenance and hosting costs. The
system also needs to be more resilient to incorrect (or malicious) use.
All these factors combine to make operating a public platform less
appealing to researchers.
2.3 effective large-scale notifications




to be notified so that they can remediate it. While this is easily done
for a small number of systems, it quickly becomes a complex endeavor
if the list of vulnerable systems grows.
The question of how system operators can be effectively and effi-
ciently notified about issues has been studied in several notification





diverse as the security of websites [14, 18, 34, 69, 98, 99, 108, 117] or
DNS servers [17], the remediation of DDoS amplifiers [16, 60, 68], and
even end-user malware infections [15]. They varied factors such as the







































































































Vasek et al. [108] 2012    
Canali et al. [14] 2013  
Kührer et al. [60] 2014  
Durumeric et al. [34] 2014   
Çetin et al. [18] 2016     
Li et al. [68] 2016       
Li et al. [69] 2016       
Stock et al. [99] 2016      
He et al. [47] 2016 G#  
Çetin et al. [17] 2017      
Stock et al. [98] 2018       
Çetin et al. [15] 2018   
Zeng et al. [117] 2019       
Çetin et al. [16] 2019   
Zhuang et al. [118] 2020 G#  
Tang et al. [105] 2020 G#  
Table 1: Overview of notification aspects discussed by prior work. G#: not explicitly stated but inferred from the paper.
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the notification itself. They also evaluated the effectiveness of send-
ing reminder messages and providing tools for operators to validate
their remediation. Many studies also sought input from the contacted
system operators through surveys [17, 34, 68, 98, 117], with varying
degrees of success. In the following, we summarize the current state
of research. We also give an overview of relevant papers in Table 1.
2.3.1 Contact Channel
Choosing which contact channel to use is one of the most conse-




notification medium, the contacted party, and the method for finding
their contact information. The approaches used in prior studies can
be roughly divided into two categories: direct contacts with the af-
fected party and the use of intermediaries. We now consider these two
categories in turn.
2.3.1.1 Direct Contact Channels
Direct contact is the most straightforward way to notify a system
operator about an issue. The main challenge lies in identifying the






automatically determine this address: domain- or IP-WHOIS data
[17, 18, 34, 68, 69, 98, 99, 108, 117], which has to be provided by
system operators when registering a domain or receiving an IP range
assignment, and addresses generated based on RFC 2142 [14, 17, 98,
99], a standard for purpose-specific email aliases [24]. One study also
tested the use of manually-collected address information [98].
whois While a WHOIS record is available for every domain and IP
address, the data is frequently incorrect or resolves to unmonitored
email addresses. This can be either an unintentional misconfiguration,







suffer from bounces34 (in some cases for more than 50 % of sent emails
[17, 18, 99]) and low email open rates. Additionally, after the GDPR
came into effect, contact information was removed from the public
WHOIS data for many TLDs and is only released upon request for
civil claims or criminal proceedings35, making its use as a contact
channel for security notifications impossible.
34 The term bounce is commonly used to describe a message being rejected by the
receiving mail server, which will usually respond with a message containing the
reason for the bounce (e.g., the email address does not exist, the mailbox is full, etc.).
35 See https://www.denic.de/en/whats-new/press-releases/article/extensive-
innovations-planned-for-denic-whois-domain-query-proactive-approach-for-
data-economy-and/, last accessed 2020-11-09.
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standard aliases Given these problems with WHOIS data, re-
searchers have evaluated the use of standard aliases as an alternative.





should be used for. This includes aliases such as security@domain.tld,
abuse@domain.tld or webmaster@domain.tld, but also the general-
purpose alias info@domain.tld. If a website operator observes this
RFC, they should have created these aliases and routed them to the
correct person inside their organization. In practice, studies have re-
ported that the bounce rates are still significant, even if multiple aliases
are notified [98, 99].





et al. performed automated scans and found that, depending on
the sample, only between 4 and 22.6 % of websites appeared to
offer at least one relevant alias, and the most common alias was
abuse@domain.tld [96].36 Thus, notifications will reach only a minor-
ity of websites when using this approach, and even fewer are likely to
take action.
manual address collection The unsatisfactory performance
of many automated notification schemes raises the question if the
problem lies with the used communication channel, or if it is a deeper






but was based on a
small sample.
al. performed a small-scale (N = 364) notification campaign using
manually-collected address information and a set of different commu-
nication channels [98]. In addition to emails, they used social media,
phone calls, contact forms, and letters. They found that manual con-
tact channels led to a slightly increased remediation rate compared
to automated emails, but that the increase did not justify the signifi-
cantly increased work and financial costs. We note that their results
should not be directly compared with other studies, as participants
were selected based on the fact that they did not react to a prior au-
tomated notification. Thus, in addition to the small sample size, it
may suffer from self-selection and priming effects. Nevertheless, the
results indicate that recipients who did not respond to an automated
message may still be reached through manual channels as a fallback
mechanism.
2.3.1.2 Indirect Contact Channels
Given the issues with direct contact attempts, researchers began to
consider other options. They settled on four strategies that relied on
intermediaries (i.e., third parties that may have better options to reach
36 These numbers were obtained without sending emails and thus do not consider if
the email would actually have been read. The numbers cited above do not include
mailservers that are configured to accept emails for arbitrary addresses. If these are
added, the availability increases to between 11.6 and 41.6 %, which can serve as an
upper bound.
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the system operator): utilizing existing website monitoring services





network providers [17, 18, 99, 108], or cooperating with Computer
Security Incidence Response Teams (CSIRTs)38 [60, 68, 99]. One study
also used more drastic measures, displaying browser warnings when
users attempted to visit an infected website [69].
Additionally, the affected systems may be operated by end users.







internal devices of the network to the internet, which can be infected
with malware or exploited for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
amplification attacks. In these cases, the Internet Service Provider
(ISP) of the end user may be the only party that can establish contact.
Some ISPs have established processes to notify their customers of such
misconfigurations, which have been used in two studies [15, 16].






signed up for them.
ister for external monitoring services to be informed of problems with
their websites. These services have the downside that not everyone is
registered for them, but they offer a verified communication channel
to the system operators that use them. Additionally, by signing up for
such a service, system operators signify a desire to be informed about
issues.
Two studies leveraged one such service, the Google Search Console,
for their notifications about compromised [69] or misconfigured [117]







combined with Google search result annotations or browser warnings,
led to improvements in remediation rates compared to unmessaged
websites [69]. However, they do not explicitly compare Search Console
messages with WHOIS messages. Zeng et al. report that their Search
Console messages resulted in a small (statistically insignificant) im-
provement in remediation rates compared to the WHOIS messages
[117].39 Thus, somewhat surprisingly, there is no evidence that having
a pre-existing contact channel improves remediation rates.








ate the physical hardware that their systems are running on. Instead,
they rent servers or specialized services from providers, which can
host anything from DNS records to entire websites. These service
providers usually offer a mechanism for handling complaints from
37 See https://search.google.com/search-console/about, last accessed 2021-01-20.
38 I use the term CSIRT instead of the older and more commonly known term “Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT)”, as the latter is trademarked by the Carnegie
Mellon University. The referenced papers use the older term.
39 To avoid biasing their results, they base their comparison on recipients of WHOIS
messages that are also signed up for the Google Search Console. It is thus possible
that the difference compared to the full WHOIS group would have been significant,
however, this statistic is not reported in the paper.
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third parties, which they either act on themselves or forward to their
customers.
Several studies contacted providers to inform about malware infec-
tions [18, 108], insecure websites [99] or misconfigured DNS servers
[17]. One of these studies notified about issues that had to be reme-
diated directly by the provider [17], thus making the provider the






they found that contacting the provider directly was more effective
than contacting their customers or upstream network provider. Two
others did not explicitly compare the effectiveness of notifying the
provider compared to direct notifications to the customers [18, 108],
making it impossible to make statements about the relative effective-
ness of the channel. Stock et al. found that providers frequently did
not forward the notification to their customers, which rendered such
notification prone to failure [99]. Thus, contacting providers does not
appear to be a good solution for many situations.
csirts CSIRTs coordinate the response to computer security inci-
dents. They exist on many levels, from companies to national and
international coordinating associations like the Forum of Incident
Response and Security Teams (FIRST). Many accept reports aboutCSIRTs coordinate
vulnerability
disclosure and thus
appear to be good
intermediaries for
notifications.
vulnerabilities and coordinate the mitigation and disclosure process
with reporter and vendor. Three prior studies worked with these
institutions, addressing issues such as DDoS amplification [60, 68],
misconfigured firewalls [68], or vulnerable web applications [99].
Kührer et al. used a large outreach campaign that spanned several
CSIRTs to raise awareness for misconfigured servers that could be used
for DDoS amplification, reducing the population of vulnerable servers
by over 90 % for some misconfiguration classes [60]. However, they
did not attempt to contact system operators directly, so no comparison








than attempting to reach system operators via CSIRTs, as some of
the latter did not forward the vulnerability reports to the system
operators, stopping the notification process in its tracks [68]. The same
problem was observed by Stock et al., who found that while CSIRTs
did lead to improved outcomes compared to direct channels, this was
mostly due to a single, highly-successful organization [99]. Without
this organization, the remediation rates would have been similar to
those of the direct contact channels.






is unsuccessful, it may be possible to reach them by displaying browser
warnings when accessing or searching for their website. Even if this
notification does not immediately reach the operator, they may be
informed by their users, or notice a sudden drop in website traffic and
investigate the source.
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Li et al. evaluated this approach in a collaboration with Google (in
the same study that also used the Google Search Console), and found
that browser warnings were more effective than simply annotating the




improved if the website operators were also explicitly contacted via the
Search Console. This indicates that more invasive methods are better
in “getting the attention” of recipients and lead to a quick remediation
to avoid further disruptions of their website.
quarantine networks When consumers are operating a mis-
configured, vulnerable or compromised device, finding a way to notify
them is challenging. Here, the ISPs can play an important role, as they End users may be
reachable through
their ISPs, which
can deny them access
to the internet until
they remediate an
issue.
have contact information for their customers, and can also access and
modify their internet traffic. Two studies worked with an ISP to evalu-
ate the effectiveness of their notification scheme that relied on both
direct email contact with the affected customers, and on placing them
in a quarantine network, which denied the customers access to large
parts of the internet unless they remediated the issue (or manually
released themselves from quarantine) [15, 16].
Both studies found quarantine networks to be a potent tool in




but led to customer
complaints.
networks to be effective, leading to remediation rates of 69 % for first-
time quarantine events [15]. They later conducted a second study
in which they compared quarantines with simple email notifications
(without quarantine) and found the latter to have a worse performance
(75 % remediation rate, compared to 87 % for quarantined users and
53 % for the control group) [16]. This indicates that, like in the case
of browser warnings, more disruptive notification methods are also
more effective in driving remediation. However, they also lead to more
complaints: in both studies, about 10 % of quarantined users called
their ISP to complain, and 3 % threatened to cancel their contract.
Thus, these disruptive measures also come at a higher cost for the
sender.
2.3.2 Senders
Intuitively, another factor that may influence the trust afforded to
a notification message may be the sender of that message, where
name recognition may lead to a higher initial trust. This idea was The sender of the
message may have
an impact due to
name recognition.
evaluated by three prior studies. Çetin et al. sent notifications using
three different senders: a private security researcher, a university
group, and StopBadware, a well-known anti-malware organization
[18]. In their previously discussed study, Zeng et al. sent part of
their messages via the Google Search Console (with Google branding),
while the rest of the messages were sent by an email account associated
with UC Berkeley [117]. Stock et al. took a different approach and
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compared messages that appeared to come from a human with those
that claimed to come from an automated system [98].
Surprisingly, all three studies reported the influence of the messageHowever, three
separate studies
found that the sender
did not have an
impact in practice.
sender on remediation as small and, where this was reported, statisti-
cally insignificant — a counter-intuitive result that warrants further
investigation, as no convincing explanation has been found.
2.3.3 Format
Aside from the message sender and medium, researchers can of course





have investigated four factors: the verbosity of the message, appear-
ance, the use of different framings of the problem, and translations of
the message into the native language of the recipients.
verbosity Three studies investigated if more detailed messages
improve remediation success. All three studies found that messagesMessages with more
details perform better
than short messages.
with more detailed led to higher remediation rates than shorter mes-
sages [18, 68, 108], even if the shorter messages contained a link to
a website with further information [68]. Vasek et al. actually found
that their shortest messages were statistically indistinguishable from
not notifying at all [108]. This indicates that notification messages
should contain enough actionable information that the recipients can
understand and validate the problem without consulting external
resources.
appearance Only one study varied the visual design of the no-
tification message for the same sender: Stock et al. compared HTMLThe visual design of
the message did not
make a difference in
one study.
emails (with a well-designed message following the corporate design
of their university) with plaintext messages and found no significant
differences in remediation [98]. They also found HTML messages to
suffer from lower deliverability, with the reading rate dropping by 2-3
percentage points (from ∼12 to ∼9 %) compared to plaintext messages,
which may be explainable by spam filters.
translation All previous notification studies used English as
the primary language for the notification. However, many websites
are operated by individuals or companies outside of english-speaking
countries. Thus, three studies translated notifications into the language







of translating messages (all messages were translated) [69]. However,
in their second study they found that translated messages actually
observed reduced remediation rates compared to their English counter-
parts [68]. They attribute this to recipients not expecting to receive a
translated message from a US university and suspecting it of being
phishing or spam. The final study, by Zeng et al., saw no differences in
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remediation rates, positive or negative [117]. As their translated mes-
sages were sent by Google, they suspect that the recipients were less
surprised about receiving a localized version of the message, which
may have prevented a more negative impact.
framing Intuitively, another factor that may influence the notifica-
tion success is the framing of the problem. Zeng et al. investigated two Different framings of
the problem did not
make a difference in
one study.
different framings for their notifications about TLS misconfigurations
[117]: in the technical focus, they described the technical implications
of the misconfiguration (i.e., the browser being unable to verify the
authenticity of the connection), while the user focus instead focused on
the experience of the website users, naming issues like the increased
threat of data tampering or harms to the reputation of the website.
They observed no differences in remediation rate between the two
framings. This may also be due to the fact that both messages con-
tained the information that website visitors may see browser warnings
that impede access to the website — a potent incentive for remediation
that may overshadow the rest of the arguments in the message. We
thus discuss the role of incentives next.
2.3.4 Incentives







diate an issue is to ensure it is in their own best interest to do so. While
a certain amount of intrinsic motivation can be assumed (especially in
cases where operators are notified about security issues), some studies
augmented this with additional incentives.
access restrictions We have already considered two forms
of incentives while discussing the indirect communication channels.
They took the form of either making it harder for customers of a Restricting access to
the website or the
internet at large was
an effective
incentive.
website to actually reach it while it was insecure (e.g., through browser
interstitials or warnings in the Google search results [69]), or, in the
case of end user with infected devices, denying them access to large
parts of the internet until they remediated the issue [15, 16]. In cases
where such an incentive was not universally applied, but compared
against a group without such an incentive, they increased remediation
rates [16, 69].
legal liability A different form of incentive is the risk of legal
liability for inaction. Here, Çetin et al. reported that phishing and Anecdotal evidence
suggests that legal
liability may serve as
an incentive.
malware distribution sites were often remediated more quickly if they
targeted banking credentials than in other cases [18], leading them to
propose that the risk of punitive legal action may be a powerful moti-
vator as well. The role of legal requirements in driving remediation
has otherwise remained unexplored, although Diop et al. have done
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some preliminary work to investigate potentially relevant laws and
regulations [29].
status competition Finally, we briefly highlight four studies
that were not primarily designed as notification experiments, but pro-
vide an interesting view on possible incentives. The studies relied onStatus competition
proved effective in
four prior studies.
competition between companies [47, 104, 105, 118] to incentivize reme-
diation, creating rankings where companies were compared based on
the outgoing volume of automated spam messages. They investigated
this approach in different countries and industry sectors, and three of
them explicitly notified the companies about the ranking [47, 105, 118].
The studies found that rankings (as a form of reputational sanctions)
were effective at reducing the volume of outgoing spam compared to
an unranked control group, indicating that they may be a potential
mechanism in other areas as well.
2.3.5 Reminders
If a recipient does not react to a notification, it does not necessarily
mean that they are not going to remediate. They may simply have
missed (or dismissed) the first message, and may be receptive to a re-





reminder messages to system operators that had not remediated a few
weeks after the initial notification, and found conflicting results: while
Stock et al. reported a small effect from sending a reminder [99], Li et
al. observed no significant increase in remediation from the reminder
message [68]. The question of the effectiveness of reminders has thus
not been settled yet.
2.3.6 Tool Support
Since many of the issues the notifications are concerned with can be
detected automatically, it is also possible to provide the recipients
with an automated tool that they can use to see if their remediation
attempt was successful. This is especially important as previous re-It may be possible to
improve remediation
by providing
operators with a tool
to verify their
remediation.
search has shown that recipients sometimes attempt remediation, but
fail to adequately address the issue and remain affected, sometimes
unknowingly [17, 34, 68]. Thus, providing a tool for validation may
increase overall remediation rates.
Previous studies also proposed that such tools may prove helpfulOnly one study
evaluated this
hypothesis and found
that a tool did not
increase remediation
rates.
[68] or reported recipients requesting tool support [117], but only two
studies actually provided a tool that allowed notification recipients to
verify if their remediation attempts were successful [17, 69]. Of the two,
only Çetin et al. actually evaluated the effect of the tool on remediation
by providing it to some recipients while withholding it from others,
as part of a notification study involving misconfigured DNS servers.
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They found that while many recipients expressed a desire for a tool
when asked, and found it helpful when it was offered, providing or
withholding the tool did not have a significant impact on remediation
rates [17].
Of course, a tool may also have a positive impact outside of the
direct remediation rates: similar to the effect of sending more detailed
notification messages [68], it may decrease the amount of support




hand, it may also reduce trust as it requires providing a link to an
external website in the notification, which has been reported as a trust-
inhibiting factor [98]. It may even be legally problematic if it allows
scanning arbitrary websites for security issues, necessitating access
control and introducing further complications in the study design.
Researchers should consider whether providing a tool is worthwhile
on a case-by-case basis.
2.3.7 Surveys
Several prior studies included surveys of the recipients [17, 34, 68,
98, 117], asking after their views about the notifications. Many of Previous studies
surveyed recipients





these surveys suffered from low response rates, with many reaching
less than 100 respondents [17, 34, 68, 117]. In addition, the surveys
may suffer from self-selection effects, as respondents will, on average,
likely have a higher trust towards the notification messages (those
that distrust the notification are less to answer surveys). Nevertheless,
the responses can provide valuable insight on topics such as prob-
lem awareness, the acceptability of unsolicited notifications, and the
perceived trustworthiness of the notifications.
problem awareness Surprisingly, many system operators were
aware of the notified issue. Durumeric et al., notifying about the Many respondents
had already been
aware of the issue
they were notified
about.
Heartbleed issue, reported that all 17 respondents had heard about
the vulnerability, and the remaining vulnerable systems were either
not managed by the respondent, or had been missed in their own
scans [34]. Çetin et al. similarly reported that 40 % of their 25 re-
spondents had taken action before receiving the notification, but been
unsuccessful [17]. 88 % of respondents reported intending to remediate
in response to the notification.
Li et al. reported that 46 % of their 57 respondents had been aware
of the notified issue (firewall misconfigurations, DDoS amplification,
and exposed industrial control systems) before receiving the notifica-




numbers may also be explained by the fact that some system operators
disagreed with the assessments of the researchers that the detected
issue was actually a misconfiguration, and characterized them as in-
tentional. This likely contributed to the fact that only 63 % of them
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reported intending to take action in response to the notification. Such
disagreements with the researchers’ assessments were also found by
Zeng et al., who found system operators citing compatibility con-
cerns as reasons not to deactivate outdated and insecure TLS cipher
suites [117]. These counterintuitive results indicate that awareness of a
problem is not the only barrier to remediation.
acceptability System operators generally found unsolicited no-
tifications acceptable [17, 34, 68, 98], with approval rates exceeding
90 % in some cases [34, 98]. Çetin reported a low number of hostileNotifications were
generally deemed
desireable.
responses, including one threat of legal action and a “rather unimagi-
native insult” [17, p. 11]. However, in all reported cases, positive and
thankful responses outnumbered negative and hostile ones.
trustworthiness The main challenge inhibiting notification
trustworthiness seems to be the high prevalence of spam and scam





the use of external links and unexpected and unknown message
senders as trust-reducing factors [98]. Interestingly, messages that
were sent by a US university but translated to the local language of the
recipients were perceived as less trustworthy than the untranslated
messages [68]. In their study comparing WHOIS messages with those
sent via the Google Search Console, Zeng et al. found that messages
sent via the Search Console were rated as more trustworthy [117], with
respondents noting that they remembered opting in to these messages,
making them less unexpected than the unsolicited WHOIS messages
sent to other recipients. However, as discussed in Section 2.3.2, this did
not translate into large increases in remediation rate. Overall, more
research is needed to understand which factors influence the perceived
trustworthiness of notification messages.
2.4 organizational decision-making
Notification studies seek to determine how messages must be designed





even if a message is trusted, the recipient may still choose not to act
upon it, as they may not consider the issue worth addressing based on
their own calculus of costs and benefits. Additionally, many systems
are operated not by private individuals, but by organizations. To
understand what factors may influence an organizations’ willingness
to make changes to promote privacy and security, we need to consider
how organizations make such decisions. Understanding these views
and priorities can help us to design notifications that take them into
account, thereby increasing the likelihood that an issue is addressed.
We will thus give a brief overview of existing works on security and
privacy from the perspective of organizations.
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2.4.1 Economics of Security and Privacy






company holds about security or privacy may differ depending on
many factors, including their industry sector, competition, marketing
or financial goals. Due to this range of possibilities, we consider
security and privacy separately.
2.4.1.1 Security
Companies can invest in security in several different ways. For the Organizational
behavior differs
depending on who is
bearing the cost of
(in)action.
purpose of this dissertation, we limit ourselves to two: Securing their
own systems against attacks, and ensuring that their systems cannot
be used to attack others. Each of these options has a different economic
calculus attached to it.
protecting themselves Intuitively, investing money in protect- Organizations
consider the cost of
remediation
compared to the




ing yourself against loss is a rational action. However, in an economic
consideration, the necessary investment needs to be proportional to the
potential risk, both in terms of the probability of the event occurring,
and in terms of the damage the event would cause. For this purpose,
they use models to trade off the costs and benefits of investing in
security [10, 12].
The main challenge faced by companies is that the risk (and thus the Quantifying that
likelihood and cost is






potential return on investment to prevent it) can be difficult to quantify.
Some metrics have been proposed to measure this information [10],
but calculating them frequently requires access to proprietary data
about the frequency of specific attacks or other risks [51]. This calcu-
lus implies that notifications may be more effective if they explicitly
quantify the potential risks of the issue they are notifying about to aid
the recipient in making a correct cost-benefit-analysis.
protecting others While it is hard to convince companies to
invest money to protect themselves, it is even harder to convince them
to invest it to protect others. An example of such a case is when the
networks of companies are abused to send spam or phishing messages
to others. The sending company has very low costs associated with Insecure systems
that harm others
(but not the operator)
are a negative
externality.
sending the messages, while the recipients face significantly higher
costs (some authors estimate that every dollar earned by spammers
costs 100 dollars in lost productivity on the recipient side [89]). Send-
ing spam is thus a negative externality [89], like carbon emissions,
where the emitting party does not bear the full cost of the action, but
transfers it to other companies, or society at large.
This leads to a situation that is commonly referred to as the tragedy
of the commons, where a public good (like email, or our planet) is made
unusable because no one has an incentive to invest in prevention if no
one else does the same. Research into this area, under the umbrella
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multi-round game, collaboration can be established using a reputation
mechanism, where parties that have not collaborated in the past can
be sanctioned while collaboration is rewarded [81]. It has also been
shown that participants are willing to face losses themselves to punish
non-collaboration (altruistic punishment) [40].
In the context of network providers, these sanctions could take
the form of de-peering networks that refuse to take action against







a (formal or informal) reputation system with (formal or informal)
sanctions may not be practical in all situations, especially if no direct
business relationships between the relevant companies exist. One of
the most successful examples of such a reputation system is certificate
transparency [63], a public directory of issued TLS certificates which
seeks to catch misbehaving Certification Authoritys (CAs) in the TLS
ecosystem. Beginning as a voluntary system, it has helped to detect
many mis-issued certificates40 and has since become mandatory for
all CAs trusted by the Chrome browser41. Transparency systems were
also used with some success by four academic studies investigating
spam emitted by corporate networks [47, 104, 105, 118].
2.4.1.2 Privacy
When it comes to privacy, the views and needs of companies have
received surprisingly little attention, with only a few articles consid-





the area of privacy: On the one hand, their customers desire privacy
and don’t want to disclose data unless necessary, while on the other
hand, the company needs data to improve their products, generate
revenue, measure customer retention, and stay competitive. At the
same time, companies operate within a legal framework that forces
them to conform to minimum standards or face fines.
For the purpose of this dissertation, we consider the two theoretical
frameworks offered by Greenaway and Chan [44]: the Institutional
Approach (IA) and the Resource-based View (RbV). We also brieflyWe consider a subset




consider the strategies companies use to balance data use and privacy,
as described by Gerlach et al. [43]. For further reading, we refer the
interested reader to a later paper by Greenaway et al. [45] discussing
four different privacy orientations. Additionally, the papers by Gerlach et
al. [43] and Bélanger and Crossler [8] both contain surveys of research
into organizational strategies in the area of privacy.
40 See https://security.googleblog.com/2015/10/sustaining-digital-
certificate-security.html or https://scotthelme.co.uk/extended-validation-
not-so-extended/ for two examples, last accessed 2021-02-15.
41 See https://archive.cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2016-October/
008638.html, last accessed 2021-02-15.
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of companies is seen as a “search for legitimacy”42 [44, p. 176] under
external pressures and social norms. Greenaway and Chan [44] distin-
guish two approaches: the acquiescent approach consists of compliance
with the law and imitation of their peers, but does not seek to exceed
the minimum requirements, while the proactive approach consciously
seeks to exceed minimum requirements and uses clear communica-







themselves and do not deviate too far from industry standards, to
avoid attacking and undermining the basic claim to legitimacy of their
industry.
If we assume companies to operate in this model, acquiescent com-
panies can be best reached by framing the notified privacy issue as





tive company could also be reached by highlighting the potential
for further differentiation by improving its practices (e.g., by using a
more privacy-friendly tracking provider or enabling additional privacy
features).
the resource-based view (rbv) The RbV instead considers
privacy as a resource that is managed by the company to achieve a






an information focus or a customer focus. Under an information focus,
superior data analysis allows the company to be more innovative and
offer a better product through better knowledge of their customers,
at the price of reduced privacy. A customer focus instead seeks to






trust of their users at
the cost of some
information fidelity.
necessarily mean that less data is collected, but that the purposes are
made clearer and the customer is given more control over the process.
As a simplified example, Google and Amazon could be considered to
pursue the information focus, while Apple’s public commitment to
privacy and user control follows the customer focus.
A company operating with an information focus may be persuaded
to change its practices if it is presented with alternatives that allow it





of the users (e.g., by using a self-hosted tracking solution instead of
a commercial tracking and profiling provider like Google Analytics).
Companies with a customer focus may similarly be open to alternative
solutions for their own data collection, and may even accept slightly
reduced fidelity to protect the privacy of its users (like the use of
differential privacy by Apple43).
42 Greenaway and Chan distinguish different types of legitimacy, which have different
meanings. Companies may pursue some, but not other forms of legitimacy. For
details, see [44, p. 177].
43 See https://www.apple.com/privacy/docs/Differential_Privacy_Overview.pdf,
last accessed 2021-02-15.
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balancing strategies The previous theories treat companies
as a monolithic institution following an archetype in order to be able
to make broader claims about corporate strategies. When it comesCompanies can also
use balancing
strategies and decide
on privacy issues on
a case-by-case basis.




to the day-to-day decisions inside a company, a different class of
strategies must be considered. Gerlach et al. [43] conducted interviews
with practitioners and distilled three sets of strategies that are used
to balance privacy concerns and corporate interests: surrogate tactics
(finding alternatives to data collection), segmentation (collecting data
only from some users), and transparency tactics (controlling if and
how information about the data collection is disclosed and presented).
Here, efforts can be made to influence which strategies are chosen
through a variety of methods that highlight the benefits of one solution
over another, be they technical, legal or reputational.
2.4.2 Transparency
Both reputation-based sanctions (in the case of security) and privacy-
based competition require peers and customers to be aware of the
behavior of other companies. Establishing (semi-)public knowledgeReputation systems
and competition both
rely on transparency.
about and comparability of the practices of different companies falls
under the umbrella of transparency. Coming from the economic and
management perspective, Parris et al. define transparency as “the
extent to which a stakeholder perceives an organization provides
learning opportunities about itself” [85, p. 233]. Stated less formally,
it is the degree to which an organization is open to inspection from
outside stakeholders like customers or the general public.
Transparency can take many forms, including voluntary data re-
leases by the organization itself, mandated disclosures, and external
audits, to name a few. It has been discussed and used as a buildingTransparency in its





block in many areas, including Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
[65, 78], human-rights policy [53], and nuclear disarmament / non-
proliferation [115]. In computer science, it can take the form of scans
of websites [2, 38, 39] or penetration tests [21, 58, 101, 106], but also
systems like the previously-discussed certificate transparency [63].
As transparency is perceived as positive by many stakeholders,
there is a risk that organizations will attempt to simulate transparency




tempted to co-opt it.
discuss how the transparency ideal can be subverted before using these
limitations to illustrate the requirements for an effective transparency
regime.
2.4.2.1 Limitations of Transparency





transparency in practice. We highlight some concerns below, and refer
the interested reader to the articles by Ananny and Crawford [3]
(discussing accountability), Stohl et al. [100] (discussing visibility and
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effective use), and Christensen et al. [19] (discussing transparency as a
communicative practice) for a more detailed criticism of the concept
and practice of transparency.






tively disclose information in one area to distract from another. For
example, nutrition labels provide one type of information about a
product, but a good performance on such a label may mask the undis-
closed environmental and social impact of the production chain [19].
Alternatively, organizations may disclose so much information that
the recipient is unable to understand and process all of it, thereby Too much
transparency can be
as effective as too
little in hiding
information.
hiding incriminating information [3]. This is called strategic opacity by
Stohl et al. [100], who also describe the transparency paradox, in which
higher amounts of information lead to less knowledge as it becomes
impossible to comprehend.
transparency as a burden The capabilities of stakeholders,
like customers, to analyze and understand the data is thus an im-





parency also assume that stakeholders are actually interested in the
information, will not misunderstand it, and are willing to change
their behavior in response, none of which is a given [19, 30, 112]. For
example, no amount of transparency about working conditions in
the supply chain will change the behavior of a consumer who is not
interested in them.
Ananny and Crawford also offer a more fundamental critique of this
point: they argue that the ideal of transparency places too much re-
sponsibility on the consumers, thereby reproducing a neoliberal ideal Such criticisms of
transparency can
also be found in the
data protection
discourse.
of personal responsibility as a replacement for government oversight
and intervention [3]. This concern mirrors critiques of the “informed
consent” model of data protection with its unreadable [80] and fre-
quently incorrect [84] privacy policies, which are their own form of
transparency.
transparency without leverage Implicit in the idea of trans- Transparency can
only be effective if
stakeholders have





parency is that, if the stakeholders change their behavior in response to
disclosed information, this will have an effect on the disclosing organi-
zation and serve as a motivation to change their own behavior in turn.
This assumes that it is vulnerable to public shaming [3] or that the
stakeholder has another form of leverage [53]. It also presupposes that
a viable alternative exists, which raises the issue of (quasi)monopolies
like Facebook that can operate on a “take it or leave it” basis [112].
2.4.2.2 Effective Transparency




regime must be designed to be effective. For this, research has iden-
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tified two core concepts: embeddedness and leverage, the latter of
which also leads to the related concept of competition.
embeddedness Embeddedness refers to information users (theThe transparency
process and its
consequences need to




person or entity making use of the disclosed information) and infor-
mation subjects44 embedding the information produced by the trans-
parency process into their decision-making [112]. For example, cus-
tomers may decide to stop purchasing from a company after specific
information about its practices have come to light. This lack of new
purchases is noticed by the company (i.e., the data is embedded in its
decision making process), causing it to change its behavior.
In practice, the work of analyzing the information published by
the discloser may be outsourced to an intermediary (or “infomediary”
[30]), which eases the embedding into the decision process of the user
by disseminating, controlling, verifying and translating the informa-
tion for easier consumption [30]. Such infomediaries may take theThe preparation of
information for
easier consumption
can be outsourced to
dedicated
intermediaries.
form of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or consultancies
that specialize in developing and auditing CSR policies, and selling
their auditing reports to investors that implement ethical screening
procedures for their investments [30]. Alternatively, a state-mandated
transparency system can be designed to make complex information
salient and accessible to the stakeholders, like publicly posted restau-
rant hygiene grading cards that contain a clear overall rating [112].
From a computer science perspective, a successful scanning plat-
form (cf. Section 2.2.3.2) can be seen as a kind of infomediary. WhilePublic scanning
services may be able
to serve as such an
intermediary.
establishing such a platform is comparatively easy, ensuring that it be-
comes popular enough to actually have the effect of an infomediary is
significantly more difficult, although some companies are attempting
to establish themselves in such a role.45
leverage If stakeholders have no plausible way of exerting influ-
ence over the organization in question, no amount of transparency
will force it to change. Thus, transparency must be combined withTransparency must




some form of leverage. Outside of the IT world, this can take the form
of withdrawing financial aid from misbehaving countries [53] or a loss
of investors [30] or customers [112]. It can also be in the form of legal
requirements that impose fines for violation, which may be spurred
by newly revealed misbehavior [112]. In the IT world, leverage can
be obtained from threats of de-peering bad ISPs [7] or distrusting
misbehaving CAs, as discussed in the case of certificate transparency.
44 Weil et al. use the term discloser [112]. We use the term information subject as the data
may also be disclosed by a third party like journalists, in which case the terminology
used by Weil et al. breaks down.
45 See, for example, https://locaterisk.com/, which explicitly sells its services as
a way to audit potential business partners (“Gain insight into the security situa-
tion of your business partners, such as suppliers, service providers, consultants or
distributors.”, quoted from the front page). Last accessed 2021-02-15.
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Establishing leverage may be difficult for a scientific study, as these This can be difficult
to do in a scientific
study.
are usually hesitant to employ what amounts to threats (of driving
off customers, pursuing legal action, or complaining to a supervisory
authority). However, they can attempt to create status competition as
another form of leverage, which we discuss next.
competition Exploiting competition is one of the most basic








CSR performance of different companies [65], or in the previously-
mentioned studies that sought to reduce the amount of spam sent
by corporate networks [47, 104, 105, 118]. In addition to the potential
loss of public goodwill and customers, such competition may also
motivating companies through peer effects / social comparison [41], a
theory that predicts that status competition within a group will lead
lower-ranked group members to try to improve their performance.46
In the area of privacy, competition and consumer protection are
frequently considered together [61, 83], while Kerber sees the lack Existing literature





of competition in online markets as an explanation for the lack of
privacy offerings, which he sees as a market failure [57]. This indicates
that using competition to motivate changes to a privacy issue may
prove difficult, however, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been
attempted so far.
2.5 summary
In this chapter we have considered the basic challenges of the web and
email ecosystems, and how automated analyses can be conducted on
them, discussing the tradeoffs between large-scale scanning and user-
facing transparency tools. We have summarized a series of studies that In this chapter, we
have summarized the
relevant prior
literature in the field
of this dissertation.
sought to identify the determinants of effective large-scale notification
campaigns that seek to inform system operators about issues detected
through such analyses. Finally, we have then sought to understand
how organizations make decisions in the area of security and privacy
from an economic lense, and how their perspectives may be leveraged
to produce desired behavior.




Part ii, we describe the design and implementation of two user-facing
transparency platforms that we developed to serve as a basis for data
collection and experiments. This data will then be used as a basis for
a series of experiments described in Part iii, where we investigate the
factors that influence operators’ willingness to make changes to their
systems in response to outside notifications.
46 We note that studies into peer effects have been criticized for methodological mistakes
that have lead to self-fulfilling predictions. For further reading, see Angrist’s work on
the “perils of peer effects” [5].

Part II
E C O S Y S T E M A N A LY S I S
Promoting change requires knowing the current state of
the ecosystem, and what problems it faces. Our literature
review has shown that public transparency platforms can
fill a gap in the current research data collection practices.
We thus develop two public platforms that seek to take
stock of the current state of privacy and security in two




T H E W E B E C O S Y S T E M — P R I VA C Y S C O R E . O R G
In this chapter, we describe the design and implementation of our
public transparency platform, PrivacyScore.org. The platform is in-
tended as both a public tool for users, operators and regulators and
as a platform for research data collection and experiments. It allows This chapter
describes our
transparency
platform for the web
ecosystem.
anyone to submit a domain, which will be automatically analyzed for
privacy and security issues, with the results published on a website.
We discuss the technology underlying the data collection and public
results, as well as their limitations. Finally, we consider the ethical and
legal questions surrounding a platform like PrivacyScore, and close
with a discussion of the impact of the platform.
3.1 data collection
PrivacyScore collects data in two major areas: privacy and security.
Scans use a combination of existing open source systems and special-
ized tools developed by the PrivacyScore team. They are orchestrated The system collects
data about privacy
and security issues.
by a backend written using the Python-based1 web framework Django2
and a PostgreSQL3 database, and run on a set of virtual machines
currently hosted by the University of Bamberg.
3.1.1 Privacy
Modern websites are highly interactive and often rely on the execution
of JavaScript for core parts of their functionality. Thus, a static analysis It uses a full browser
for analysis to also
evaluate dynamic
content.
of the source code will be insufficient to gain a realistic impression
of the behavior of the website, especially when it comes to the use of
external content like tracking or advertising scripts. We thus need to
use dynamic analysis, i.e., actually execute the code of the website and
observe its behavior in a real browser. This increases the complexity
of the platform, but leads to more realistic results.





platform [38], an automated, headless Firefox browser intended for
research. Due to stability issues, this has since been replaced with Pri-
vacyScanner [87], a similar system based on a Google Chrome browser
controlled via the Chrome DevTools protocol, primarily developed by
Henning Pridöhl, a member of the PrivacyScore team. Both systems
1 See https://www.python.org/, last accessed 2020-11-27.
2 See https://www.djangoproject.com/, last accessed 2020-11-27.
3 See https://www.postgresql.org/., last accessed 2020-11-27
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are based on the same principle: using a real web browser to automat-
ically access a website and log all interactions of the website (network
requests, cookies, etc.). We match the generated network requests and
cookies against common tracking- and advertising blocklists from
the EasyList project4 to determine if any of them belong to known
trackers.
non-compliance The automated browser also allows injecting




this feature to collect information about a privacy / compliance mis-
configuration: the absence of IP anonymization for Google Analytics,
a popular tracking service. At the time PrivacyScore was developed,
activating this feature was mandatory for German websites that use
this service. After the GDPR came into effect, using the feature is still
recommended by the German data protection authorities5.
server location Finally, the geographic location of the web-
and mailserver (if one exists) is of interest, as this has both legal
implications (which jurisdiction regulates third-party access to the
data stored on the machine? Which data protection rules apply?) andIt infers the
geographic location
of servers based on
the IP.
can influence which countries and Internet eXchange Points (IXPs)
can observe traffic sent to and from the server. To determine this
information, we use a GeoIP lookup, which maps IP addresses to
countries. While this process isn’t always perfectly accurate, it will
often generate results of sufficient precision for our purposes.
3.1.2 Security
As discussed earlier, the security of the servers in question is also of
interest to the user, not to mention the system operators. We thus alsoA set of security
checks verifies if best
practices are being
followed.
conduct a series of security-related checks. While these checks do not
allow us to make general statements about the overall security of a
website, they can show how much effort the operators have invested
in following best practices for secure web development.
connection security It is considered best practice to encrypt
the connection from the web server to the user using TLS (HTTPS).
We thus check if this encryption is offered and if the website uses itWebsites should use
TLS / HTTPS by
default.
by default (i.e., forwards visitors from the non-secure version to the
secure version of the website). If both versions exist, we also compare
them to ensure that they show identical content, as some servers may
4 See https://easylist.to/, last accessed 2020-11-27.
5 See https://www.datenschutzkonferenz-online.de/media/dskb/20200526_
beschluss_hinweise_zum_einsatz_von_google_analytics.pdf (page 6), last
accessed 2021-05-17.
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offer an encrypted version of the page, but only serve an error page
on it.
However, even if the connection is encrypted, it may still be insecure.
Over the last few years, a large number of issues were found with




through external scans. We thus use the popular testssl.sh6 software to
determine if the TLS configuration fulfills modern standards and all
security issues are patched or mitigated. As this is natively supported
by testssl.sh, we take this chance to also perform the same checks for
the email server associated with the domain (as determined by its
Mail eXchange (MX) record in the DNS).
website security The website itself can also take measures to
ensure it is more robust against compromise. To begin with, if the A number of HTTP
headers can be used
to improve security
and privacy.
website is offered via an encrypted connection, the website can set the
HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) header7, thereby instructing
the browser to always visit the site using the encrypted version. This
can protect visitors against TLS stripping attacks [74].
Other useful headers include the X-Frame-Options8 header (which
controls if the website can be embedded inside a frame in a differ-
ent website), the X-Content-Type-Options9 header (which disables
MIME sniffing, thereby offering protection against attacks that try to




Protection10 header (which enables certain countermeasures against
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks), and the more comprehensive Con-
tent Security Policy (CSP)11 header (which contains detailed policies
about which resources can be retrieved or executed from external
sources, a powerful defense against many attacks). Finally, the referrer-
policy12 header can be used to limit the amount of information the
browser sends to other servers when clicking links embedded in the
website. We check for the presence and values of all of these headers
in the server responses collected by the automated browser used for
the privacy checks.
6 See https://testssl.sh/, last accessed 2020-12-04.
7 See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Strict-
Transport-Security, last accessed 2021-03-19.
8 See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-Frame-
Options, last accessed 2020-12-04.
9 See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-Content-
Type-Options, last accessed 2020-12-04.
10 See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-XSS-
Protection, last accessed 2020-12-04.
11 See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-
Security-Policy, last accessed 2020-12-04.
12 See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Referrer-
Policy, last accessed 2020-12-04.
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information leaks Finally, a server may unintentionally dis-
close information through misconfigurations or unlisted files, an issue
that is more common than may be expected13 [98]. Such files canServer operators




include source code repositories, database backups, cryptographic key
material, or details about the configuration or access patterns of the
server. We attempt to detect such leaks using a pre-defined list of
common names for unintentionally disclosed files, which we try to
access. If a matching file is found, we verify if it contains potentially
sensitive information using a series of heuristics like common strings
that are included in database backups or cryptographic keys.
3.2 communicating results
After the scanners have collected the information, it needs to be dis-
played to the user. Like the controller for the scanning system, theResults are shown on
a Django-based
website.
web frontend exposed by PrivacyScore is written using Django. A
screenshot of the homepage is given in Figure 1. The Website can
show the results in two forms: for an individual site, and for an entire
list of websites.
individual results An individual result is shown as a report
on the website, with a number of individual checks in four categories.




as a more detailed explanation that can be displayed by clicking on
the result (see Figure 2). The interface also allows the user to see when
the scan was conducted, as well as a small, pixelated14 screenshot of
the website to visually verify that it was retrieved correctly by the
scanning system. The user can also trigger a new scan or download
the scan results in a machine-readable format.
lists In some cases, it may be desireable to compare multiple
websites and see which one performs best in specific areas. For theseWebsites can be
compared using lists. cases, the system offers the option to upload a set of related websites
to create a custom list. All websites in the list will then be scanned
individually, and the results for the entire list will be aggregated in a
dedicated, ranked report.
The ranking is established by taking the worst result for each cat-
egory of check (tracking, web encryption, protection against attacks,
and mail encryption) as the result for the entire category. It then or-The ranking is based
on the worst results
in each of the four
categories of checks.
ders them by the results of the first category, using the second as a
tie-breaker for the first, the third for the second, and the fourth for
13 See https://en.internetwache.org/dont-publicly-expose-git-or-how-we-
downloaded-your-websites-sourcecode-an-analysis-of-alexas-1m-28-07-
2015/, last accessed 2021-04-01.
14 We significantly reduce the resolution the screenshot to ensure that we do not
inadvertently violate the copyright of the website owner by replicating the contents
of the website.
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Figure 1: The PrivacyScore.org homepage showing the options to create a list or trigger a one-off
scan at the top and a few example lists at the bottom.
the third. If all four categories have the same result, multiple sites can
share a place in the ranking (e.g., place 3 and 4 in Figure 3). The order
of the categories can be changed by the user, depending on their own
priorities.
3.3 limitations
Like every automated process involving a complex subject, an auto- Automated scans are
imperfect.mated analysis of websites can suffer from errors. We discuss the most
important error classes here.
third party detection The most significant limitation is related




effect, many websites started adding cookie consent banners. Their
exact implementation varies, but many only start embedding external
content once the consent has been given. Automatically detecting and
confirming consent forms is a complex issue, which has not been
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Figure 2: A detailed result for a website, showing the results for the tracking checks.
addressed in the PrivacyScore implementation so far. Thus, the system
may suffer from false negatives, i.e., it may miss some third parties on
some websites.
single-page scans PrivacyScore currently only scans the page
provided by the user. Vekaria et al. have shown that different parts
of the same website may have different trackers enabled [109]. Thus,Tracking may differ
between different
parts of the website.
the measured privacy-friendliness of a website may depend on which
exact page is added to a ranking. This could be addressed by choosing
a small number of internal links from the initial page and crawling
them as well. However, this would raise additional questions (e.g.,
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Figure 3: An example for a list of websites on PrivacyScore.
how to display the results if the pages do differ). Thus, such a solution
has not been implemented in PrivacyScore.
idss and firewalls Some of the scanning techniques used by
PrivacyScore may trigger automated defensive systems like Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs). For example, email servers frequently use PrivacyScore may




so-called tarpitting15 to slow down spammers by reducing the speed
of each subsequent connection within a short timeframe from the
same IP. As a TLS scan establishes many connections, such scans
frequently encounter errors or timeouts when facing such defensive
mechanisms. Similarly, our checks for information leaks can also
trigger IDS systems and lead to automated or manual abuse messages
if they are interpreted as attacks. This also raises the question of the
ethics and legality of our scans, which we discuss now.
15 See https://www.techopedia.com/definition/1722/tarpitting, last accessed 2021-
02-01.
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3.4 ethical and legal issues
Intuitively, unsolicited scans may be considered questionable from




openly on the internet. We thus briefly discuss these two issues here.
ethics of scanning We aim to assist users and website operators,
but not criminals, with our scans. One may consider PrivacyScore to
be a dual-use tool, as it can surface security-critical information that
can be abused by attackers. Given that many other public tools offerPrivacyScore is a
dual-use tool. TLS scans, we consider any information derived from such scans by
PrivacyScore to be unproblematic, as it can be easily obtained from
other sources as well. For information leaks, the situation is less clear.
We believe the scans to be acceptable, as scanning for these issues
is very simple, i.e., it could be done easily by the attacker without
resorting to PrivacyScore.
Scans also generate traffic and CPU load on the servers of the






a website with the express purpose of making it available for public
consumption, we believe that the resources consumed by PrivacyScore,
which do not significantly exceed that of a regular page visit, are
acceptable. We carefully designed PrivacyScore to avoid overloading
servers by imposing a rate limit on scans — each website can only
be scanned every 30 minutes. This prevents PrivacyScore from being
used for DDoS attacks.
legality of scanning Some site operators may also question
the legality of operating PrivacyScore. Potential concerns includeIt raises several legal
questions, which we
address in a separate
publication.
(intellectual) property rights, data protection, cybercrime legislation
and competition law. As PrivacyScore is operated in Germany, German
and EU law primarily applies. This makes it a difficult topic to discuss
in an English-language dissertation. We thus refer readers to our
German-language publication on this topic [71], in which we consider
several potential legal issues. We briefly summarize the findings of
that paper here.
To determine the legality of scans, we consider the questions of
data ownership, website terms of service, copyright, data protection,
competition, and “hacking” laws, finding that none of them apply to




the legal implications of publishing the scan results, where we find
that the individual technical scan results are falsifiable statements
of fact and can thus be published. Finally, we discuss if the website
operators can demand that published (factually correct) results should
be deleted, where we find that in most cases, the public interest in
the results will outweigh the interests of the site operator, unless
significant concerns stand against them (which can only be decided
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on a case-by-case basis). We thus believe the operation of PrivacyScore
to be compliant with all relevant legislation.
3.5 impact
PrivacyScore has been operating in an open beta model since June 2017. PrivacyScore has
attracted significant
traffic.
As of May 2021, it regularly observes between 250 and 500 visitors per
day, and has performed over 2.9 million scans. It has also served as




detection and remediation of a security issue in a web shop system
used by hundreds of pharmacies17. The technology was also used as
the basis for the three studies described in Chapter 5, 6 and 7.
3.6 summary
In this chapter, we described the development and operation of the





forms automated analyses of websites for privacy, security and com-
pliance issues, and seeks to provide a useful service to end users,
system operators, regulators and researchers, and serves as a technical
basis for several studies, which are described in later chapters of this
dissertation. However, before discussing these other studies, we first
describe another transparency platform that we developed as part of
this dissertation.
16 For example at the German OWASP Day 2017, the Vienna Privacy Week 2017 (both
given by other members of the PrivacyScore team), and the MRMCD 2017 (given




original article on Tagesschau.de has since been deleted, an archived ver-





T H E E M A I L E C O S Y S T E M — P R I VA C Y M A I L . I N F O
The area of web security and privacy has (rightly) received a lot of
attention in the past years. However, this focus on the web and, to a The email ecosystem
has not received a lot
of attention in
privacy research.
lesser extent, mobile applications, has led to another ecosystem being
mostly ignored: the area of email tracking has only received limited
attention in the past years, with only a few studies seeking to quantify
its extent [37, 46, 50] or evaluate its acceptance by users [113]. No
automated tools exist that allow users to determine if a newsletter is
tracking them.
In this chapter we present our public transparency platform for the






analyses of email newsletters and, like the previous system, reports the
results on a website. In contrast to previous studies, this allows us to
rely on users to perform the manual work of signing up to newsletters,
a process that has proven hard to automate [37]. We describe the
design and implementation of the platform as well as its limitations
and the ethical and legal issues surrounding its operation. We close
with a discussion of the impact of the platform in the time since its
inception in 2019.
4.1 data collection
Similar to PrivacyScore, PrivacyMail is intended as a public trans-
parency platform that makes the prevalent tracking visible to end
users. In this section, we give an overview of the data collection We describe the data
collection process of
PrivacyMail.
process, from signing up a new newsletter to analyzing incoming
messages. Like PrivacyScore, the platform is built using Python1 and
the Django Web framework2.
4.1.1 Adding a Service
Any service that sends out newsletters can be registered with the





a unique identity with an email address (hosted by PrivacyMail),
name, and gender (as some newsletter providers ask for this upon
registration), and display it to the user performing the registration.
The user will then enter that email and other required information
into the newsletter sign-up form. The resulting email confirmation
will be received by PrivacyMail.
1 See https://www.python.org/, last accessed 2020-11-27.
2 See https://www.djangoproject.com/, last accessed 2020-11-27.
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service. This includes information about the country and industry
sector of the website. This metadata can later be used for further
analyses.
Once a confirmation email is received, the system will attempt to
automatically determine the correct confirmation link to click based
on a number of keywords. If this is successful, the confirmation linkIt will attempt to
automatically click
confirmation links.
is clicked automatically and the identity is marked as confirmed.
Otherwise, the link must be found and clicked and the new identity
confirmed through manual action by an administrator, and no further
automated processing takes place until then. Once an identity has been
marked as confirmed, any future emails from the sending domain will
be automatically processed without human interaction.
4.1.2 Analyzing Emails
When a new email from a permitted sender for a confirmed identity





database, including all relevant headers. Next, all external links (but
not the embedded external resources, like images) are extracted from
the email. The system tries to detect subscription management links
based on a number of common keywords, to avoid accidentally click-
ing an unsubscribe link. Once all likely management links have been
excluded, the system randomly chooses one of the remaining links
and marks it for later investigation.
external resource analysis A common technique for tracking
email messages is to include images that are loaded from a remote




server operators to determine if a message was read by checking if the
image was loaded. Additionally, they can inform additional trackers by
forwarding the request to other tracking services which can perform
their own tracking and profiling. Englehardt et al. observed this to be
a common occurrence [37].
To detect this tracking, we save the message to an HTML file and





OpenWPM, an automated Firefox browser intended for research [38]
that can be operated with JavaScript disabled to approximate the
behavior of a mail client with remote content enabled. OpenWPM
will log all requests and responses generated by viewing the email,
thus giving us an accurate representation of what will happen when a
user views this email without clicking any links. Using this (instead
of a static analysis of embedded external content) allows us to see not
only the embedded external trackers, but also any additional trackers
contacted through HTTP redirects. All requests and responses and the
relations between them are saved in the database.
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link analysis In addition to tracking through remote content,
newsletter providers can also track individual links by linking to their
own servers, which log the visit before forwarding to the actual target
of the link (i.e., the news article or product). This confirms that an Trackers can also use
personalized links.email was viewed, and further contributes to the profiling of the reader
by seeing which links they are interested in. Once again, trackers can
also transitively forward to additional trackers before linking to the
final destination.
To detect tracking through personalized links to third party track- The system visits a




ing services, we delete the local state (cookies, sessions, ...) of the
OpenWPM browser and instruct it to visit the link we have previously
selected in the email. Again, we log all requests and responses and
identify the chain of HTTP redirects that takes place when visiting the
link, until the final destination is reached. Any contacted domain that
is not a (sub)domain of the final destination domain is interpreted as
a tracker.
email disclosure analysis Trackers use different techniques
to identify email recipients in their tracking URLs. However, identi- User identifiers may
be derived from the
email address.
fiers derived from the email address are common. Previous work has
shown that in many cases, hashes or encoded versions of the email
address are used by tracking services [37, 50], in some cases nesting
different encodings or hash algorithms (e.g., md5(sha1(email))). This
shows that the email addresses of recipients are widely shared with
third parties, either intentionally by the sender of the newsletter, or
implicitly by the tracking services. Previous work has shown that sim-
ple hashing of such personally-identifiable information is insufficient
to guarantee privacy [75].
To detect this eMail leakage, we compute a series of hashes and The system detects




encodings of the address, nested to a depth of 2, and check if any of
them are found in any of the recorded request URLs for the eMail. If
so, we assume that this request discloses the email address, and save
this fact in the database. After this, processing of the email is finished.
further personalization detection Not all personalization
uses identifier derived from the email address. Users may be identified





detect this type of personalization, we offer the option to register more
than one identity per service. The system then uses a combination
of email timestamps and subject lines to match newsletter messages
between different identities. Once a pair has been found, the links are
extracted from both and compared. If no personalization is used, the
links in both messages should be identical when excluding subscrip-
tion management links. Thus, if (partially) different links are detected,
this is a strong indicator that they are personalized.
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Another possibility for differing links may be the use of A/B testing,
in which different versions of emails are sent out to recipients to de-
termine which headlines are more effective at generating clicks. TheseThis also allows it to
detect A/B testing. practices have been observed by Englehardt et al. [37]. To distinguish
A/B testing from other forms of personalization, we also compare the
text of the messages to see how similar they are. A high similarity
indicates that the same message was sent to both identities, while a
low similarity indicates A/B testing.
email sale and spam A newsletter provider or sender may also
disclose the email address to other companies to send unsolicited
advertising / spam. To detect such disclosure, each recipient identityThe system tries to
detect the disclosure
of the email address
to third parties.
in PrivacyMail has a list of domains that are marked as legitimate
senders for messages sent to this email address. If a message from
a different sender arrives, we manually investigate the message to
check if it is legitimate or spam. If it is legitimate, the sender is
added to the list of permitted senders, and the message is evaluated
normally. Otherwise, the message is marked as spam and the results
for the newsletter indicate the suspicion that email addresses may be
disclosed.
further analyses Having a large archive of emails, both for a
single newsletter over time and for a large, crowdsourced collection
of different newsletters, will also allow us to perform additional anal-
yses. For example, does the number of trackers increase or decreaseAdditional analyses
are possible using
the collected dataset.
over time? What is the influence of regulatory changes like the up-
coming ePrivacy directive? For newsletters annotated with additional
metadata through crowdsourcing, we can compare tracking practices
between countries and industry sectors, where Haupt et al. found
significant differences [46]. As we collect which external services are
used in the different newsletters, we can also determine what the most
popular third-party services are, and similarly crowdsource metadata
about them (currently type of service and country of origin). Due to
time constraints, we have not yet performed such analyses, but are
open to sharing the dataset with other researchers.
4.2 communicating results
The results for all newsletters are made available using a searchable
frontend on the project website, https://PrivacyMail.info (see Fig-




the newsletter they are interested in has already been analyzed, and
if so, which trackers it uses and to which the email addresses are
disclosed.
The results for an individual newsletter contain both an overall
privacy rating (see Figure 5) and a more detailed list of results that
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Figure 4: The homepage of PrivacyMail.info, with the option to search for a newsletter or sign up a
new one on the top, and statistics about the number of processed messages below.







information about the embedded domains to determine if they be-
long to tracking companies and expose this information where it is
available.
4.3 limitations
Similar to PrivacyScore, PrivacyMail suffers from limitations, some of The architecture has
some limitations.which we discuss below.
human error As we rely on untrained, non-expert users to sign
up the generated email addresses to the correct newsletter, there is al-
ways a potential for error. Users may sign up for the wrong newsletter, Human error may
lead to incorrect data,
which we can only
imperfectly mitigate.
or multiple different newsletters. We try to detect and prevent these
errors using a mixture of automated and manual processes, but our
mitigations may be incomplete, leading to incorrect information for
some identities and newsletters.
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Figure 5: Summary of the rating for a single newsletter, using a US school
grade system from A (best) to F (worst).
manual effort At the moment, several aspects of the system
rely on manual action by the administrators to classify messages,
click confirmation links, etc. We are currently working on extendingThe platform is
currently
labor-intensive.
the system to allow it to operate with more autonomy to reduce the
overhead for the operators, for example by improving the automated
detection of confirmation links.
manipulation by senders Finally, service providers may not





unilateral action from the service providers (i.e., identifying and un-
subscribing identities linked to PrivacyMail based on the used email
domains), we provide them with the option to opt out of being ana-
lyzed by contacting us. To make this transparent to the users, their
services will then be listed as excluded from analysis. However, operators
may still choose to block email addresses that belong to the domains
used by our service.
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Figure 6: Detailed results for a single check. The information about the
types of embedded third parties (tracker, content distribution, ...) is
crowdsourced.
4.4 ethical and legal issues
Like PrivacyScore, the operation of PrivacyMail should also be con- We discuss ethical
and legal issues.sidered from an ethical and legal standpoint. We thus briefly discuss
these two points below.
ethics of scanning The first ethical question concerns the cost




PrivacyMail consumes even less server resources than PrivacyScore
(as it does not perform complex operations like TLS scans), the pure
bandwidth and computation costs imposed by PrivacyMail are mini-
mal. Many newsletter providers charge less than a cent per recipient,
making the financial costs in service fees negligible as well. The plat-
form does not collect any information that could be used to attack the
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service. Thus, there are also no concerns about dual-use tools. We thus
consider PrivacyMail to be ethically unproblematic.
legality of scanning While we did not perform a dedicated
evaluation of the legal issues surrounding the operation of the Privacy-
Mail platform, we modeled it after the PrivacyScore platform, for
which such an evaluation exists (cf. Section 3.4 or [71]). We thusFor the legal issues,




believe these findings to also apply for this system. We do not repub-
lish the contents of the newsletter to avoid allegations of copyright
infringement.
4.5 impact
The PrivacyMail platform is younger than PrivacyScore, and thus
had less time to establish itself. Nevertheless, it is regularly observing
50-150 unique visitors per day, and has collected a dataset of over
350 000 emails as of May 2021. In addition to the Master thesis thatPrivacyMail has a
solid base of users. saw it developed, the system and its datasets have been an integral
part of three further Bachelor or Master theses and two lab projects
inside our group at TU Darmstadt. We also received one external data
access request as part of a research project conducted at KU Leuven




the PrivacyMail platform was presented at GPN 20193, a conference
organized by the German Chaos Computer Club (CCC), and was
discussed in a podcast by a German public broadcaster4.
4.6 summary
In this chapter, we described the development and operation of the au-
tomated transparency platform PrivacyMail.info. PrivacyMail seeks toPrivacyMail seeks to
act as a transparency
platform for the
email domain.
provide a better view into the often-overlooked area of email tracking
by performing automated analyses of email newsletters for different
forms of tracking and publishing the results on a public website. It
also collects a corpus of emails and analyses that can be used for
future studies.





utilizing the data collected by PrivacyMail, time constraints necessi-
tated a focus on a different topic, which led to work on follow-up
studies using the PrivacyMail dataset to be postponed. The rest of
this dissertation will thus be focused on the web ecosystem, where we
3 See https://media.ccc.de/v/gpn19-59-analyzing-the-email-tracking-
ecosystem for a recording of the talk, last accessed 2020-11-27.
4 The episode was part of the SWR Podcast “Netzagent”, which appears to have been
depublished on the homepage of SWR. The episode is still available on Apple Pod-
casts (https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/id1466938159?i=1000466287752)
and Spotify (https://open.spotify.com/episode/6KgjXqUJAX2GTFnYiPlp6V), last ac-
cessed 2020-11-27.
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describe the results of three studies focusing on different aspects of
Web privacy and security. Nevertheless, we believe PrivacyMail can
prove to be a helpful tool for research into the area of email tracking,
and will be happy to collaborate with other researchers, for example
by providing them with datasets.

Part III
P R O M O T I N G C H A N G E
Once a set of websites is known to be affected by a privacy
or security issue, we wish to encourage the operators to ad-
dress it. Depending on the exact issue, different strategies
may be required. We thus report on three notification stud-
ies that consider different issues and notification strategies.

5
C O M P E T I T I O N
The results collected by PrivacyScore have shown us that modern
websites use significant numbers of tracking and advertising services.




client-side blocking. However, such a solution only offers protection
to a single person at a time, while changes to the website are imme-
diately effective for every visitor. Thus, if the website operator can
be convinced to voluntarily reduce the amount of tracking on their
website, the impact can be significant.
This may seem, at first, to be an impossible task: the website opera-
tors add tracking and advertising to their website because they rely
on it for their own purposes, and thus have little interest in removing
it unless pressed. They gain the benefit, while the cost (in lost privacy) Status competition
may help to reduce
tracking at the
source.
is borne by the visitors — it is an externality. However, previous work
has shown that status competition based on public rankings can be an
effective tool in such situations [47, 104, 105, 118].
To evaluate the effectiveness of such a strategy in the area of privacy
and security, we leveraged the platform and publicity offered by
PrivacyScore. As the subject of our study we chose a set of 152 German We utilized the
PrivacyScore
platform to evaluate




health insurance companies, as the importance of privacy in the area
of health and medical data is beyond dispute. We created a ranking
of the security and privacy aspects of their websites using the list
functionality of PrivacyScore and contacted the companies via email
to inform them about their results and evaluate their responses.
We begin this chapter by giving an overview of the goals and
dataset of the study. We then describe the study design in more detail, The resulting study
is described in this
chapter.
before describing and discussing the results. We close with a look
at the limitations of our study before concluding the chapter with a
summary of the results and an outlook of future research questions
posed by the study.
5.1 overview
In this section, we briefly describe the questions we sought to answer We first describe
research questions
and dataset.
and the dataset we collected for this purpose.
5.1.1 Research Questions
There were two major questions underlying our study: how do web-
site operators react when they are notified that their website has been
rated in terms of privacy and security and the result has been pub-
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competitive rankings [47, 104, 105, 118], does the fact that the results
are displayed as part of a ranking with their competitors change their
reaction (RQ2)? To answer these questions, we considered both the
changes the operators made to their websites and the responses they
sent to our solicitation emails.
5.1.2 The Issues
We generated a ranking of websites using PrivacyScore, which com-
bines a number of different privacy issues into a single, combined
ranking (cf. Section 3.2 for the details). The issues include third partyWe used the
PrivacyScore
ranking as a metric.
tracking, cookies, the use of non-european hosting providers (where
enforcement of the GDPR may prove more difficult), and other consid-
erations. In case two websites achieve the same results in the privacy
checks, other PrivacyScore tests are used as tie-breakers as per the
standard ranking algorithm.
5.1.3 The Dataset
We chose to use a dataset of health insurance companies (both private
and public) for this study, as health data is an especially sensitive
class of data that most people will have at least a certain degree of




insurance companies from the Wikipedia articles “Liste deutscher
Krankenkassen”1 and “Liste deutscher privater Krankenversicherer”2
in the German Wikipedia, which gave us a list of 152 health insurance
companies whose websites we add to a PrivacyScore list3.
To contact them, we manually searched for contact information on




total, we found data protection contacts for 96 insurance companies,
which leaves 56 companies with a different point of contact, usually
the address for general inquiries.
5.2 study design
We use a mixed-method approach for our study [110], which has
been proposed by Greenaway and Chan [44]. We combine an openWe used a
mixed-method
approach.
question survey (to understand the perspectives of the insurance
companies) with a quasi-experimental setup based on measurements
by the PrivacyScore platform (to determine if the messages had any
1 See https://de.wikipedia.org/w/?title=Liste_deutscher_Krankenkassen&
oldid=180861868, last accessed 2021-01-15.
2 See https://de.wikipedia.org/w/?title=Liste_deutscher_privater_
Krankenversicherer&oldid=180752925, last accessed 2021-01-15.
3 See https://privacyscore.org/list/15/, last accessed 2021-01-15.
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effect on the websites). We then follow a qualitative research process,
which consists of planning, data gathering, preparation of analysis,
analysis, and summarization [79].
5.2.1 Experimental Factors
To investigate the effect of competition (RQ2), we split the insurance






solicitation emails. Insurers in group A received their scan results in
terms of the four areas that are published on PrivacyScore: tracking
and privacy, website encryption, mail encryption, and web security.
Those assigned to group B additionally received the rank of their site
relative to other companies in the same list, and the names of the
two companies directly above and below them in the ranking. All Companies were
asked to comment on
their results.
emails also contained a brief description of the PrivacyScore project,
and ended with a request to participate in the study by answering
two open questions: what do you think about such an assessment from the
point of view of your company? Would you consider making changes to your
website in order to improve its privacy properties? The messages were sent
from a university mail account. We give the full text of the messages
in Appendix A.1.
5.2.2 Group Allocation
Social comparison theory predicts that the effects of a ranking differ
depending on the position of the actor in the ranking, with actors with
bad rankings showing a larger effect [41]. This was also experimentally We used alternating
group assignments
based on ranking.
observed by Tang et al. [104]. We thus opted to optimize for homo-
geneity in rank distribution between the two experimental groups
by assigning the 152 insurers to alternating groups based on their
position in the ranking at the beginning of the study. This resulted in
two groups with identical sizes and a similar distribution of rankings.
This process has two limitations: firstly, it led to an imbalance
between private and public insurance companies: group A contains 61
public and 15 private insurance companies, while group B contains 51




address for 45 companies in group A (with the remaining 31 having
only a general-purpose contact point), while in group B we found 52
and 24, respectively. If there is a systematic difference between these
company types, it may skew the results. We will consider this in the
analysis. Secondly, as we only have 152 insurance companies in our We did not include a
control group.dataset and the expected response rate is low, we did not include a
control group in the experimental design. This will lead to a higher
number of survey responses, but means that our analysis of the effect
of our messages on the websites is limited, as no unnotified group
exists as a baseline.
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5.2.3 Experiment Timeline
Before sending out the notifications, in December 2017, we saved a
snapshot of the scan results for the PrivacyScore list for later compari-





emails to all insurers. As many insurers had not given a definitive
answer after four weeks, we sent a reminder message on the 11th of
January 2018. Most responses were received in January or February.
At the end of February, we saved another snapshot of the scan results
(T2). In March, we began to evaluate the received responses (including
those sent directly to the PrivacyScore contact address) using open
coding with multiple iterations. Finally, in August 2018, we saved a
final snapshot of the scan results (T3) for a long-term comparison.
5.2.4 Ethical Considerations
We have already discussed the ethical and legal issues surrounding




to ours are common practice in information systems research. Our
messages to the insurance companies clearly identified that they were
sent as part of a research project. Answering the questions sent in the
email was voluntary.
5.3 results
We now discuss the state of the websites before the messages were
sent. We describe the responses of site operators, and the three typesWe now discuss the
results of the study. of responses we received: positive responses, complaints, and other
messages. Finally, we describe how the websites changed over the
course of the study timeframe.
5.3.1 Initial State of Websites
Before we sent the solicitation messages (T1), 26 % (39) of the websites







a well-configured TLS setup, defined as an automated forward to the
encrypted version of the website, offering TLS 1.2, and not offering
SSLv2 and SSLv3. Only 26 % (39) of websites used the HSTS header.
The mail server scans proved unreliable, with 6.5 % (15) of scans failing,
likely due to spam protection measures like tarpitting4. Still, 79 % (199)
of websites could be confirmed to have a well-configured TLS setup
on their mail server, offering TLS 1.2 while not offering SSLv2 and
SSLv3.
4 See https://www.techopedia.com/definition/1722/tarpitting, last accessed 2021-
02-01.
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Table 2: Recipient (Recp.) and respondent counts (#) for responses received
in the two experimental groups.
Group A Group B
Recp. Respondent # Recp. Respondent #
General DPO / IT 1 General DPO/IT 4
Marketing 3 Marketing 1
Board Member 1
Other 2
DPO DPO / IT 6 DPO DPO/IT 12
Marketing 5 Marketing 1
Board Member 1 Board Member 2
Other 1 Other 1
5.3.2 Contacts and Respondents
The overall response rate was 27 %, with 41 insurers responding to
our solicitation messages. More than half of the responses (23 out Many recipients had
to be reminded before
they responded to
our questions.
of 41) reached us only after we sent a reminder message. We con-
tacted 97 data protection contacts (64 % of the total; A=45, B=52) and






have similar response rates (A=26 %, B=28 %), with data protection
contacts showing a higher response rate (A=29 %, B=31 %) than the
general-purpose contacts (A=23 %, B=21 %). In many cases, messages
were forwarded inside the contacted company and a different depart-
ment responded to the message. An overview of which departments
responded is shown in Table 2.





group A, responses often came from either marketing or data protec-
tion / IT teams5 (40 and 35 %, respectively). The remaining responses
came from members of the board of directors (20 %) and other depart-
ments (5 %).
Group B shows a distinctly different behavior. Most responses came In group B, a higher
proportion of
responses came from
data protection or IT
teams, regardless of
who was the initial
contact.
from data protection and IT specialists (71 %), with the remainder split
evenly between marketing, board members, and other departments.
At first glance, this difference may be due to the higher number
of data protection contact points we contacted in group B (A=45,
B=52). However, the fraction of responses from data protection / IT
departments is higher in group B regardless of if we contacted a data
protection (A=35 %, B=75 %) or a general-purpose contact (A=14 %,
B=60 %).
5 Many companies do not differentiate between their data protection and IT teams,
which prevents us from making a more detailed distinction here.
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Response Type
Total Public Private Group A Group B yes no
Positive 11 % 7 % 3 % 6 % 5 % 1 % 10 %
Neutral 11 % 9 % 2 % 5 % 5 % 0 % 11 %
Complaint 6 % 6 % 0 % 2 % 4 % 0 % 1 %
None 73 % 52 % 21 % 37 % 36 % 11 % 66 %
Sum 100 % 74 % 26 % 50 % 50 % 12 % 88 %
Insurer Type Group Website improved?
*No scan results for 8 insurers that opted to be excluded from further scans. **Deviation due to rounding error.
*
**
Figure 7: Breakdown of responses according to response type.
5.3.3 Types of Responses





positive responses (statements of gratefulness, expressions of interest
in the study, and detailed discussions of the scan results), complaints
(about unsolicited scans or the publication of the results), and other
responses (acknowledgements of receipt and explicit expressions of
indifference to the study).
We break down the responses by their types in Figure 7. The figureThe responses are
broken down in
Figure 7.
also shows how the response types relate to which websites improved
or did not improve over time, which will be analyzed in more detail in
Section 5.3.4. We now discuss the different response types. All quotes
are translations of German replies.
5.3.3.1 Positive Responses






came from the marketing (5) and data protection / IT departments (3),
with a single response from a board member. In group B, the responses
came almost exclusively from data protection or IT departments (6),
with only a single response from a marketing department. Almost
all respondents (A=7, B=5) reported forwarding the report to their
technical staff for further analysis. The responses varied widely in
length and level of detail, ranging from single-sentence responses
thanking us for the information and noting that the IT department
would be investigating the report further, to differentiated technical
and economic analyses of the trade-offs between user privacy and
economic success for their company.
contextualizing the findings Some recipients contextualized
the findings of our automated scans. For example, B58 explained thatSome recipients
aimed to
contextualize the
results of the scans.
while they use tracking services on their websites, these are disabled
in sensitive areas, and noted that “tracking is above all about the care with
which data is handled. The mere collection of data does not necessarily lead
to better business success.” A33 noted that while they do not forward
users to the secure version of their website by default, all sensitive
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data (login information, payment details) are transmitted over a secure
connection.
Finally, A91 provided a highly detailed response, going into some
detail on the trade-offs between user privacy and economic success in
online tracking. They noted that online tracking was required to evalu- One highlighted the
need for tracking and
personalization for
their company.
ate the effectiveness of their online affiliate marketing campaigns. An
additional concern is the analysis of the needs of potential customers,
where they noted that “we determine the needs of new and existing cus-
tomers through market research studies. However, [...] their results are only
of limited significance. This can be seen in the fact that statements determined
by market research and actual user behavior partially contradict each other.”
Another concern is personalization, where the respondent argued that
“both market research and measurements show that personalized content [...]
is used much more intensively by users and is increasingly expected, [which]
can only be fulfilled by tracking tools and marketing automation. [...] Of
course, users also have a high interest in sufficient protection of their privacy.
However, we are convinced that the data protection regulations in force in
Germany [...] cover the expectations of most users.”
promising changes Two respondents claimed that they will
be making changes based on the results of the scan: A67 gave a de- Two respondents
promised to make
changes.
tailed response, referring to many individual test results in detail,
and demonstrated that they already reacted by implementing some
changes like enabling the Referrer-Policy6 HTTP header. They also
noted that some parameters related to the mail server were outside of
their control, as they are managed by a third-party appliance. A63 re-
sponded that internal tests had confirmed the findings of PrivacyScore
and mentioned nonspecific changes that were made to the website as a
result. They also noted that “the results helped us protect the privacy of the
users of our website [and provided] valuable support for the implementation
of changes based on an easier analysis and identification of weak points.” In
contrast, A35 highlighted the beta-status of PrivacyScore, but claimed
that they will be performing their own checks to confirm the results,
and act upon them, if necessary.
use of software and services Several respondents stated that
they are already using external scanners to validate the security of







security audits for their websites. On the other hand, we also saw
cases of respondents not being aware of alternatives to the privacy-
invasive technologies they were using, with one respondent showing
surprise when being informed about privacy-enhancing alternatives
(like self-hosted analytics systems) to their current practices.
6 See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Referrer-
Policy, last accessed 2020-12-04.
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5.3.3.2 Complaints
We received nine complaints, all of them from public insurers. AsNine public
insurance companies
complained to us,
mostly from group B
and with poor initial
ranks.
group A contains a higher ratio of public insurers, we may thus expect
more complaints to have come from this group. However, the majority
of complaints came from group B (A=3, B=6). Most complaints were
from companies whose site had a poor rank in the initial scan (min
25, mean 80, median 87, max 123 of 125). Four of the nine complaints
(A=1, B=3) were raised directly with the contact address listed on the




one case, we received a positive reply to our solicitation email, while
the PrivacyScore address received a complaint two days later. Eight of
the nine companies requested to be excluded from future scans.
reason for complaints We observed that the tone of the re-





from group B referenced the ranking, and one of the three complaints
from group A mentioned the fact that the results are publicly avail-
able. Many were displeased that the scan was performed (B=2) and
published (A=1, B=2) without asking for permission in advance. Three
companies (A=1, B=2) claimed to be investigating if the scan consti-
tuted an illegal attack on their infrastructure. Moreover, B150 allegedSome companies
(incorrectly) claimed
that the scans were
illegal.
a violation of competition law, and A109 argued that the scan vio-
lates their copyright. We had already predicted and addressed these
concerns in the design phase of PrivacyScore, and our existing legal
evaluation (cf. Section 3.4 or [71]) proved very helpful in responding
to these allegations.
an example case Of particular interest is the complaint by B150,
which we discuss in more detail here. After obtaining a low rankWe discuss one
specific complaint in
more detail.
in the initial scan, their information security officer contacted the
PrivacyScore team, requesting the exclusion from future scans. Almost
two months later another response reached the PrivacyScore team, this
time from the chief legal officer, stating that the legal department of
the company had analyzed the case and raised a number of issues with
how the results were being displayed. In particular, they objected to aIt highlighted that
the PrivacyScore
results were hard to
interprete for
laypeople.
perceived incomprehensibility on how the rankings were computed
and how the old and outdated results from excluded websites were
still being displayed. They claimed that this could be “damaging to their
company”, and may be illegal under the law against unfair competition.
At the same time, they acknowledged that they are open to critical
analysis of their website.
In a subsequent phone call, the company representative explicitlyPrivacyScore was




noted the competitive and privacy-sensitive nature of the public health
insurance market and the disadvantages a company could experience
from a low rank in such a privacy ranking. A constructive discussion
resulted in several changes to PrivacyScore being proposed and im-
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plemented, adding various clarifications to the results pages to make
it easier for visitors to understand what they (do not) imply. At the
same time, the insurance company started work to improve some
of the security and privacy properties of its website. However, they
still declined to be added back to the ranking. No legal charges were
pressed.
5.3.3.3 Other Responses
We received 16 neutral reactions (A=8, B=8). Six organizations (A=4,
B=2) explicitly stated that they are not interested in participating in




forwarded internally, but never send a full response to our questions.
Organization A153 declined participation, citing insufficient capacity,
and B40 stated that responding would entail a work order to an
external service provider. A51 stated that they could not give any
information on the topic of privacy while B94 claimed that they did
not understand the provided information. Finally, A95 simply stated
that they would not be making any changes to their website.
5.3.4 Changes to the Website
To evaluate how websites change over the course of the study, we per- We evaluated the
state of websites
before and after the
messages.
formed measurements before sending our messages (T1) and repeated
them at the end of the study (T2), skipping insurers that had asked to
be excluded from future scans.
privacy aspects We recall that twelve companies stated that






T2, only 4 (A=4) of them had actually made changes to one of the
parameters measured by PrivacyScore. The total number of embedded
third-party trackers actually increased over the course of the study
period, from 411 to 439. We observe 12 (A=7, B=5) cases of at least
one tracker being removed, and 13 (A=7, B=6) cases of at least one
tracker being added.7 Most of these websites belong to companies that
did not respond to our messages. A63, who responded positively and
promised to make changes, only replaced one tracker with a different
one. A91, who provided us with a differentiated view of the trade-
offs between privacy and economic success, appears to have briefly
removed a number of third parties, but has since added them again.
A133 had stated their willingness to adapt their website — and indeed,
they have removed all trackers, leaving only a cookie consent script
hosted by a third party. Conversely, A74 responded positively to our
message, but only discussed the security aspects of the PrivacyScore
7 We consider individual third parties, not the total number. Thus, if a website removes

















Results for Third Party Tracking







Results for Mail Server Encryption
T1: before sending solicitation mails (Dec 2017)
T2: after receiving responses (Feb 2018)
T3: after GDPR became effective (Aug 2018)
Figure 8: Scan results of health insurer websites at different points in time.
evaluation, without regard to the privacy ratings. Their website added
four additional trackers over the course of the study.
security aspects Several companies also made changes to the
security of their systems by changing the configuration of their TLS





did not respond to
our messages.
protocol version TLS 1.0, and two of them (A=1, B=1) also disabled
TLS 1.1, leaving only the latest available version TLS 1.2 active. Five
companies (A=3, B=2) enabled HSTS, while one (B=1) disabled it.
However, none of them responded to our message, so it is unknown if
this happened as a reaction to our messages, or due to other, unrelated
reasons. Similarly, 10 companies (A=6, B=4) started automatically
forwarding all visitors to the secure version of their websites. Closer
investigation reveals that while none of them had responded to our
messages, five were maintained by the web design agency maintaining
the website of B128, who had asked to be excluded from future scans
and threatened legal action. A manual visit of their website revealed
that they also now forwarded all visitors to the secure version of their
website. Thus, it is plausible that our messages are at least partially
responsible for this agency-wide change.
summary Our observations indicate that insurers are more willingChanges seem to be
more likely if they
are aligned with the
interests of the
company.
to deploy changes that benefit the privacy interest of users without
impacting the economic interests of the insurer (i.e., security improve-
ments like enabling a more recent TLS versions). If privacy and com-
pany interests are in conflict, companies are more reluctant to make
a change, as demonstrated by the smaller number of insurers that
removed third-party trackers from their site.
5.3 results 75
5.3.4.1 Comparison with Regulatory Changes
To put our results into context we compare the impact of our solici-
tation mails with the effect of regulatory changes (cf. Figure 8). For We compared the
observed effects with




this purpose, we scanned the websites once more in August 2018 (T3).
Besides the introduction of the GDPR in May 2018, the timeframe also
included new Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI
DSS) rules coming into effect in June 2018,8 requiring websites that
process credit card payments to update their TLS configuration.
data quality issues Due to technical issues with PrivacyScore,
scans for 10 sites reproducibly failed and had to be excluded in T3.
Moreover, we observe significantly higher failure rates for the mail We observed an
increase in failed
scans, likely due to
spam protection
measures.
server TLS scans in T3 than in T1 and T2, precluding a meaningful
comparison in this area. Cursory investigations indicate that the fail-
ures are due to the increasing prevalence of spam defense mechanisms
deployed by mail server operators.
observed changes As expected, the changes between T2 and





reintroduced trackers (compared to 2 and 1, respectively, in time time
between T1 and T2). 10 of the former websites were operated by the
same association of insurers, whose websites are centrally managed.
Thus, the number of distinct operators removing all trackers is at most
10. 16 improved their TLS configuration (compared to 11 in our study),
with 6 adding and 1 removing HSTS (5 additions and 1 removal in
our study).9
summary Even though the time between T2 and T3 is much longer
than between T1 and T2, it is unlikely that the observed differences
are only due to the different durations given the changes to two
regulatory frameworks. While we cannot infer what reasons served as As expected,
regulatory changes
had a much higher
effect than our
messages.
an incentive for insurers to improve security and privacy features of
their websites between T2 and T3, the combination of the passage of
time and new regulatory requirements had a higher impact than our
messages. This is to be expected, as the GDPR and PCI DSS changes
were important and widely publicized, with strong incentives for
compliance.
While regulation has a large effect, transparency may still remain Nevertheless,
transparency and
competition may still




a valuable tool in affecting changes, as regulatory changes are infre-
quent events. Furthermore, regulation only establishes a lower bound
of acceptable behavior, without incentives for exceeding the minimum
requirements. Since the minimum requirements still permit many
8 See https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/are-you-ready-for-30-june-2018-
sayin-goodbye-to-ssl-early-tls, last accessed 2020-11-25.
9 The difference with the changes visible in Figure 8 is due to some websites moving
to the excluded or failed category.
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privacy-invasive techniques, an effective transparency regime (cf. Sec-
tion 2.4.2.2) could serve as an incentive to exceed these requirements,
which is vital for improving the state of online privacy.
5.4 discussion
In this section, we discuss our results and their implications. The goalWe now interprete
our results in more
detail.
of our research was to investigate how health insurance companies
react to transparency through public security and privacy ratings
of their websites (RQ1) and if knowledge about the results being
displayed in a ranking changes their response (RQ2).
5.4.1 Operator Responses
We find that the responses varied greatly in the level of detail andWe observed a large
variety in the level of
detail of responses.
content, ranging from detailed analyses of the trade-offs between user
privacy and economic success to terse legal threats seeking removal
from the public ranking.




the state of their
websites.
the current state of their websites, ranging from conscious trade-offs
between user privacy and the economic success of their company to
technical limitations, e.g., third-party appliances whose configuration
cannot be changed. One respondent also identified tension between
the users’ expectations of personalized content, which necessitates
tracking, and user privacy, indicating that the company had made
a conscious decision to use these technologies after considering the
tradeoffs.
In addition to the positive or neutral responses, we also received a





nature of the health insurance market, and the potential competitive
disadvantages caused by a bad privacy grade, thereby implicitly con-





led to a number of companies asking to be excluded from future scans,
often under the threat of legal action based on questionable legal bases,
including copyright, competition law, and cybercrime legislation. Gen-
erally, public health insurers seemed to be more likely to complain
than private insurance companies.
effects of ranking Overall, we observed a higher proportion
of complaints in group B (A=3, B=6), which was explicitly informed




ranking led to a higher probability of complaints being made. This
explanation is supported by the fact that five of the six complaints
from group B explicitly referenced the ranking.
5.4 discussion 77
The complaints also have in common that all of them passed through
the data protection and/or IT department of the companies, either as
the initial point of contact for our study, or through company-internal
forwarding. Thus, at first sight, a competing explanation for the higher The higher rate of
complaints in group
B likely cannot be
explained by the
different distribution
of points of contact
in the groups.
ratio of complaints from group B may be that the data protection
and IT departments generally have a higher likelihood to complain.
Coincidentally, we sent a higher fraction of our mails directly to data
protection contacts in group B (A=59 %, B=68 %), which corroborates
the competing explanation. However, there are two arguments that
challenge its validity: firstly, several responders explicitly referenced
the ranking in their complaints, and secondly, the complaint rate is still
higher for group B if only messages passing through data protection
and/or IT departments are considered (A=21 %, B=30 %). Thus, we
give more credence to our initial explanation, which supports RQ2.
We also note that, as discussed in Section 5.3.3.2, the complaints




social comparison theory [41], which predicts that members of a
comparison group that are further from the top will have a stronger
reaction to the ranking. It is usually assumed that this reaction is to
seek to increase their position in the ranking. However, if the difference
becomes too large, social comparison theory also predicts that “there
will be tendencies to cease comparing oneself with those in the group
who are very different from oneself” [41, Derivation D3], and that
“[t]he cessation of comparison with others is accompanied by hostility
or derogation to the extent that continued comparison with those
persons implies unpleasant consequences” [41, Hypothesis VI].
parallels to csr research We note that some of the responses
we received are similar to those observed by Lee et al. in the area of
CSR [65]. They analyzed responses by pharmaceutical companies to a We also observe
some similarities
with prior research
in the area of CSR.
public benchmarking report by Oxfam that evaluated the companies’
CSR efforts in increasing the availability of free or affordable medicine
for disadvantaged populations. Among other responses specific to
this topic area, the responding companies tended to express disap-
pointment with the way they were portrayed, claimed that the report
was incorrect, or tried to recontextualize their existing CSR efforts to
illustrate why they perceived the rating scheme to be unfair. It seems
like the same patterns also apply in the case of privacy rankings.
5.4.2 Changes to Websites
Our scans indicate that the websites under study are in permanent Websites change
frequently, and it is
difficult to attribute
these changes to a
single source.
flux, with a general trend towards increasing the number of third-
party trackers. As many of the insurers whose website changed during
our study did not respond to our messages, the effect of our study
on the websites is hard to quantify. Based on the received responses,
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we can attribute four changes directly to our messages, including
one company that stopped using third-party trackers altogether, and
assume that at least six more changes are at least partially the result
of our messages. While these changes improve the privacy and se-The low number of
changes after our
messages shows that
they had only a
limited effect.
curity of website visitors, the low number of overall changes shows
that the effectiveness of the messages is limited, indicating that at
least in its current state, transparency and rankings through Privacy-
Score do not significantly influence the willingness of most website





result or an artifact of the PrivacyScore platform, which was relatively
unknown at that time, and may have thus not been able to provide
sufficient embeddedness and leverage to lead to effective competition
(cf. Section 2.4.2.2).





proposed in the IA [44] (cf. Section 2.4.1.2), stating that they are in
full compliance with applicable laws without giving additional details.
A small number of companies moved towards the proactive approach
by elaborating more on their internal processes, stating that tracking
is disabled in critical areas, or citing frequent security audits of their
websites.




reasons for the current state of insurance company websites: conflicting
value propositions, missing awareness, and negligence.
conflicting value propositions Companies operate in a field
of tension between their own economic goals (e.g., evaluating the
effectiveness of their marketing campaigns), their reputation, and
(sometimes conflicting) customer expectations like privacy and person-
alization. If not all expectations can be fulfilled, a trade-off needs to beFirstly, companies






found, leading companies to evaluate the costs of each solution. Stated
in terms of the RbV [44] (cf. Section 2.4.1.2), by gathering customer
data (intellectual resource), companies can satisfy their own goals and








tracking is ubiquitous and mostly invisible, it incurs almost no repu-
tational cost and thus has low potential for differentiation (relational
resource), leading most companies to pursue a knowledge focus and
value their own economic goals higher than the privacy interests of
their customers. This also explains their observed reluctance to be in-
cluded in a ranking, making them favor an intentionally intransparent
strategy, as proposed by Gerlach et al. [43].
missing awareness The received responses indicate that someSecondly, companies
may be unaware of
privacy-friendly
ways to achieve their
economic goals.
website operators were not aware of alternative solutions that allowed
them to maintain the utility of their current solutions while decreasing
their impact of the privacy of their users. Such alternative solutions
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include self-hosted tracking software like Matomo10 that keeps the
data under the control of the company, or two-click social media
buttons11 that do not disclose information to social networks on every
page view.
negligence Website operators may have been negligent and for-
gotten to configure their website correctly to respect the privacy of
their users. This could manifest as the failure to enable the IP anonymi- Finally, companies
may simply be
negligent.
zation feature of Google Analytics (which is mandatory in Germany),
or not forwarding visitors to the encrypted version of the website.
summary Problems caused by negligence can in many cases be
remediated by a notification to the website operators, although such
notifications have been shown to not always be reliable (cf. Section 2.3).
Raising awareness for privacy-preserving alternatives cannot easily These three reasons
can be addressed in
different ways, but
doing so can be
challenging.
be done at scale. In addition, awareness alone is not sufficient, as
deciders need to be convinced that the benefits of switching to a
privacy-preserving solution are worth the required effort and potential
costs of changing the website, leading back to the issue of conflicting
value propositions. These can only be influenced by changing the costs
associated with the different options, which is easiest in the area of
reputational costs. In the context of online privacy this means that
privacy-invasive techniques have to become reputationally “expen-
sive”, which may turn forgoing their use into a relational resource,
allowing differentiation through the proactive approach. However, as
previously discussed, our evaluation has shown that at the moment,
the effect of transparency through PrivacyScore is not sufficient for
this purpose.
Finally, the behavior of companies can also be influenced by legisla-
tion and regulatory oversight. This is confirmed by our post-GDPR Regulation is a
promising avenue for
driving changes.
scan, which show changes in a larger number of websites. Thus, the
upcoming European ePrivacy regulation is a promising avenue for
affecting further changes at scale.
5.5 limitations
Our study is subject to limitations: It only investigates a single, privacy- Our study suffers
from limitations.sensitive sector — health insurance — in a single country. Extending
and replicating the study with different sectors and in different coun-
tries could shed additional light on the general applicability of the We only investigate
a single sector and
do not have a control
group or statistical
significance tests.
results. Additionally, the number of respondents and related lack
of a control group do not allow us to draw statistically significant
conclusions. Our analysis also only considers two fixed dates when
10 See https://matomo.org, last accessed 2020-11-25.
11 See https://github.com/heiseonline/shariff, last accessed 2020-11-25.
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evaluating changes to the websites of the included companies, and we
do not investigate if improvements are sustained over time or reverted.







While we did not inform members of group A about the ranking fea-
ture of PrivacyScore, the scan results page contains a (non-prominently
presented) link to the ranking. Thus, members of group A might have
learned about it on their own. Nevertheless, we observed notable dif-
ferences between group A and B, which indicates that many members




PrivacyScore. As a relatively new platform, the publicity provided by
it may present less of an incentive for change than a more popular
and well-known platform or publication would have provided.
5.6 conclusion
In this chapter, we described our notification experiment with 152
German health insurance companies, where we evaluated competition
as a possible factor in motivating website operators to change their






that transparency — in the form of public assessments — can improve
privacy features of websites. However, such efforts can also result in
complaints and legal threats. A major factor limiting the willingness
to change is the conflict between user privacy and the perceived need
for privacy-invasive analytics for economic success: our solicitation
mails led to much larger changes in areas where company and user
interests are aligned, like website connection security.
Another factor contributing to the current state appears to be a lack
of awareness about privacy-preserving alternatives to common track-
ing services. While our study provided some initial insights on thesePrior and later work
has shown that more
widely disseminated
channels can prove
to be more effective.
difficulties, evaluating the effects of transparency on privacy remains
a promising avenue for future work, for instance when publishing
assessments in more widely disseminated channels like newspaper
articles. This is also demonstrated by both previous and later studies
that successfully used competition to reduce the emission of spam
from corporate networks [47, 104, 105, 118].
We also learned five important lessons from this study that inform
our future studies, as described in the next chapters: First, manyWe also learned
methodological
lessons that inform
the other studies in
this dissertation.
websites may be managed by the same company, which can skew






the results are not dominated by changes from a single company,
websites should be deduplicated based on public information (e.g.,
from the imprint) to at least lower the probability that a single actor
can have an outsized impact on the results, as we saw in the case of a
single organization making changes to 10 websites at the same time
(cf. Section 5.3.4.1).
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Second, having different points of contact (i.e., general purpose vs.
DPO) leads to unnecessary complexity in the analysis. It is preferable The point of contact
should be uniform
for all recipients.
to either choose one that is used for all recipients to ensure comparable
results, or to make the type of contact point an explicit experimental
variable that is evaluated separately.
Third, having an uncontacted control group is critical to be able
to determine the effect of our messages. Due to the low number The sample size
should be large
enough to allow for
the inclusion of a
control group.
of insurance companies, this proved to be impossible in this study.
However, this lack of comparison significantly impacts our ability to
make statements about the effect(iveness) of our messages.
Fourth, measuring the impact of messages is easier if the message
contains a concrete “call to action”, the outcome of which can be





that can be easily
detected remotely.
this study does not allow us to clearly determine how many operators
took action, as there are too many possible actions they could have
taken in response to viewing the report. Notifying about a specific
topic like the security issues used in previous notification studies (cf.
Section 2.3) makes it easier to encourage specific, measurable change.
Finally, we saw that changes to the legal framework websites operate
under can have a significant impact. This indicates that citing legal Legal requirements
may prove effective
in driving change.
requirements may be a promising approach to promote change in
future studies, at least in cases where the notified issue can be phrased
in terms of data protection or cybersecurity law.

6
A LT E R N AT I V E C O N TA C T C H A N N E L S
While privacy problems pit the desires of the users against those of
the operator, a place where both are aligned is in the case of website
security: the operator is interested in keeping their own systems secure,
and the users also have an interest in the security of the website, as
this reduces the chance of a data breach or malware infection, which
would impact the users as well. Given this, we would assume that Both users and
operators want







notifications about a security issue should be effective in driving
remediation. However, prior studies have found that many different
factors influence the remediation rates of notified website operators,
and that the overall results can be disappointing (cf. Section 2.3).
Further research may be able to shed additional light on some of these
factors, like the message medium (cf. Section 2.3.1) or the framing of
the problem (cf. Section 2.3.3).
The PrivacyScore platform gives us an opportunity to conduct our




study in this area.
Score is the presence of information leaks (cf. Section 3.1.2) — data
that is unintentionally exposed by the website, like configuration in-
formation or even database backups. These issues can be surprisingly
prevalent1, and dangerous to the website [98]. Based on the prelimi-
nary data collected by PrivacyScore, we thus designed and conducted
a notification study with information leaks in the focus.
The rest of this chapter discusses this study in more detail, starting
with an overview of the goals and dataset of the study and continuing
with the study design. We then go into more detail about the observed We describe the
resulting study in
this chapter.
results and put them into context. After a brief discussion of the
limitations of our study, we conclude the chapter with an outlook of
the answers we have found, and the new questions our study raises.
6.1 overview
Here, we describe the basic research questions that guided our study, We once again begin
with the research
question and dataset.
and the dataset that we collected for this purpose.
6.1.1 Research Questions
With this study, we sought to investigate two areas of notification
campaigns: the message medium and the descriptions provided in the
1 See https://en.internetwache.org/dont-publicly-expose-git-or-how-we-
downloaded-your-websites-sourcecode-an-analysis-of-alexas-1m-28-07-
2015/, last accessed 2021-04-01.
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system operators directly relied on email (cf. Section 2.3.1). However,
emails suffer from deliverability issues [17, 18, 34, 68, 98, 99] and the
difficulties of automatically obtaining a functional contact address
[96]. We thus investigated the use of postal letters as a contact channel,
which necessitated the manual collection of contact information.2
The second factor under investigation was the text of the notificationWe also considered
different wordings of
the notification as a
second factor.
message. Previous research indicates that more detailed messages are
more successful [18, 68, 108]. We aimed to test this result by using two
variants of the notification text, with one containing a more detailed
description of the dangers of the reported security issues.
6.1.2 The Issues




tion disclosure. In total, we considered five different information leaks:
cryptographic keys, database backups, VCS repositories, server status
pages, and PHPInfo files. We explain each of them in more detail here.
cryptographic keys Connections to servers can be secured with
cryptographic protocols like TLS for web surfing or Secure Shell (SSH)
for remote administration. These protocols use asymmetric keypairs toThe first is the
disclosure of
cryptographic keys
that should be kept
confidential.
encrypt and authenticate the data. The private keys must be protected
to keep the protocols secure. However, sometimes system operators
accidentally place these sensitive files in public locations, where they
can be found and read by third parties. In the case of TLS keys, this
could allow an adversary to forge or decrypt encrypted data sent or
received by the server. For SSH keys, it may allow an adversary to
gain full remote access to the server to manipulate or steal data.
database backups Databases frequently contain sensitive data
like personal information, business transactions, or even payment




both against unauthorized access and against data loss. System op-
erators frequently create copies of their databases using tools like
mysqldump3, which serializes the database into a text file which can
then be backed up. However, if this file is placed in a public directory
on the web server, it may allow adversaries to download a copy of the
database, thereby potentially compromising sensitive information.
2 While we did not compare automated and manual collection in the study, our results
for manually-collected email addresses can at least be compared with previous
studies. Such a comparison should be regarded with caution due to the potentially
very different characteristics of the sample, but it may at least give a first indication
about the effectiveness of manual collection, which can then be validated through
future studies, if desired.
3 See https://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/8.0/en/mysqldump.html, last accessed
2020-08-07.
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vcs repositories Software developers use VCS software like Git4





code can in some cases include sensitive configuration data like pass-
words or API keys, which can allow adversaries access to the system.
Alternatively, the source code may contain vulnerabilities that can
be found and exploited by a dedicated adversary. Thus, the source
code needs to be kept secure. VCS software stores copies of the source
code in hidden folders (e.g., .git/ or .svn/). If these folders are made
publicly accessible, this can allow adversaries to download a copy of
the website source code6. This issue was previously considered by
Stock et al., who found large numbers of public VCS folders [98].
server status pages System administrators may need to ac-
cess information about their web servers to trace performance issues




the server and the
visitors.
server status pages under URLs like example.de/server-info7 or
example.de/server-status8, which contain information about used
software versions or active connections to website visitors. An adver-
sary who is able to access these pages may be able to read out sensitive
information about visitors or find information about outdated and
insecure software versions.
phpinfo files Many websites are written in the scripting lan-
guage PHP, which contains a special command, phpinfo()9, to print
information about the PHP version, active extensions, and basic infor-




the web server and
should not be public.
to server status pages, these pages are sometimes created by system
administrators looking to validate the configuration of their server.
However, this information can also be helpful to an adversary that
is searching for outdated and insecure software installed on a server.
Under some circumstances, PHPInfo pages can even leak sensitive
information directly if it is encoded in environment variables. It is
thus advisable to delete PHPInfo pages once they are no longer used.
4 See https://git-scm.com, last accessed 2020-08-07.
5 See https://subversion.apache.org, last accessed 2020-08-07.
6 See https://en.internetwache.org/dont-publicly-expose-git-or-how-we-
downloaded-your-websites-sourcecode-an-analysis-of-alexas-1m-28-07-
2015/, last accessed 2021-04-01.
7 See https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/mod_info.html, last accessed 2020-
08-07.
8 See https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/mod_status.html, last accessed 2020-
08-07.
9 See https://www.php.net/manual/en/function.phpinfo.php, last accessed 2020-08-
07.
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6.1.3 The Dataset
To perform a notification campaign, we needed to assemble a dataset of
vulnerable domains and their contact information. Here, we describeWe now describe the
collection of the
dataset.
the individual steps of our dataset collection.
data sources To generate our dataset, we relied on data from two






the operation of the PrivacyScore platform (cf. Chapter 3), which
searches for many of these information leaks on every scanned website.
At the time of the study, PrivacyScore had found approximately 700
exposed files, spread over slightly more than 600 domains.
Given the goal of investigating the effect of letters, we decided to
limit the study to websites hosted in the country of the researchers,
i.e., Germany. This allowed us to limit the financial costs of sendingWe focussed on
German websites to
avoid unquantifiable
biases due to letter
delivery.
the letters, and also avoids the potential biases and unquantifiable
effects that differences in national postal systems could have on the
evaluation, for example through different message delivery times for
different countries. We thus only used domains under the .de TLD
that were still vulnerable at the start of the study. This left us with a
dataset of 248 exposed files spread over 234 distinct websites.
We extended this dataset with approximately 35 000 websites col-
lected by querying the official website attribute of Wikidata.org,
which gives programmatic access to Wikipedia data, and again fil-




websites based on a
Wikipedia dataset.
popular websites like the Alexa Top Million, as the latter has doc-
umented issues with data quality [64, 94] and the research-focused
Tranco toplist [64] was not yet available. Additionally, websites in
the Alexa Top Million list have already received significant attention
(including a set of notifications about exposed VCS files by Stock et al.
[98]), which may introduce biases in their responses. Finally, websites
listed in the Wikipedia can be assumed to have a certain level of rele-
vance. After creating the dataset, we excluded all German universities,
as they had already been part of a different study conducted by other
members of the PrivacyScore team [82].
detecting exposed files To determine which websites have ex-
posed files, we developed a custom scanner which sends consecutive
GET requests for a set of paths on each domain in the dataset and
downloads the first 20 kilobytes of the response if the response code
is 200 OK, i.e. a file has been found under this path. It then determinesOur scanner usesd a






if the detected file is an information leak based on a regular expres-
sion that matches common features of the relevant file type. Some
of the requested paths are static (i.e., identical for all websites, like
example.de/key.pem or example.de/phpinfo.php), while others are
customized based on the domain name (e.g., example.de/example.pem).
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The exact requested paths are documented in Table 14 in Appendix B.
We ran this scan twice on different days and discarded all websites
that are found to be non-vulnerable in both scans. In the end, our scans
detected 1830 information leaks spread over 1736 different websites.
Vulnerabilities on different websites may have the same source. For
example, two domains may be hosted on the same misconfigured







vulnerability can be remediated with a single configuration change. As
this may introduce biases in the evaluation, we extracted characteristic
features from each exposed file and checked if they are shared with
other sites. If we detected correlated information leaks on multiple
domains, we excluded all but one domain from the dataset. With
this method, we were able to link 79 duplicate vulnerabilities to 23
common sources.
gathering contact information In order to be able to send
letters, we needed to manually determine a postal address for each




address in the imprint of the website. In order to keep the results
comparable, we also used manual address collection for the email
addresses. We thus manually collected postal and email addresses by
checking the imprints of all remaining vulnerable websites. For each
medium, we searched for a technical contact and, if none was given,
fell back to a general-purpose contact address, if available.10
The collected addresses also allowed us to further deduplicate the
dataset by detecting websites run by the same operator (e.g., a publish-
ing house or music label that operated multiple websites). This allowed We used the
addresses for further
deduplication.
us to only send a single message to the operator which notified them
about all vulnerabilities at once. In the following, we thus use the term
recipient to mean a single contact (individual or organizational) that
controls one or more websites.
6.2 study design
After collecting a corpus of websites and contact data, we proceeded We now describe the
design of the study
in more detail.
to preparing and conducting the actual study, which we describe in
this section.
6.2.1 Experimental Factors





presence of a more detailed description of potential attacks enabled
by the information leak. We also included a personalized link to a
10 This decision was made before we learned the lesson about having a unified contact
point from the previous chapter, and will once again cause problems in our evaluation.
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self-service scanning tool (cf. Section 6.2.5) in every message, which
allowed the recipients to validate if the information leak persists.
notification medium To investigate the role of the message
medium, we compared two notification classes: postal letters (letter)
and emails (email). Emails were sent using a purpose-specific emailEmails were sent
from a special email
account, while emails
were sent from our
research group.
account linked to our research group that was only used for this pur-
pose (web-survey@seemoo.tu-darmstadt.de). All emails were sent in
plaintext format (instead of HTML), as Stock et al. previously reported
HTML emails to be less effective [98]. Physical letters were using the
official letterhead of our group and contained a scanned and printed
signature from one of the researchers. The letterhead contained con-
tact information for letters, email (listing the purpose-specific address
mentioned above) and fax, but no telephone number. For an example
letter, see Figure 16 in Appendix B.
attack scenarios The second factor we were interested in is the
effect of providing or withholding a more detailed explanations of the








framings for our messages: in the baseline message, we simply gave a
very short description of the issue, without going into detail as to how
it could be exploited. The second class of messages, denoted with a
suffix of +atk (e. g. letter+atk), additionally contained a description
of an attack enabled by the vulnerability, under the assumption that a
detailed description of the risk leads to a higher incentive to remediate.
6.2.2 Group Allocation
Given these two factors, we were left with four experimental groups,
plus an unnotified control group, denoted control. After the ad-Message recipients
were randomly
assigned to the four
groups as well as a
control group.
dresses were collected and before we began group assignments, we
scanned all vulnerable websites again and removed those from the
dataset that had already been remediated. Afterwards, we randomly
assigned each recipient to one of the five groups, without consider-
ation for address availability. Recipients assigned to a medium for
which no address was available were not contacted and thus not
considered in later parts of the evaluation. This slightly reduced the
sample size, but avoided the introduction of a self-selection bias.
As different vulnerabilities may show different remediation behav-
ior, the vulnerability classes were stratified between the groups. TheVulnerabilities were
stratified between the
groups.
final assignments are shown in Table 3, which lists only recipients
for which the correct address is available (i. e., those that were actu-
ally notified). As we could only send a limited number of messages,
the letter+atk group was slightly smaller than the other groups
and contained a lower percentage of PHPInfo leaks. This leads to an
imbalance, which will be discussed in Section 6.4.
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Table 3: Number of notified recipients per group and vulnerability (recipients
can be affected by more than one vulnerability).
Group Status VCS DB Key PHPInfo Total
email 17 18 2 1 243 275
email+atk 13 16 3 0 253 280
letter 17 19 3 1 250 287
letter+atk 14 18 2 0 180 213
control 21 18 4 0 269 304
Total: 82 89 15 2 1196 1359
6.2.3 Experiment Timeline
We finalized the group assignment on June 10th, 2018, and sent the The experiment
spanned one month.letters one day later. To compensate for the higher delivery times
of postal mail, we delayed sending the emails by two days, sending
them on June 13th, 2018. We then monitored all websites for a month.
Due to the high cost of letters, we opted not to send reminders to
unremediated sites. Instead, we ended the experiment after a month
and (re-)notified all recipients (including the control group) who had
not yet remediated by email, informing them that they were (still)
vulnerable so that everyone had a chance to remediate the issue.
6.2.4 Monitoring
We monitored all website that are part of the experiment using nightly We monitored
included sites using
nightly scans.
scans with our automated scanning system. The results were saved to
a database for later analysis.
6.2.5 Self-Service Tool
Previous studies have repeatedly reported requests from recipients
for automated tools that support their remediation efforts [17, 69,
117]. While the impact on remediation rates has been reported as We offered recipients
a tool to verify if the
information leak had
been remediated, and
tracked their use of
this tool.
low [17], a tool can still be helpful to system operators. We thus
provided an online status page for each recipient where they could see
the remediation status of their own website (cf. Figure 9). It showed
each information leak with a short explanation of how it can be
remediated and a status indicator in the form of a colored dot that
is red (leak is still present), yellow (leak is no longer present, but
was there within the last five days) and green (leak has not been
detected for five consecutive days). The tool also allowed recipients to
trigger an automated scan of their website to immediately update the
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Figure 9: The self-service tool.
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remediation status after they made an attempt to remediate the issue.
The page could be accessed using a personalized link included in the
message, thereby allowing us to track who was using the tool, when
they triggered scans, and what the results were.
6.2.6 Evaluation
For the evaluation, we considered the remediation rates over time. As We evaluted
remediation rates
over time.
previously mentioned, recipients who were assigned to a medium
for which no contact information could be found were ignored in the
evaluation. As not all email servers send a notice if they discard a
message as spam, there may be messages in the email and email+atk
groups that were not delivered. To avoid discrepancies with the letter
and letter+atk groups, we thus did not attempt to exclude recip-
ients with undeliverable messages from the evaluation. This lowers
remediation rates compared to studies that choose to exclude bounced
messages.
We considered a website as remediated once all of its information All vulnerabilities
had to be addressed
for a site / recipient
to count as
remediated.
leaks had been remediated, and a recipient as remediated once all
of their websites were. This leads to all recipients making the same
contribution to the overall remediation rates, regardless of the number
of websites they control.
Given our overall small sample sizes, we wanted to estimate how
much variation we could expect on different samples with similar




to approximate the variation of the results. This allowed us to quantify
how uncertain we are about the results. We now briefly describe how
bootstrapping works. A more complete explanation can be found
in the original paper [35] or in the course materials by Orloff and
Bloom11.
an introduction to bootstrapping In the terminology of
bootstrapping, the results of our experiment are called the empirical
distribution (of (non)remediation) and denoted F∗. The empirical dis-
tribution is over our sample of n recipients, denoted x1, ..., xn, which
are drawn from the base distribution F (i.e., the distribution we would
have obtained, had we somehow been able to run our evaluation on
all German websites with information leaks, instead of our smaller
sample). Bootstrapping allows us to use our empirical distribution Bootstrapping allows




to estimate the variation of a statistic u computed over F by taking a
sample with replacement of size n from our (known) empirical distri-
bution F∗, which we denote x∗ = x∗1, ..., x
∗
n. We can then compute the
statistic of interest u∗ = u(x∗) over this new sample. According to
the bootstrap principle [35], if we repeat this process many times, the
11 See https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/mathematics/18-05-introduction-to-
probability-and-statistics-spring-2014/, last accessed 2020-11-10.
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variation of the obtained u∗ approximates the variation of u. We can
thus compute many resamples x∗, compute u∗ from them, and then
compute the measure of choice for the variation of u∗.
limitations of bootstrapping The bootstrapping technique
has some limitations. In particular, it assumes that x1, ..., xn are inde-
pendent (i. e., that the result of xa does not in some way depend on
the outcome of xb, with a ̸= b), and that the empirical distribution
F∗ is a representative sample of F. We tried to ensure the former byBootstrapping has
some limitations,
which we tried to
address in our
methodology.
considering recipients instead of websites (thus sidestepping the is-
sue of correlated remediations for multiple websites run by the same
operator), although additional connections between websites could
exist that we were not aware of (like being run by the same web de-
sign agency). The latter issue hinges on the representativeness of our
sample of websites, and what we consider to be our base distribution
for which it should be representative (all websites? German websites?
German websites fulfilling the Wikipedia relevance criteria?). Thus,
the results should be interpreted with care. However, bootstrapping
still gives us more solid results overall.




compute the 1st and 3rd quartiles (denoted Q1 / Q3) in addition to
the median of remediation rates on each day.
6.2.7 Ethical Considerations
Whenever we perform large-scale vulnerability scanning, we operate
in a gray area. We have previously discussed the legality of such scansWe took care to
ensure the legality
and ethics of our
research.
(cf. Section 3.4), and the results also apply here. To avoid collecting
sensitive data, we limited the amount of data we retrieve with our
scans to 20 kilobytes. This allows us to avoid accidentally downloading
entire database backups and also reduces the impact we have on the
system under test. All downloaded data was deleted after the end of
the study.
Our scanning system identified itself with a custom user-agent
string and a reverse DNS entry for the IP of the scanning machine. ItWe did not attempt
to hide the source of
the scans.
hosted a small website with an explanation, thereby allowing system
operators to easily determine who is scanning them and why. It also
offered them a way to opt out of the study.
Our notification messages clearly stated that they were sent as part
of a study and contained our contact information to allow recipients
to opt out of the study. Recipients who were not notified during theMessages clearly
stated that they were
sent as part of a
study.
study (due to a lack of available contact information with the assigned
channel or because they were assigned to the control group) were
notified after the end of the study to give them an opportunity to
remediate and also the option to opt out of the study. We received no
opt-out requests.
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Table 4: Reachability of the recipients per contact group.
Group Assigned No Contact Bounced Reached Unknown
email 302 27 (8.94 %) 4 (1.32 %) 76 (25.17 %) 195 (64.60 %)
email+atk 302 22 (7.28 %) 6 (1.99 %) 74 (24.50 %) 200 (66.23 %)
letter 304 17 (5.61 %) 3 (0.99 %) 97 (32.01 %) 187 (61.51 %)
letter+atk 224 11 (4.89 %) 3 (1.34 %) 58 (25.78 %) 152 (67.86 %)
Sum 1132 77 (6.80 %) 16 (1.41 %) 305 (26.94 %) 734 (64.84 %)
At the time of the study, TU Darmstadt did not require ethics We did not seek
ethics approval for
this study.
approval for this type of research. We thus did not apply for ethics
approval. However, we later sought out and received ethics approval
for a substantially similar study employing similar safeguards, which
will be discussed in the next chapter.
6.3 results
We now investigate the effect of our notifications, the use of our self- We now present the
results of our study.service tool, and briefly discuss the interactions with the recipients.
Once again, the interpretation of the results will follow in the next
section.
6.3.1 Remediation Rates
The overall delivery success is reasonably high. 77 of 1132 recipients
(6.8 %) were assigned to a medium for which no contact information
was available, and thus not notified. An additional 10 emails (1.7 %) Delivery success was
reasonably high.and 6 letters (1.1 %) were returned as undeliverable. As previously
mentioned, the real number may be higher for emails, as not all
mail servers notify the sender about rejected or dropped messages.
305 recipients (26.9 %) either sent a non-automated response to the
message or used the self-service tool. We thus consider them reached for
the purpose of the evaluation. The remaining 734 messages (64.8 %) are
in an unknown state. Table 4 provides an overview of these numbers,
broken down by experimental group.
overall remediation We observed large differences between All groups
outperformed the
control group.
the different experimental groups. The least effective group, email
Remediation rates
for notified groups
ranged from 39.3 to
64.3%.
(without attack scenarios) achieved a remediation rate of 39.3 %, while
the best group, letter, achieved 64.3 % remediation, an improvement
of 25 percentage points. However, even the worst group outperformed
the remediation rate of the control group, which only achieved 4.3 %.
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(b) Vulnerabilities (Cryptographic Keys omitted
for readability)




























































Figure 10: Median, 1st and 3rd quartiles for the remediation rates in different experimental groups,
vulnerabilities, mediums, and presence of attack scenarios. Gray areas denote weekends,
dotted line shows when the emails were sent.
Figure 10 shows that most remediations occur within the first two
weeks of the study. We summarize the results in more detail in Table 5.
communication medium Letters resulted in a substantially
higher remediation rate than emails (59 vs. 40 % remediation, cf. Fig-




the email groups did not show large jumps in remediation after the
first week, letters still increased remediation in the second week and
only fall off afterwards.
attack scenarios Curiously, the impact of adding a description
of attack scenarios differed between the two communication mediums:




able increase in remediation rates, while for letters, attack scenarios
actually decreased the the remediation rates by 12.4 percentage points
(cf. Figure 10(a)). In aggregate, this led to messages that include the
attack scenario achieving a remediation rate of 45.3 % and thereby
being outperformed by the 52 % remediation rate of their less explicit
counterparts.
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Table 5: Median, 1st (Q1) and 3rd (Q3) quartiles of bootstrapped remedia-
tion rates in percent for different groups at the end of the study
timeframe.
Group n Median Q1 Q3
email 275 39.3 37.5 41.5
email+atk 280 40.4 38.2 42.1
letter 287 64.3 62.6 66.1
letter+atk 213 51.9 49.5 54.2
All emails 555 40.0 38.4 41.3
All letters 500 59.0 57.4 60.4
All baseline 562 52.0 50.8 53.5
All +atk 493 45.3 43.7 46.8
PHPInfo 926 48.3 48.3 50.5
VCS 71 40.8 36.6 45.1
Status 61 45.9 41.0 50.8
Database 10 60.0 50.0 70.0
Keyfile 2 50.0 50.0 50.0
control 304 4.3 3.6 4.9
We investigate this counterintuitive result in more detail by con-
sidering the different vulnerability types separately. Table 6 shows
the remediation rates for the three largest groups of vulnerabilities
separately for the different groups. It shows that the reduction seems








creased by 8.3 percentage points when including an attack scenario.
This decrease is not spread evenly between the contact mediums: the
email and email+atk groups have almost identical performance (40.7
vs. 41.1 %), while letter+atk showed a large decrease compared to
the baseline letter group, lowering the remediation rate from 65.2 to
51.1 %. The other vulnerabilities showed increases in remediation of
6.3 to 10.7 percentage points when adding attack scenarios. However,
the latter numbers should be treated with caution due to the limited
number of samples, which lead to a large spread in the quartiles
of the bootstrapped distributions, decreasing the confidence in their
accuracy.
vulnerability type The different vulnerability types show small





VCS leaks show remediation rates of 48.3, 45.9 and 40.8 %, respectively.
The two most severe vulnerabilities, public database backups and
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Table 6: Median and quartiles of bootstrapped remediation rates for different
vulnerability types at the end of the study timeframe, with and
without attack scenarios. (Database and keyfile omitted due to low
sample size).




e PHPInfo 493 53.3 51.9 55.0
Status 34 41.2 35.3 47.1




k PHPInfo 433 45.0 43.4 46.7
Status 27 51.9 44.4 59.3
VCS 34 44.1 38.2 50.0
cryptographic keys, show remediation rates of 60 and 50 %, respec-
tively. However, their small sample sizes of 10 and 2 lead to limited
expressiveness.
effect of reachability Some of these results, in particular
those for the message medium, may also be explainable through
general differences in message delivery success: It may be that we are
only measuring if letters are delivered more successfully than emails,
instead of measuring if a letter is more effective than an email if both






not matter (or is even desireable), as we are primarily interested in
the probability of a single sent (not: read) message causing a recipient
to remediate. However, we can still try to begin to answer the second
question by considering only those recipients that have either sent a
manual response to our message or used our self-service tool. This
(highly self-selected) subsample contains only those recipients where
we can be certain that they read and considered the message — if we
still observe differences here, we may reasonably expect them to be
caused by the contents and medium of the message, not the success
of the delivery.
In this subsample of 305 recipients, the remediation rates were (as
can be expected) very high: 85.3 % for emails and 90.3 % for letters (cf.






the message resulted in very similar performance (88.4 and 87.1 %),
but when taking them together with the medium, we see that the
attack scenario still helped for emails and hurt the letters, although
the difference is less pronounced now. The trends for the different
vulnerability classes remained similar to the full dataset as well.
6.3 results 97

























































(b) Vulnerabilities (Cryptographic Keys omitted
for readability)






















































Figure 11: Median, 1st and 3rd quartiles for the remediation rates in different experimental groups,
vulnerabilities, mediums, and presence of attack scenarios, for reached recipients only.
6.3.2 Use of Self-Service Tool
The self-service tool was widely used, with 266 recipients (25.2 %)
accessing the tool at least once, and 192 of them (18.2 % of the total,
72.1 % of tool users) triggering a manual scan. The spread between
the different experimental groups is given in Table 7. Many status
pages (65.8 %) were only accessed on a single day, while a small subset The self-service tool
was widely used,
though only 60.4%




was accessed on up to 15 separate days (median: 1, Q1: 1, Q3: 2). The
triggered scans show a similar behavior: 37 % of tool users required
only a single scan, while some used up to nine scans (median: 2, Q1: 1,
Q3: 3). Surprisingly, only 116 recipients (60.4 % of scan users) scanned
their website after remediating to validate that they were successful.
Tool users were very likely to remediate. 90.2 % of recipients that
accessed the tool remediated, and this percentage climbs to 95.8 %
when considering only those that triggered at least one manual scan
before attempting their remediation. We stress that this does not imply
that the tool causes remediation, as tool users are self-selected: they
received and read the notification and trusted it enough to click a link The (highly
self-selected) sample
of tool users was
very likely to
remediate.
from an unknown sender. This makes them more likely to remediate,
with or without a tool. Thus, we cannot make any claims about the
effect of providing a tool on remediation rates.
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Table 7: Percentage of recipients who viewed and used the tool before (B)
and after (A) remediation.
Group ViewB ViewA UseB UseA
email 23.6 % 13.5 % 13.5 % 7.3 %
email+atk 22.1 % 15.4 % 15.0 % 11.4 %
letter 25.2 % 22.0 % 18.5 % 15.0 %
letter+atk 22.0 % 15.4 % 15.9 % 9.8 %
Table 8: Number of contacted recipients and non-automated responses by
group and medium.
Group n Email Phone Fax Letter Sum
email 275 29 3 0 0 31
email+atk 280 28 2 0 0 30
letter 287 25 3 1 0 29
letter+atk 213 13 1 0 1 15
All 1055 95 9 1 1 105
6.3.3 Communication with Recipients
The overall response rate (not counting bounces and autoreplies) was
10 % (105 out of 1055). Most responses expressed gratitude for the10% of recipients
responded to the
notification message.
notification, although two recipients interpreted our messages as fraud
or spam and complained. To the latter, we clarified our intentions and
offered not to contact them again. 86 respondents informed us that
the problem had been addressed or forwarded to the maintainers of
the website, although three of these still had unremediated PHPInfo




commented on the tool, calling it helpful, and some asked if we
could scan other websites under their control. These, we referred to
the PrivacyScore platform. We did not receive any opt-out requests,
although our network operator received one abuse message about
our scans which did not contain enough information to assign it to a
domain.
95 responses used email as their medium of choice, regardless of
the medium we used to contact them (cf. Table 8). We also received
one letter and one fax and, most interestingly, nine phone calls. TheMost responses were
sent via email,
although we also
received a number of
phone calls.
latter apparently searched out a phone number from the website
of the research group, with at least one reaching the secretary of
the group, and another one calling the central switchboard of the
university and being forwarded over multiple intermediaries until
they reached the correct person. The number of phone calls should
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thus be considered a lower bound. Many of these callers wanted to
validate the authenticity of the message on a different communication
channel, as they mistrusted it and suspected a forgery.
6.4 discussion






4.3 % of the control group, shows that our notifications were effective
at increasing the remediation rates. However, we also observed a large
spread of remediation rates between the different experimental groups,
which ranged from 39.3 to 64.3 %. This shows that the varied factors
can have a large impact on the remediation rates. We thus consider
these factors in the following.
manual address collection improves deliverability Many
previous studies attempted to reach website operators directly [17,
18, 34, 68, 69, 98, 99, 108, 117] (instead of intermediaries like hosting
providers), and frequently reported delivery issues when using fully
automated address collection. For example, contacting email addresses Many previous
studies struggled
with finding a valid
contact address for
their notifications.
collected from the WHOIS interface repeatedly led to bounce rates ex-
ceeding 10 % [98, 99], although Zeng et al. also reported rates as low as
3 % [117]. When using auto-generated email addresses following RFC
2142 [24] (abuse@domain.tld, ...) the bounce rates frequently exceed
50 % [18, 96, 99]. This demonstrates that automated address collection
or generation struggles to reliably reach a large fraction of recipients,
especially now that the WHOIS system no longer lists email addresses
for many TLDs.
Stock et al. attempted to circumvent this issue through manual
address collection, similar to the experiments performed in this study
but at a smaller scale (N = 364 over 10 groups) [98]. They reported no




their experiments suffer from the small sample size and self-selection
(manual notifications were only attempted with websites that had not
reacted to an automated notification), they nevertheless indicate that
the delivery success of manual address collection may not always be
as high as in our study, where we observed bounce rates of 1.1 and
1.7 % for emails and letters, respectively.
It is clear that manual address collection does not scale to very large The work involved in





notification campaigns. However, it may have a place for smaller or
very important notifications. Overall, a reliable, automated method
for reaching system operators is urgently needed to facilitate the
distribution of security notifications.
letters are effective In our experiments, letters substantially
outperformed emails in terms of remediation rates, showing an in-
crease of almost 20 percentage point. This is likely related to a com- Letters outperformed
emails, likely due to
a combination of a
priori trust and
better deliverability.
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bination of factors. It is possible that letters simply receive a higher
a priori trust than emails, as the amount of spam and scam messages
sent via postal mail is much lower than that for emails. It may also
be due to the lack of automated spam filters on postal messages.
However, letters lead to an improvement in remediation rate even
when we only consider recipients that definitely received and read the
message. Thus, improved delivery alone cannot explain the improved
remediation rates achieved with letters, and other factors must be at
play as well.
Regardless of the source, this improvement comes at a cost: even
leaving aside the issue of manual address collection, sending 500However, it is
expensive and
labor-intensive, so it
may not work for all
scenarios.
letters cost around 400 € in postage and five hours of work to print
and place the letters in envelopes. This investment may be justified
for very important notifications, but is likely unsuitable as the default
mechanism for notifications, even taking into account commercial
mailing services and enveloping machines that could be used to reduce
the required manual effort.
verifiability fosters trust The first step in achieving reme-
diation is to gain the trust of the recipient and convince them that







ognized the name of the university, which helped them overcome
their initial distrust. However, we also encountered some distrusting
recipients that went to considerable effort to validate the authenticity
of the message through phone calls, sometimes initially reaching the
wrong person. This is in line with prior results that reported recipients
reaching out to verify the veracity of the notification message [15, 16].
Another factor that reportedly increased trust was the self-service






significantly increase remediation rates [17], a tool could nevertheless
increase trust and decrease support requests by recipients (if it contains
sufficient documentation for the recipient to remediate the issue). Such
tools have been repeatedly requested in previous studies [17, 69, 117].






search has shown several times that more detailed messages increase
remediation rates [18, 68, 108] and trust in messages [98]. We were
thus surprised that the attack scenarios did not substantially improve
remediation for emails, and actively detracted from it for letters, at least
for the PHPInfo vulnerability.
A different explanation holds that an expanded explanation pro-
vides a more nuanced view of the danger, which may reduce the
perceived danger compared to categorical statements like “this file
should not be available”. This may explain why the PHPInfo sites
were the only group where the attack scenario did not improve re-
mediation. The recipients may have also done their own research: anIt may be related to
the added nuance a
more detailed
explanation provided,
or to other, unknown
factors.
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online search for “phpinfo dangerous” returns some results that imply
that exposing PHPInfo files is discouraged but not dangerous in itself.
However, there is no plausible explanations for why the number of
recipients seeking our further information should be higher in the
group that already received more detailed explanations, and why they
should only apply to letters, not to emails.
A final explanation may be that the messages are read by a different
group of people: maybe the people who read and respond to email
messages are from a different department than those acting upon
letters. This is plausible, as it is likely that more organizations offered
a specific email address for technical issues than offered a special postal
address. It may thus be the case that a higher percentage of emails was
sent to technical contacts than was the case for letters, and that system
operators react different to other people in the organization. As we
did not label collected addresses with the type of contact, we cannot
determine if the behavior of technical and general-purpose contacts
is different, and it also remains unclear why only the PHPInfo group
should be affected by this difference. Regardless of the mechanism
creating these observed differences, the results highlight that more
work is needed to understand the perspectives of system operators
that receive unsolicited notifications.
6.5 limitations
A few issues can potentially limit the external validity of our results.
First of all, most vulnerabilities in our dataset are PHPInfo leaks, We now discuss
limitations of our
study.
which are arguably the easiest to remediate. However, we’ve seen
that their remediation rates are only marginally higher than that of
other vulnerabilities (cf. Figure 10(b)), which limits the impact of this
imbalance. The lower percentage of PHPInfo vulnerabilities in the Our dataset had
multiple imbalances,
the effects of which
should be minor.
letter+atk group (83.7 vs. 86.2 to 88.7 %) poses another imbalance
in the dataset. However, due to the aforementioned low differences
in remediation rates between the different vulnerability types, it may
contribute to but cannot explain the observed differences between
letter and letter+atk.
Our study suffers from observer effects, as we did not attempt
to hide that our messages were sent as part of a study. This may The study is affected
by observer effects.have caused recipients to (consciously or unconsciously) alter their
behavior. Future studies should consider obfuscating the nature of the
notifications to avoid these effects, as long as the deception is revealed
after the end of the study. In this case, it is advisable to seek ethical
review.
Our dataset is geographically limited to German websites. This The study was
limited to German





increases the availability of contact information on websites due to
German legislation requiring its disclosure. It may also promote name
recognition of the sending institution, thereby influencing the remedi-
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ation (assuming the identity of the sender has an effect on remediation
rates, which is questioned by previous studies [18, 98, 117]).
Finally, we conducted the study three weeks after the GDPR cameThe
coming-into-force of
the GDPR at the
time of the study
may have had an
unquantifiable effect
on the results.
into effect. If this event had any temporally limited effects on system
operators, for example due to an increased concern for data protection,
it may skew our results. We are unable to quantify the effects of this.
6.6 conclusion
In this chapter, we described our randomized controlled notification
experiment with 1359 German website operators affected by unin-
tentional information leaks. We used this dataset12 to compare the







and letters — and the inclusion of scenarios describing potential at-
tacks that result from these leaks. We collected contact information
manually, which resulted in low bounce rates (less than 2 %).
The overall remediation rate reached 48.9 % for notified recipients
over a period of a month, compared to 4.3 % for an unnotified control
group in the same timeframe. The use of letters as an alternativeNotification were
effective, especially
for letters. Changing
the message led to
inconclusive results.
notification channel proved to be successful, in some cases increasing
remediation rates by 25 percentage points. On the other hand, descrip-
tions of attack scenarios failed to improve results for the email group,
and reduced the overall remediation rates for letters. This trend seems
to be driven by a decrease in remediation rate for the most numerous
vulnerability, while other vulnerabilities saw increased remediation
rates from attack descriptions.
These results leave us with a number of questions. First, given
that the only previous study using letters reported only marginal
improvements [98], can our results be replicated on a larger dataset?
Second, if attack scenarios do not reliably improve remediation, whatThese results raise a
number of questions
that we attempt to
answer with a third
notification study,
described in the next
chapter.
other arguments could be used? Given the prominence of the GDPR
at the time of this study, can legal arguments provide an incentive, as
proposed by Çetin et al. [18] and our own study concerning health
insurance websites? Third, given that several recipients mentioned
trusting us because they recognized the sender, does the sender of
notification messages really have little to no effect, as claimed by
previous studies [18, 98, 117]? Fourth and finally, what are the views of
notification recipients? Are unsolicited notifications desireable? How
should they be designed and delivered? To answer these questions,
we design and conduct another notification study, which we describe
in the next chapter.
12 The used messages, code and data underlying the study can be found on Zenodo:
https://zenodo.org/record/4817464 (last accessed 2021-07-15).
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A LT E R N AT I V E S E N D E R S A N D N O N - T E C H N I C A L
A R G U M E N T S
In the previous chapters we have shown that utilizing competition only
has very limited effects in driving changes to the privacy properties of
websites, and even in the area of security, where the interests of users
and operators are more aligned, notifications still led to less than half






raises the question of what other incentive may convince operators
to remediate, if the security of their website is not sufficient. Given
the near-panic caused by the GDPR coming into effect, which saw
companies shut down rather than risk the fees imposed for violations1,
compliance may be the answer. This idea that legal liability may be a Legal requirements /
liability may serve as
an alternative
motivator.
powerful motivator was previously proposed by Çetin et al. [18]. It is
also supported by the measurements conducted as part of the first
study, which saw significant changes on websites when the GDPR
came into force (cf. Section 5.3.4.1). At the same time, the previous
study has raised a number of additional questions (cf. Section 6.6), for
which we want to collect additional data.
To evaluate these, we conducted a third and final study, which will




of the study before continuing with a detailed description of the study
design, which includes three components working together to answer
our research questions. We then give the detailed results of our study
and put them into context, before ending the chapter with a discussion
of the limitations of our study and an overall conclusion.
7.1 overview





before going into more detail about the technical and legal background
of the misconfiguration under study. We close with a description of
the dataset underlying the study.
7.1.1 Research Questions




tions. First, we aimed to strengthen the evidence for the results of the
previous study by repeating the comparison of email and letter as the
contact medium. Second, given that several respondents in the previ-
1 See, for example, https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/11/technology/gdpr-tech-
companies-losers/index.html, last accessed 2021-03-05.
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ous study mentioned trusting the messages because they came from
a university (Section 6.4), we sought to replicate or refute previous
studies that claimed that the sender of the message does not have a
significant impact on remediation rates [18, 98, 117] by comparing
three different senders: a private individual as well as a computer science
and a legal research group. Third, given the effectiveness of regulatory
changes observed in the first study (cf. Section 5.3.4.1), we investigated
legal compliance as a new framing to incentivize remediation, replacing
the security framing of the previous study.






aimed to collect additional data on the use of a self-service check tool
that allowed recipients to validate their remediation attempts. We also
sought to gain further insight about the perspectives of the recipients
by sending them a survey at the end of the study and conducting a
more detailed analysis of their responses to our messages.
7.1.2 The Issue
To test a compliance-based framing, we needed an issue that has




this purpose, we used a misconfiguration of the Google Analytics
web analytics software, for which we already had a proof of concept
detection system implemented in the PrivacyScore platform (cf. Sec-
tion 3.1.1), which also showed the problem to be wide-spread and
thus a promising avenue for such research. We first describe the issue
from a technical perspective before discussing the legal aspects that
make it suitable for our study.
google analytics basics Google Analytics2 is a web tracking
platform operated by Google. It allows website operators to gainGoogle Analytics is a
web tracking service. insight into how many users visit their website, which sites referred
them, and how long they stay on the website, among other features. It
can also be integrated with Google’s advertising platform3, increasing
its value for websites that rely on advertising to attract customers.
Google Analytics is used by including a JavaScript-based library in
the website. This JavaScript code is then configured with a trackingIt is embedded and
configured using a
JavaScript snippet.
ID and any additional settings, before sending events to the Google
Analytics servers. The most common event is a page view, although
other events (like adding items to a shopping cart) can also be tracked.





google analytics ip anonymization One of the settings that






this setting is activated, the parameter aip=1 is added to all tracking
requests, which instructs the Google servers to “anonymize” the IP
address of the visitor by setting the last octet of the IP address to
zero (i.e., 130.83.183.199 will be turned into 130.83.183.0). For IPv6
addresses, the last 80 bits are set to zero instead. Enabling IP anony-
mization requires changes in the JavaScript code that configures the
Google Analytics library, and the exact methods differ between dif-
ferent versions of the library. This makes the process error-prone (cf.
Appendix C.1).
Such an anonymization likely has only a small impact on the real-





advantages that make it suitable for our study: It can be detected au-
tomatically (by checking for the aip=1 parameter), and not activating
the feature is considered a data protection law violation in Germany.
ip anonymization and data protection law Even before




mization was considered a violation of data protection law5. Under
the GDPR, this requirement has been upheld in a 2019 decision of a
German sub-court [66].6
Enforcement of the GDPR usually falls to the data protection au-





of a non-compliant company to send a written warning with costs
(“Abmahnung”). As this practice has seen some misuse in the past,
German website owners are very conscious of any issue that may
result in such a warning.








sponsibility for any content they embed into their website from third
parties [22]. This means that even Google Analytics code used by
third party providers (like widgets, CMSs or advertising networks) fall
under the responsibility of the website owner. This makes the issue
particularly suitable for our purposes, as it ensures that, regardless of
the source of the misconfiguration, attributing the legal responsibility




analytics-ab-sofort-moeglich.html for a German press release on the topic
(original source unavailable due to link rot), last accessed 2021-03-05.
6 After the end of the study, the German association of data protection authorities
released an opinion that recommends, but no longer requires, IP anonymization
for German websites. However, it also requires explicit consent before any data is
sent to Google, implying that any website that our scanners find to be using Google
Analytics are in violation of the proposed guidelines, regardless of the anonymization
status. See https://www.datenschutzkonferenz-online.de/media/dskb/20200526_
beschluss_hinweise_zum_einsatz_von_google_analytics.pdf for further details,
last accessed 2021-05-17.
106 alternative senders and non-technical arguments
for a misconfiguration to the operator of the tested domain will always
be correct.
7.1.3 The Dataset
For our final notification campaign, we needed to assemble a dataset.We describe the
dataset collection
method.
We describe the individual steps of the process here.





the same reasons outlined in the previous chapter, we focussed our
study on websites based in Germany by filtering for the German TLD
.de (further filtering was performed later in the process). Firstly, we
again used data collected from the Wikidata platform, from which
we obtained 32 782 domains with the correct TLD. We augmented
this dataset with a set of merged and deduplicated internet toplists
collected by Scheitle et al. [94], filtered by TLD, resulting in 1 265 750
additional domains being added to the dataset, for a grand total of
1 298 532 domains.
detecting the misconfiguration To detect the misconfigu-
ration, we developed and deployed a compliance checker based on the
Chrome browser and controlled via the Chrome DevTools protocol, a
platform we have prior experience with due to its use in the Privacy-





as an automated scanning system with a modified user agent, and
executes JavaScript and other code like a regular browser, logging all
traffic. If traffic to Google Analytics servers is found, it injects custom
JavaScript to determine the configuration of the Google Analytics li-
brary. The data obtained through this custom JavaScript is not used to
determine the compliance status (which can be more reliably inferred
from the network traffic). However, it can be used to determine certain
types of the misconfiguration, like activating IP anonymization only
after the tracking request was sent (cf. Appendix C.1). It also provides
some additional information for users of the self-service scanning tool
(discussed in Section 7.2.5)
We used the scanner to check the compliance status of all websites
in our dataset, finding 3070 (9.36 %) non-compliant websites from




numbers should be considered a lower bound, as the scanner does not
interact with consent forms on the website. Thus, a cookie consent form
that only embeds a non-compliant Google Analytics after the dialog
has been confirmed would not be detected by our system.
gathering contact information We selected a subset of
these websites for our study by first visiting all non-compliant websites
from the Wikidata group and attempting to collect address information
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from the imprint. We also categorized them into different groups We manually
collected contact
information and
other metadata for a
subset of these
websites.
(company, individual, public sector, ...), which allowed us to avoid
biases later in the experiment. Of the 3070 non-compliant Wikidata
websites, 1590 were found suitable for the study and included (the
criteria for this will be discussed below). To achieve a larger sample, we
then repeated the process for a random sample of 5000 non-compliant
websites from the toplist dataset. 91 of these were already present in
the Wikidata dataset and thus not considered again.
The address collection was performed independently by three dif-
ferent researchers for each website. Disagreements were resolved by Three researchers
independently
collected the data for
each website.
majority votes or, if no majority existed, discussion inside the team.
The process of collecting and validating this data took over 500 person-
hours, during which we also performed periodic rescans to remove
sites that had become compliant in the meantime.
During and after the address collection, we excluded a total of 3225
websites from the study for several reasons: The most common issues We excluded a
number of websites
from the study for
different reasons.
were that no contact information was found (about 20 % of excluded
domains) or the website operator resided outside of Germany (again,
about 20 % of excluded sites). Some websites were unreachable at
the time of the data collection and excluded (about 10 %). We also
excluded websites of politicians to avoid cross-contamination with a
different study (less than 1 % of excluded sites). Finally, we scanned
all websites again before the messages were sent and excluded all
websites that either became compliant or went offline in the months
between address collection and the initial notification, which accounts
for the remaining excluded websites (approx. 30 %).
Similarly to the previous study, we attempted to merge websites
run by the same operator by deduplicating based on the contact




are obviously related, i.e., had identical or very similar addresses (e.g.,
identical street address and company name only differing by a suffix
like “GmbH”). Our final dataset contains 4754 websites run by 4594
owners.
7.2 study design






sion of the experimental factors that we varied as part of the study,
before discussing how recipients were assigned to groups. We then
describe the timeline of the experiment, and continue with a discus-
sion of the three core data collection mechanisms used in this study:
the monitoring system, self-service tool, and survey of recipients. We
close with a discussion of the evaluation methodology and the ethical
issues surrounding our study.
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7.2.1 Experimental Factors




the sender, and the framing. We discuss each in more detail below.
notification medium As in the previous study, we were inter-
Like in the previous
study, we compared
letter and email.
ested in determining the effect of the notification medium. Once again,
we compared letters (letter) and emails (email). Emails were again
sent in plaintext.
sender We evaluated three different senders for the messages:






puter science research group (uni-cs), and a legal research group
(uni-law). Max Maass posed as the private individual. The Secure
Mobile Networking Lab at TU Darmstadt served as the computer
science sender, and the Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht, Informationsrecht,
Umweltrecht, Verwaltungswissenschaft headed by Prof. Spiecker at the
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt as the legal research sender.
For the two university senders, emails were sent using a purpose-
specific email account (notification@group.university.tld) hosted on uni-





matically printed postage), as printed postage was deemed unrealistic
for a private sender. They used the regular postal address of the uni-
versity and its official letterhead. The letterhead and email signatures
contained the full address of the research group and an email and a
phone number, including a weekly time window when telephone sup-
port would be provided. Max Maass used his home address for lettersWe provided
recipients with a
contact phone
number for the two
institutional senders.
and created a new email account with a commercial German email
provider for the study. His letters did not contain a phone number,
and emails contained neither phone number nor postal address, as it
was judged unlikely that a private individual would include them in
such a message.







vacy concern without referencing any regulation (privacy), a notifi-
cation about the GDPR violation (gdpr), and an extended version of
the latter that also mentions the potential fines for GDPR violations
(gdpr+fine).
The privacy message was intended as a baseline, as it contains no
special attempts to motivate remediation, aside from a general argu-
ment that not enabling IP anonymization is bad for the privacy of the
website visitors. The gdpr and gdpr+fine framings investigated theThe privacy framing
served as a baseline
to compare the others
against.
added effectiveness from providing a legal argument and referencing
potential fines, respectively. As no precedent for the expected fines for
this violation existed, we chose to cite the maximum sanctions allowed
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by the GDPR for the gdpr+fine framing. The text of the different
messages is given in Appendix C.3.
7.2.2 Group Allocation
We conducted our study with a full factorial design, i.e., all combi-
nations of medium, sender and framing were used, in addition to
a control group (control) which did not receive any notifications.







could be found in the imprint are randomly assigned to one of the
groups that used this channel. This was the case for 87 email-only
and 152 letter-only recipients (approximately 6 % of non-control
recipients). The other recipients were assigned to a random group (in-
cluding the control group). This sampling was stratified by the type of
We stratified based
on the type of the
website to avoid
biases.
website (company, individual, public sector, etc.) to avoid introducing
biases. As many previous studies considered emails, we decided to
emphasize letters in our study by assigning twice as many recipients
to letter groups than to email groups. This allowed us to collect
more data on the behavior and perspectives of letter recipients.
7.2.3 Experiment Timeline
In total, we sent up to three messages to notification recipients. We sent three sets of
messages as part of
the study.
initial notification The first message was the initial notifica-
tion, which was sent to all (non-control) recipients. Email notifications The initial
notification was sent
in July 2019.
were sent from the 1st to 5th of July 2019, spread over multiple days
to avoid triggering rate-based spam filters. To ensure that they would
arrive at approximately the same time, letters were sent on the Friday
of the previous week to compensate for postal delivery times.
reminder Recipients that had not remediated by the 25th of July
2019 received a reminder message on the same medium. Aside from We sent reminders to
all unremediated
sites in August.
a small number of website operators that had complained about our
messages and asked not to be contacted again, we also excluded all
recipients for whom the delivery of the initial message failed from the
reminders. Recipients that had already contacted us but not become
compliant yet received a hand-crafted reminder message if one was
judged appropriate based on the previous interactions. Reminder
emails were sent on the 1st and 2nd of August 2019, while letters were
only sent on the 6th of August due to organizational delays.
Human error in the creation of the reminder messages led to all A mistake in letter
creation led to
incorrect reminders
being sent to some
recipients.
letter – uni-law recipients receiving the gdpr+fine framing. This
mistake may skew the results, and will be discussed in more detail in
Section 7.3.1.2.
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disclosure and survey Finally, on the 1st of October we sentThe final message





a debriefing message that revealed that the messages were part of a
scientific study, and contained a link to a survey with a number of
questions for system owners, which will be described in Section 7.2.6.
The message also offered recipients the option to opt out of the study.
The control group received a separate debriefing message that in-
formed them that their website had been part of a study, to give them
the opportunity to remediate the issue as well.
7.2.4 Monitoring
During the data collection timeframe, we used the compliance scanner
discussed in Section 7.1.3 to conduct four scans of all study websites
per day. This allowed us to determine when the misconfiguration wasWe scanned all
websites that were
part of the study
four times per day.
remediated. Scanning multiple times a day also allowed compensating
for scan errors or other factors that can influence individual scans. For
example, the multiple daily scans revealed that one website served
different content during the day and night, and only one of the two
versions was affected by the misconfiguration. Thus, the larger amount
of scans increases our confidence in the correctness of our results.
7.2.5 Self-Service Tool and Support





to a self-service scanning tool that allowed them to validate their
remediation attempts, and we offered limited support via email and
phone.
self-service tool Scanning tools are often requested by noti-
fication recipients [17, 69, 117], although their effect on remediation
rates is reportedly low [17]. For our study, we decided to offer a publicWe operated and
linked to a public
self-service tool that
was not outwardly
affiliated with any of
the senders.
scanning tool, called Check Google Analytics (CheckGA), that allows
recipients (and everyone else) to verify the status of Google Analytics
on their website. As we were using multiple different senders, we did
not want to associate the tool with one of the involved individuals
or institutions to avoid biasing the results. Thus, we hosted the tool
under the domain of the research group “Privatsphäre und Sicherheit
in Informationssystemen” at the Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg,
which also operates the PrivacyScore platform and is not outwardly
affiliated with any of the senders. To ensure the tool could be found
using search engines, we linked it from the homepage of the group
and explicitly submitted it for indexing by popular search engines.
Over the course of the study, some recipients also shared the tool onSome recipients
shared the tool on
social media.
social media or wrote blog posts about it, further increasing its reach.
The tool provides users with a detailed report about the presence of
Google Analytics on their website (cf. Figure 12). The report includes
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Figure 12: Part of a scan result by the self-service tool (cropped to exclude list of requests).
a list of detected tracker objects with their settings, what their origins It provided helpful
information to allow
operators to find the
source of the
misconfiguration.
are (as some third-party content like Spotify widgets include Google
Analytics), and a list of all tracking requests sent to Google Analytics
with all parameters. It also contains a help page with more information
on how IP Anonymization can be enabled for the different Google
Analytics libraries, and a list of common pitfalls and mistakes (cf.
Appendix C.1).
For the purpose of the study and future evaluations, we instru-
mented the system with data collection capabilities. We collect the The tool was
instrumented for
data collection for
the purpose of the
study.
scanned URL, the time of the scan, the truncated IP of the user (with
the last octet removed) as well as the TLS session ID [28], which we
use to link scans performed by the same user [103]. This allowed us
to determine sets of websites that may be operated by the same user
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(as one administrator may scan all their websites to validate their
compliance). The tools’ privacy policy documents this data collection.
personal support We also gave limited personal support via
phone, email and occasionally letter. This support mostly came in theWe provided limited
one-on-one support. form of assuring recipients that the message is authentic and resolving
complaints and misunderstandings. However, we also provided basic
troubleshooting support if recipients contacted us with questions on
the configuration. The interactions with the recipients are described in
more detail in Section 7.3.3.
7.2.6 Survey
To gain further insight into the perspectives of the recipients, the final




issues of trust and
problem awareness
and -solving.
hosted on the platform Soscisurvey7 and contained questions about
the recipients’ perception of our notification messages, their problem
awareness and -solving strategies. Additionally, we collected infor-
mation about their awareness of other tools geared towards system
operators, asked if they would like to receive notifications in the future
and via which medium, and requested basic information about their




were tailored for the individual groups (based on medium, sender,
framing, and compliance status at the end of the study timeframe)
and contained 17-21 questions, depending on the group. Results were
analyzed using SPSS8 for basic statistical data and MAXQDA9 for
qualitative analyses of the open replies. A translated version of the
survey questions can be found in Appendix C.4.
7.2.7 Evaluation




had two basic phases. We began with a data cleaning step, followed
by a detailed analysis of the different groups using survival analysis.
We describe both phases in more detail here.





information received from website operators revealed several special
cases that warranted excluding websites from the dataset. Firstly, we
found that some domains were operated by advertising agencies.
These so-called traffic services forwarded visitors to the highest bidder
and thus frequently changed the domain they were forwarding to. As
7 See https://www.soscisurvey.de/, last accessed 2021-03-23.
8 See https://www.ibm.com/analytics/spss-statistics-software, last accessed
2020-12-18.
9 See https://www.maxqda.com/, last accessed 2020-12-18.
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our monitoring system follows redirects, such traffic services resulted
in the system scanning different websites at different times, leading
to incomplete data for the individual domains. We thus excluded 31
domains that forwarded to three or more different domains over the
course of the data collection timeframe.
Secondly, discussions with system operators revealed that websites
hosted on the free tier of the hosting platform Wordpress.com contained
Google Analytics code controlled by the platform. They were thus out- We also excluded
websites hosted on
the free tier of
Wordpress.com.
side of the control of the system operator, and IP anonymization had
to be enabled by Wordpress.com, leading to correlated remediations.10
After validating that all websites containing the Wordpress.com tracker
(which can be identified by its tracking ID) did not contain any other
trackers, we excluded all 22 websites from the study.




opted out of the
study.
as German websites and are in fact operated by companies outside of
Germany. We excluded these domains from the evaluation. Finally, we
also excluded four domains at the request of their operators.
survival analysis To evaluate the effectiveness of our notifica-
tions, we utilized a method called survival analysis, which was used by
several prior studies [15, 18, 68, 108, 117]. This method is particularly Our evaluation used
survival analysis.suitable to the purpose, as it can operate on data where the event
of interest (i.e., a problem being remediated) may not have occurred
at the time of the analysis. This type of data is called right-censored





like Kaplan-Meier [56] to derive a function S(t) that describes the
probability of an event not having occurred at time t (e.g., that a
misconfiguration has not been remediated after 20 days). The method-
ology comes from the medical field, where it is commonly used to
compare the effect of different therapies on mortality (hence the name).
While in the medical field a high survival rate is desireable, for our
case, a lower survival rate is preferable (as it describes websites reme-
diating the misconfiguration). We used the Python library lifelines11
for our evaluation. In addition to the survival rate, this library also
provided us with a confidence interval that allowed us to determine
the (un)certainty of the estimation.
Our study design put an important twist on the evaluation: We As one operator may
run multiple
websites, we needed
to account for these
correlated fixes in the
evaluation.
considered multiple websites that are operated by the same person.
Thus, their remediations were unlikely to be independent of each other,
as an operator that fixes one website is very likely to also fix other
websites under their control (see Appendix C.2 for a more detailed
discussion and evaluation of this issue). However, we wanted to avoid
merging multiple websites run by the same operator into a single
10 Following interactions with one system operator, Wordpress.com activated IP anony-
mization for all their customers during the study timeframe.
11 See https://lifelines.readthedocs.io/en/latest/, last accessed 2020-12-18. Our
evaluation uses version 0.25.4 of the library [26].
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entry (as we did in the previous study), as this would lead to a loss
of information, and may also result in edge cases where defining the
time of remediation becomes difficult. Instead, we used a weightedTo address this, we







Kaplan-Meier fit [86] to ensure that every operator (instead of every
website) has the same impact on the results. We defined the weight
w for each individual website as w = 1/|G|, where |G| denotes the
number of websites run by the same operator. Through this change,
we now considered the impact of our notifications on operators instead
of websites, which is arguably the more interesting question to ask.
To reduce the impact of transient scan errors, we considered a
website remediated once our monitoring system had observed c con-
secutive results that showed the website to be remediated (either by




found the problem to
be resolved.
counting these consecutive readings, we ignored results that show the
website as unreachable unless we obtain c consecutive such readings.
This prevented the occasional scan errors caused by a faulty firewall
appliance in the network of the monitoring system from impacting
the results. For the purpose of our evaluation, we set c = 5. We also
repeated the evaluation with c = 3 and c = 8 and found equivalent
results, which indicates that the exact threshold does not have a large
impact.




event per subject, i.e., once a website becomes compliant, the eval-
uation assumes that it remains so. We test this assumption in Sec-
tion 7.3.1.3.
significance testing Validating if two survival curves are statis-




this test cannot be used if the dataset does not fulfill the proportional
hazard assumption [13], which our dataset does not.12 Instead, we used
the method described by Klein et al. [59] to test the significance of
differences between survival curves at a specific point in time (before
sending the reminders and at the end of the study timeframe, respec-
tively). This approach uses a log(−log(·))-transform to improve the





using the Holm-Bonferroni method [48], which we applied to all sta-
tistical tests conducted in this chapter. All reported p-values already
include the adjustments made by the Holm-Bonferroni method and
can thus be considered significant at p < 0.05.
12 This assumption is also required to use the Cox regression [23], which would have




As is the case for any study involving human subjects, the ethics of
the research must be carefully considered. Our goal is to help system Our study attempted
to help operators, but
also causes work for
them.
operators become compliant with the law and thus avoid costly fines.
However, reading and considering our messages and acting upon them
takes time and can also cause stress for the operators. As we believe
this to be in their best interest, we consider this acceptable. Contacting
system operators “out of the blue” shares some characteristics with
spam messages. However, the contact information provided in the
imprint is intended for this purpose, and its use should thus be
considered acceptable.
On a technical level, our scans consumed server resources equivalent
with one normal page load per scan, i.e., four page loads per day. We It consumed
negligible resources
on the server.
consider this small resource consumption acceptable, as the costs to
the operator should be negligible. Similarly, our scanning tool also
does not consume significant resources. As it allows anyone to scan Our tool could be





any website, it may be used to identify targets for written warnings
with costs (Abmahnungen). However, as the underlying technology is
very simple, we consider this risk to be acceptable, as anyone planning
to misuse the platform would likely be capable of building a similar
system themselves without a lot of effort.
Our messages did not initially disclose that they were sent as part of Our messages
initially deceived
recipients, but the
deception is lifted at
the end of the study.
a scientific study. This was done to avoid observer effects that may bias
the results, but it implies that we are deceiving the system operators.
We thus lifted this deception with the final message of the study, which
also contained the link to the survey.
Our study was approved by the ethics review boards of the TU
Darmstadt and the Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg. The Goethe The study was
approved by two
ethics review boards.
Universität Frankfurt does not offer a process for ethics approval.
However, we sought and received approval from the dean of the law
department.
7.3 results
We now consider the results of our notification campaign. First, we We now discuss the
results of our study.describe the effectiveness of the notifications by discussing remediation
/ survival rates. Afterwards, we evaluate the usage of the self-service
tool in detail. We then briefly discuss the interactions we had with the
recipients, before closing with the results of the survey we conducted
with website operators.
7.3.1 Remediation Rates
To evaluate the effect of our notification, we used survival analysis as
described in Section 7.2.7. We recall that this implies that low rates are
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Table 9: Survival rates in percent for pre- and post-reminder groups and at
the end of the study (lower is better). Results marked with † may be
impacted by human error, see Section 7.3.1.2. Results are based on
1321 emails and 2644 letters.
Group Pre-rem. Post-rem. End of study
email 66.3± 2.6 75.8± 3.1 50.9± 2.7
letter 55.6± 1.9 66.6± 2.6 † 39.7± 1.9 †
citizen 59.9± 2.7 69.0± 3.4 43.9± 2.7
uni-cs 61.4± 2.7 70.8± 3.4 46.0± 2.7
uni-law 55.0± 2.8 69.5± 3.8 † 40.3± 2.7 †
privacy 69.6± 2.6 75.1± 3.2 † 54.7± 2.7 †
gdpr 56.6± 2.8 69.0± 3.7 † 41.9± 2.7 †
gdpr+fine 50.1± 2.8 63.3± 3.9 33.7± 2.6
All notified 58.8± 1.6 70.3± 2.0 † 43.4± 1.6 †
control 93.0± 2.4 97.6± 1.7 90.8± 2.6



















Group UNI-CS CITIZEN UNI-LAW
CITIZEN 1.0
UNI-LAW * 0.088
CONTROL **** **** ****
CITIZEN 1.0
UNI-LAW 1.0 1.0
CONTROL **** **** ****
CITIZEN 0.920
UNI-LAW * 0.588
CONTROL **** **** ****
Group PRIVACY GDPR GDPR+FINE
GDPR ****
GDPR+FINE **** *
CONTROL **** **** ****
GDPR *
GDPR+FINE **** 0.123
CONTROL **** **** ****
GDPR ****
GDPR+FINE **** **








*: <0.05   **: <0.01































(a) Contact Medium, pre-reminder

























































(d) Contact Medium, post-reminder








































Figure 13: Survival rates after initial notification and reminder. Reminder shows data only for Email groups.
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desireable, as they describe a lower probability of a misconfiguration





sage and the reminder are shown in Figure 13 and Table 9. We discuss
the initial messages and the reminders separately before closing with a
brief discussion of the used method of remediation (repair vs. removal
of Google Analytics) and long-term effects of our messages.
7.3.1.1 Initial Notification
As described in Section 7.2.3, the messages were sent at the beginning
of July 2019. The survival rates cover a timeframe starting on theSurvival times were
calculated from the
day the message was
sent.
day the recipient is expected to have received the message (i.e., the
1st of July for letters, and the day the message was sent for emails),
and ending on the day we began sending the reminder messages
(approximately five weeks).




emails (3.5 %) and 153 out of 2660 (5.8 %) were returned as undeliver-
able. As always, the number should be considered a lower bound for
emails, as not all email servers notify the sender about undeliverable
or spam-filtered messages.
medium As in the previous study, we once again observed letters
to be more effective than emails: The misconfiguration survival rate ofLetters were more
effective than emails. the email group after the initial message was 66.3± 2.6%, while the
letter group saw a survival rate of 55.6± 1.9%, a highly significant
improvement (p < 0.0001, cf. Table 10 for all significance levels). Like
all other treatment groups, both groups significantly (p < 0.0001)
outperformed the control group, which had a survival rate of 93.0±
2.4%. Most remediations took place within the first 7-10 days, with
only comparatively few in the following weeks until the end of the
timeframe.
sender The differences between the senders is smaller: notifica-The law sender was
the most effective. tions sent by the citizen sender achieved a survival of 59.9± 2.7%,
outperforming uni-cs (61.4± 2.7%) but being outperformed by uni-
law with its survival of 55 ± 2.8%. Of these differences, only the
difference between the two extremes, uni-cs and uni-law, was statis-
tically significant at p < 0.05.
framing Finally, the framings show a very pronounced difference





2.6%, while the gdpr framing resulted in a much lower survival of
56.6± 2.8%, a highly significant improvement (p < 0.001). This is
further improved by the gdpr+fine framing, which had the lowest
survival rates of all, 50.1±2.8%, a statistically significant improvement













Medium Sender Framing Owners Sites Pre-rem. [%] Post-rem. [%] End of study [%]
email citizen privacy 146 163 79.8± 7.5 80.7± 8.7 63.5± 8.4
gdpr 149 153 63.8± 8.2 77.8± 10.1 49.0± 8.2
gdpr+fine 148 159 64.3± 8.3 74.1± 10.3 48.8± 8.3
uni-cs privacy 146 166 82.0± 7.5 78.7± 9.0 66.1± 8.3
gdpr 149 152 62.4± 8.3 74.7± 10.8 47.0± 8.2
gdpr+fine 145 147 61.0± 8.5 63.4± 11.4 39.3± 7.9
uni-law privacy 147 149 65.6± 8.3 88.1± 9.1 55.6± 8.4
gdpr 144 147 65.6± 8.3 78.8± 10.7 53.1± 8.5
gdpr+fine 147 149 52.3± 8.3 67.6± 12.5 35.4± 7.7
letter citizen privacy 294 308 69.2± 5.6 70.6± 7.1 52.9± 5.9
gdpr 294 304 50.5± 5.8 60.9± 8.8 33.0± 5.4
gdpr+fine 292 298 48.4± 5.8 59.0± 8.9 30.9± 5.4
uni-cs privacy 294 302 68.5± 5.6 76.7± 6.7 55.8± 5.9
gdpr 292 305 54.6± 5.9 65.0± 8.7 39.8± 5.6
gdpr+fine 293 303 51.9± 5.8 64.4± 8.5 35.4± 5.5
uni-law privacy 293 293 62.5± 5.8 70.4± 7.5† 44.7± 5.8†
gdpr 288 294 55.6± 5.9 68.5± 8.2† 41.3± 5.7†
gdpr+fine 293 304 39.4± 5.6 54.7± 10.0 23.7± 5.0
All notified 3954 4096 58.8± 1.6 70.3± 2.0† 43.4± 1.6†
control 585 600 93.0± 2.4 97.6± 1.7 90.8± 2.6
Table 11: Survival rates for all groups. Results marked with † are impacted by human error, see Section 7.3.1.2. Remediation rate = 100 - survival.
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individual groups To illustrate how these individual differences
between the experimental conditions can add to one another, we
briefly highlight the best and worst experimental group. The worst-The contrast between
the best and worst
groups was very
large.
performing notified group (email – uni-cs – privacy) achieved a
survival of 82 ± 7.5%, while the best group (letter – uni-law –
gdpr+fine) reduced the survival rate to 39.4± 5.6% (cf. Table 11).
Even if we only consider email groups due to the cost of letters,
the differences are still large: the best email group (email – uni-law
– gdpr+fine) achieved a performance of 52.3± 8.3%, which is still a




that the differences between the experimental factors can compound
to produce very large differences in remediation rates, which makes
it worthwhile to consider them even in cases where sending letters is
not an option.
offline websites So far, we have only considered remediation
or non-remediation as outcomes. However, some operators choseSome websites went
offline instead of
being remediated.
to take their websites offline instead of remediating.13 We observed
59 non-control websites going offline within the considered five-
week period, accounting for 1.4 % of these websites. For comparison,
six websites (1 %) of the control group went offline in the same
timeframe.
7.3.1.2 Reminder Message
Only website operators that had received the initial message (i.e., it




delivery of the initial
message did not fail.
received a reminder message and were considered in the following
evaluation (for the control group, we considered all sites that were
non-compliant on the 2nd of August). Recipients that had previously
responded to us received a hand-crafted reminder, if one was deemed
appropriate. Reminder emails were sent on the 1st and 2nd of August,
while organizational reasons delayed letters to the 6th of August.
deliverability Interestingly, even though we only contacted re-Some reminders
could not be
delivered.
cipients where the initial message was not returned to the sender as
undeliverable, five out of 809 emails (0.6 %) and 27 out of 1351 letters
(2 %) could not be delivered.





to us sending the gdpr+fine framing to all three letter – uni-law
groups, which contaminated their results. As this contamination im-
pacts many combinations of groups, we only include email messages
13 These cases are counted as non-remediated websites for the purpose of the survival
rates, as we cannot be sure that the websites are taken offline as a form of remediation
instead of other reasons.
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Table 12: Survival S in percent and sample size N of uni-law – letter groups
after initial notification (i) and reminder (r), survival differences to
gdpr+fine in gray. Results marked with † erroneously received the
gdpr+fine framing.






r gdpr+fine 39.4 304 54.7 117
gdpr 55.6 +16.2 294 68.5 +13.8 † 148
privacy 62.5 +23.1 293 70.4 +15.7 † 169
in the plots in Figure 13, and mark all potentially contaminated results
in Table 12 with a † symbol.
We refrained from a detailed analysis and comparison of the dif-
ferent experimental factors. However, we note that the most effec- The reminder
generally had a large
impact.
tive group was letter – uni-law – gdpr+fine with a survival of
54.7± 10% at the end of the study timeframe (after 24 days). Interest-
ingly, the worst-performing group was also a uni-law group (email
– uni-law – privacy), which achieved a survival rate of 88.1± 9.1%.
This disappointing result was still an improvement over the control
group, which showed a survival rate of 97.6± 1.7%.
accidental experiment : increasing the pressure While
the erroneous reminders precluded a more detailed analysis of the The incorrectly sent
reminders allowed us
to evaluate if sending





reminder messages, they offered us a window into a different question:
what happens if the reminder message contains a different argument
with (presumably) higher perceived pressure to act? We thus briefly
consider the results in this light.
Let us first consider an intuitive argument for why such an arrange-
ment may make sense. Receiving a mild first message may lead some
recipients to discount the danger of the misconfiguration and refrain
from acting upon it. These recipients may have their minds changed Intuitively, we might
have expected this to
be the case.
by a reminder that spells out the danger in more detail. Leading with
the more severe message may scare recipients who would have already
acted upon a less severe message (in our study, several recipients com-
plained that the gdpr+fine message had scared them with the high
potential fees), which may lead to undesired over-compliance (people
shutting down their website instead of repairing the misconfiguration)
or pushback from recipients.
If this argument was accurate, we would expect the remediation If it was the case,
groups that did not
receive the
gdpr+fine framing
should have had a
high remediation
rate.
rates for the gdpr and privacy groups to be at least equal to that of the
gdpr+fine group. It may even exceed it, as the gdpr+fine group may
have already reached most system operators that are willing and able
to remediate under any circumstances (e.g., because the remaining
operators didn’t receive the message or distrust it), while the other two
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groups may have a larger fraction of operators that would be generally
open to remediating, but weren’t convinced by the first message.
Looking at the data, this does not seem to be the case: Even thoughHowever, this was
not the case. all three groups received identical messages, the remediation rates still
followed the trends from the first message: the gdpr+fine group out-
performed gdpr by 13.8 percentage points and privacy by 15.7. They
thus mostly maintained the trends from the first message, although
the difference between gdpr and privacy was less pronounced for the
reminder.
As this experiment was unplanned, we did not have a control group
to compare the behavior against, rendering any results anecdotal.
However, the results indicate that significant changes to the messageWe did not have a




text of the reminder
is ineffective.
for the reminder are ineffective. A possible mechanism is suggested
by responses we received to our third set of messages, which invited
recipients to participate in the survey. These messages led to several
reactions from recipients that asked us why we kept sending them
messages even though they had already resolved the issue. This in-
dicates that recipients may have learned to recognize our messages
by the sender and general layout and stopped reading them in de-
tail, which would make changes to the content ineffective. A possibleThis may be
explained by
habituation.
mechanism that could explain such an effect would be the concept of
habituation [88] from the field of psychology.




offline, including two from the control group.
7.3.1.3 Other Aspects of Remediation
We briefly consider two more aspects of the notifications: The type ofWe investigated two
other details of the
remediations.
remediation, and the long-term effectiveness.
repair vs . removal In our evaluation, repairing the misconfigu-
ration and completely removing Google Analytics have been treated as





although it can make
a large difference in
practice.
for both system operators and website visitors, as removing Google
Analytics prevents the website operator from collecting any data, while
anonymization only slightly reduces the amount. Thus, intuitively, we
would assume system operators to prefer remediation over removal,
as they presumably have an interest in collecting data about their
visitors (otherwise they would not have added Google Analytics to
their website in the first place).
Surprisingly, we found that 36 % of website operators that are com-Over a third of
remediating website





pliant at the end of the study timeframe completely removed Google
Analytics instead of remediating the misconfiguration. As this obser-
vation is consistent across the different experimental groups, this does
not seem to be related to specific factors of the notification (like the
used framing). We manually visited 50 of these websites to validate
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Table 13: Survival rate S and CheckGA usage of all (Ua), remediated (Ur),
and unremediated (Uu) owners after initial notification and at the
end of the study.
Group S Ua Ur Uu
Pre-reminder 58.8 33.9 65.1 12.5
End of study 43.4 46.9 67.6 19.8
control (end of study) 90.8 3.1 14.8 1.9
that this result is correct (and not an artifact of the introduction of
Cookie Consent banners or similar techniques that may hide the pres-
ence of a tracker until the user interacted with the website) and find
no false negatives. We discuss this counterintuitive result later in this
chapter.
long-term effectiveness A second issue we have so far not
taken into account is if the remediation persists over time, as survival
analysis cannot handle cases with more than one death event (i.e.,






2020 (7 months after the end of the study) and checked their compli-
ance status. We found that 78 out of 2224 previously compliant (3.5 %,
6 of 78 from the control group) had become non-compliant again in
the intervening time. 38 further sites had become unreachable. We
can thus conservatively estimate the long-term effectiveness of our
notifications at approximately 95 %.
In the opposite direction, we saw that of the 2371 non-compliant
sites (550 from control group), 438 non-control (24.1 %) and 82 control-
sites (14.9 %) were compliant 7 months after the end of the study,
with another 63 becoming unreachable. We note that the number of About a quarter of
sites that were
non-compliant at the




compliant websites may be overestimated due to the rising prevalence
of cookie consent systems that block the inclusion of Google Analytics
until an interactive banner has been confirmed. If we assume no false
detections, this would put the base rate of unnotified remediations at
14.9 % over 7 months, with an increase in the rate to 24.1 % for notified
sites in the same timeframe.
7.3.2 Use of Self-Service Tool
We now discuss the effectiveness of our self-service tool, Check Google
Analytics (CheckGA).14 The tool allows site owners to verify if IP anon- We evaluate our
self-service check
tool.
ymization is activated correctly on their website. Over the timeframe
of the study, CheckGA performed 38 485 scans of 14 023 websites.
14 At the time of writing, the tool is available online at https://
checkgoogleanalytics.psi.uni-bamberg.de, last accessed 2021-01-04.
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Figure 14: User-initiated CheckGA scans per day.
Of these websites, 12 047 were not contained in the study dataset,
meaning that they are either other websites operated by recipients
of our messages, or websites completely unrelated to our study. WeIt was widely used
and also scanned
many websites that
weren’t part of the
study.
did not widely advertise the tool, however, over the course of the
study, multiple people tweeted or blogged about it, recommending
it to their colleagues or networks. However, given that only 3.1 % of
the control group was scanned with the tool, we assume that most
scans of websites that were part of the study were still performed
by their owners and in connection with our study. This would mean46.9% of the notified
operators used the
tool at least once.
that approximately 46.9 % of notified operators used the tool at least
once on their site(s). We provide the fractions of owners that used the
tool (Ua) as well as the fraction of owners of remediated (Ur) and
unremediated (Uu) sites that used CheckGA in Table 13.
time distribution We give the number of scans per day during
the study timeframe in Figure 14, starting on the friday of week 0
when the first letters were sent. We considered a scan to be part ofWe evaluate the
distribution of scans
over time.
the dataset if it either directly scanned a domain in the dataset, or
forwarded to such a domain.15 We consider a scan related to the dataset
if it did not target a site in the dataset, but was performed by the same
user as a scan that was part of the dataset, where users are identified
by truncated IP and TLS session ID, as described in Section 7.2.5. Any
scan not matching either of these two rules was considered unrelated.






very few on the weekend. It also shows a large number of related
scans, meaning that the recipients either chose to scan other websites
under their control, or other, unrelated websites that they are curious
about. However, there are also surprisingly many scans that don’t
15 For clarity: we considered a domain part of the dataset if it was either part of the
original list of domains, or if at least one forward to it from a domain that was part
of the study was observed over the course of the study.
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appear to be related to the dataset at all, and are thus likely due to
word of mouth recommendations about the tool.
scans until compliance However, simply scanning the website
is not enough if the problems aren’t also remediated. As a proxy for We evaluate if scans
also lead to
remediation.
the helpfulness of the tool for remediation, we counted the number of
scans until all subsequent CheckGA scans find the site to be compliant.
In the median, the users performed two scans before a website was
either remediated or no further scans were performed. The mean was
similar for both groups (4.5 vs. 4.16), which indicates that users either
managed to remediate quickly, or gave up.
In the median, it took 2.22 hours from the first scan to completed
remediation. However, the mean was significantly larger at 5.05 days. Many websites were
remediated quickly
after the first scan,
but some took a long
time.
The fastest quartile of sites was compliant within 3.3 minutes, the third
quartile over 28 hours. This indicates that while many site owners
managed to remediate quickly, many others also needed long amounts
of time or took extended breaks from their attempts, a dynamic also
observed by Li et al. [69]. The latter may also be due to the initial
recipient confirming the issue with our tool before passing it on to
their web design agency, which took a day or two to begin work and
finally used the tool to verify the remediation.
7.3.3 Communication with Recipients
Our notifications led to many conversations with recipients over dif-
ferent media and for a variety of reasons. We briefly summarize the We analyze the
received responses
from recipients.
number and types of responses. We received 946 emails (excluding
autoreplies), 41 letters, 56 phone calls (a significant fraction of which
did not respect the time window provided in the notification message),
and two Twitter messages. These messages were sent by 764 distinct
recipients, and we responded with 374 emails, one letter, and 12 phone
calls. We summarize the most common themes below (the list is not
exhaustive).
requests for confirmation 32 recipients (4.2 % of those that
contacted us) sought confirmation that the message was authentic.
They often (but not always) used a different contact channel than Some wanted to
ensure the message
was authentic.
the one they were contacted with, although a small minority simply
responded to the suspicious email and asked for confirmation of its au-
thenticity. However, most chose the more prudent path of looking for
alternative contact details on university websites and using the email
addresses or phone numbers found there. Some even contacted the
university department or press contact instead of the involved research
group, and were forwarded from there. Many of these requests were
friendly and curious, although some were initially hostile, alleging
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bad intentions (i.e., scams / unsolicited advertising) or complaining
that the message was impossible to understand for laypeople.
requests for help Another common reason to contact us was
to request aid, either in remediating the issue or in verifying that the
remediation was successful (a request that was made surprisingly
often, considering that we prominently linked to a tool for this exact
purpose). In total, we received such messages from 204 recipientsOthers requested
help in resolving the
issue.
(26.7 %). One operator from the citizen group asked us to remediate
the issue for them, offering us login information for their web server so
we could remediate the issue “if it is that important to you.” Another
operator asked for support with an unrelated PHP issue on their
homepage. We provided remediation instructions and validations
upon request, but did not directly assist in remediation.
complaints Similar to the previous two studies, not all recipients
had a positive response to our notification message. In total, 19 (2.5 %)Still others
complained about the
tone or content of the
message.
recipients chose to complain in a variety of forms. Some were simply
unhappy about the tone of the message or found the perceived threats
in the gdpr+fine framing stressful. Others threatened legal action
(in one case contacting the chancellor of TU Darmstadt directly), and
one tried to bill us for the time they spent acting on our message. We
discussed these cases inside the team and responded with the help of
the expertise of our legal collaborators, which proved invaluable. To
date, no legal action has been filed against any involved individual
or institution.16 Where possible, we placated these recipients and
excluded them from further messages.
thanks The largest class of responses is that of simple expressions
of gratitude. 260 recipients (34 %) contacted us to communicate their
thanks for our notifications. They included simple messages of thanks,Most simply wanted
to thank us for
informing them.
but also offers of payments, discounts, or gifts. Some recipients sent
unsolicited packages of gifts, including mugs and magazines, but also
a donation to one involved university. For ethical and legal reasons,
we turned down gifts whenever possible.
7.3.4 Survey Responses
Our final major piece of data collected for this study is a survey ofWe describe the
results of our survey. notification recipients, who were invited to participate with the final
message of the study, which also contained the information that the
16 One respondent was a Reichsbürger who does not recognize the legal basis of the
German state or the European Union and pursued legal action through their own
court system, alleging our messages to be an “act of aggression with the intent to
precipitate an armed conflict”. We did not respond to their message.
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previous message(s) are part of a study. The methodology is described
in Section 7.2.6, the survey questions are given in Appendix C.4.
We received 561 responses, of which we excluded 84 because they
did not agree to the consent dialogue at the start of the study (19)




N = 477 responses, 226 completed the study. The N varies for different
questions in the evaluation below as the survey does not contain
mandatory questions, and some questions are only shown to some
groups of recipients. The questions can be grouped into three major
areas: problem awareness, trust in the notifications, and problem
solving.
7.3.4.1 Awareness





that Google Analytics was active on their website before receiving our
notification. Conversely, 272 out of 461 (58.9 %) had previously heard
about the IP anonymization feature, and 58 out of 458 (12.7 %) knew
that it was not enabled on their website.
We included a question specifically for respondents who had not
yet remediated the issue, asking why it had not been done yet (N =




knowing about the problem (22) or lack of knowledge about how
to solve it (20), which is surprising, considering that they should
have received our previous notifications. It may be that the survey
was answered by a different person from the one that received the
initial notifications, or that notifications were lost. Others also cited
a low priority of the problem (12), lack of time (10), or deeming the
notification not serious (6).
7.3.4.2 Trust




agreed with the statement that the notification made a trustworthy im-
pression. When broken down by experimental factors, the notifications
from the uni-law group was perceived as most and from citizen
least trustworthy. The differences for the remaining factors were less
pronounced (cf. Figure 15).





we included two open questions which were answered by 377 and
252 respondents, respectively (multiple answers possible). We group
the resulting factors into three aspects: formal, content-related, and
verifiability.
formal factors By far the most cited factor that promoted trust
was the sender of the message, which was named by 348 of the
377 respondents. 174 (46.1 % of all responses) explicitly referenced
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Perceived trustworthiness of notificationlow high









2.80±1.03  PRIVACY 
2.94±0.98  GDPR
2.90±0.98  GDPR+FINE
Figure 15: Agreement of website owners with the statement that the notifica-
tion made a trustworthy impression.





mentioned the possibility of contacting the sender as trust-promoting.
The correctness of the grammar and spelling of the messages were
mentioned surprisingly often (16.1 %; 63 of 377).
25 of the 259 respondents (9.6 %) that received a letter named the
medium as trust-promoting. Even seemingly small aspects of the letterThe medium and






like the corporate design with logo and letterhead (18.9 %; 49 of 259)
or signature (4.6 %; 12 of 259) increased trustworthiness for some
respondents. However, such small factors also decreased the perceived
trustworthiness for some — perceived bad wordings (16.3 %; 41 of
252) or layout (18.2 %; 46 of 252) were mentioned as trust-decreasing
factors as well, and 12 recipients (4.8 %) stated that receiving a letter
was decreasing their trust, with one participant wondering “why would
anyone even bother to send a letter?”
content-related factors Of course, aside from the formal
factors, the actual content of the message also had a large impact on
its perceived trustworthiness. The most commonly cited factors wereThe correctness of
the information and
lack of profit motive
increased perceived
trustworthiness.
the factual correctness and detailed explanations (24.3 %; 94 of 377), as
well as the CheckGA tool (14.8 %; 56 of 377). Another common factor
was the lack of a profit motive and/or threats in the message (20.2 %,
76 of 377). Conversely, other respondents found the motivation to be
unclear (15.1 %; 38 of 252) or thought that the message was a threat or
advertising (25.4 %; 64 of 252), decreasing its trustworthiness.
verifiability factors The final major factor was the verifiability




any information from unknown senders (4.4 %; 11 of 252), a larger
number rated the verifiability of the information as trust-promoting
(31.6 %; 119 of 377). This included both the possibility of verifying the
authenticity of the sender (through phone calls, emails, or other chan-
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nels), and the correctness of the facts given in the message (through
their own research or with the help of experts of acquaintances).
7.3.4.3 Problem Solving
Of course, a notification should not only seem trustworthy, but also
prove helpful in remediation. We thus included questions about the We also evaluated
the helpfulness of the
messages.
helpfulness of the notification in problem solving, the usefulness of
CheckGA, and the general desires of the recipients when it came to
future notifications.
problem solving Most respondents (77.6 %; 339 of 437) were
able to understand the described problem from the notification. More Most respondents
could understand the
problem based on the
notification, and
could resolve it.
than a third of recipients was able to resolve the issue without outside
help (37.8 %), while others asked external service providers (30.9 %) or
colleagues (13 %). 10.8 % solved the problem themselves after getting
external help (other: 7.5 %, N = 362).
self-service tool The vast majority of respondents (87.2 %; 266
of 305) rated the CheckGA-tool as helpful or very helpful on a four-
point Likert scale. 86 respondents stated that they did not use the The self-service tool
was generally viewed
favorably.
tool, while 51 did not know about the tool (despite the fact that it was
linked prominently in the notification messages). Thus, providing a
tool seems to have both increased the perceived trustworthiness of the
notifications and helped many operators to remediate.
future notifications Most operators seem to be happy about
having received a notification, with most respondents (88.4 %; 396
of 448) reporting a desire for more notifications in the future. The Respondents were
open to receiving
future notifications.
most-requested contact channel was email (84.8 %), with only 28.2 %
requesting a letter. Other channels such as blog posts (3.7 %) or calls
(3.2 %) were not considered desireable by many (1.7 % had other
preferences like a service portal that required prior sign-up for no-
tifications. N = 401, multiple answers possible). Interestingly, 30.5 % About a third would
have been willing to
pay for such
notifications.
(117 of 305) stated that they would be willing to pay for such notifi-
cations, although we note that economic research has found that the
self-reported and actual willingness to pay frequently diverge [91, 102,
116]. Thus, a future study could try to validate this experimentally.
7.4 discussion
After describing the outcome of the notification experiment and the




observed behavior (i.e., the ground truth effect of our notifications),
which allows us to put the self-reported results of the survey into
perspective. Finally, we compare and contrast our results with those
of prior studies in this field.
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7.4.1 Observed Behavior
Our experiments show that notifications had a significant impact on
remediation, with 56.6 % of contacted operators remediating within








frequently took place within the first seven to ten days after message
receipt, regardless of other factors of the message. However, there
were significant differences between the different notification groups,
with remediation rates between 76.3 % and 33.9 %. Thus, the impact of
the different factors considered in our experiment can be very high,
especially in combination. We thus discuss them in more detail below.
letters are (once again) effective As in the previous study,
we showed letters to be the more effective medium, leading to an
increase in remediation rate of between 3.9 and 17.9 percentage points
(mean: 11.1) compared to an email with the same sender and framing.
Nevertheless, letters also imply significant manual effort for contactLetters were effective,
but expensive. data collection and financial costs for postage — our study required
spending approximately 5000 € on domestic postage (for all three
messages combined).
the choice of messenger matters We observed significantly
increased remediation rates when messages are sent by a legal research
group (uni-law). Compared to uni-cs, remediation rates increased byThe legal sender was
the most effective.
5.7 percentage points, a significant change (54 % to 59.7 %, p < 0.05,
cf. Table 10). Interestingly, citizen fell between these two groups,
outperforming uni-cs, and had no statistically significant difference
to either of them. We discuss this curious result in more detail in
Section 7.4.3.
compliance framing is highly effective The largest ob-






privacy framing was significantly outperformed by the gdpr and
gdpr+fine framings, with an almost 20 percentage-point remediation
rate difference between citizen and gdpr+fine after the initial no-
tification. In fact, all differences between the three framings for the
initial message and the full timeframe were statistically significant,
many highly so (p < 0.0001). This highlights the power of leverag-
ing existing regulation in driving change, although we also found
that these notifications were more likely to lead to negative reactions
from recipients, including expressions of fear and complaints or legal
threats.





we still observed a surprisingly high rate of messages being returned
as undeliverable (3.5 % for letters, 5.8 % for emails). As the used data
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source is legally required to be correct and up to date, this failure
indicates that some of the website appear to not be maintained very
well, which may be another factor in the presence of misconfigurations.
persistence pays off Human error prevented us from conduct-
ing a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of our reminders. However, Reminders were
likely effective.the groups that are unaffected by the error showed the reminders
increasing overall remediation rates. The group with the largest effect
from reminders showed 45.3 % of sites that were non-compliant five
weeks after the initial message being remediated after the reminder.
The overall remediation rates tell a similar story: prior to the reminder,
41.2 % of all notified operators had remediated, which increased to
56.6 % after the reminder. Although we had no control of websites that
did not receive a reminder, these results indicate that reminders are
likely effective.
providing tools is helpful We saw significant usage of our
self-service tool, CheckGA: Assuming that all scans of the websites The tool was widely
used and perceived
as helpful.
included in the study were conducted by notification recipients, 46.9 %
of the notified system operators used the tool at least once, and
67.6 % of those that remediated successfully had used the tool. These
numbers are likely slightly over-estimated, as the tool was shared by
data protection experts and consultancies on blogs and social media,
which led to an influx of users unaffiliated with any website from the
study. However, given that only 3.1 % of sites in the control group
were scanned, we can still assume that most of the scans of websites
in the study were conducted by their respective operators.
7.4.2 Survey Results




pirical results. However, we also found some interesting discrepancies,
which we discuss in this section.
no single factor increases trust for everyone Respon-
dents cited many factors as increasing their trust in the message:
everything from using the official letterhead of the sending institution The same factor
could have different
effects on trust for
different people.
down to the correct grammar and spelling and the signature at the
bottom of the letter was noted as increasing trustworthiness. However,
a minority of respondents stated that these factors actually reduced
their trust in the message. This shows that no one message will be
right for everyone, and designing an effective message always includes
tradeoffs.
recipients distrust unsolicited messages The golden rules
that IT security professionals keep teaching their colleagues to keep
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them and their company safe — “don’t open unsolicited messages”,
“don’t click links from unknown senders”, “when in doubt, don’t re-
spond”, “if it is too good to be true, it probably isn’t”, etc. — actually
work against IT security and compliance when it comes to notification
campaigns. It is thus unsurprising that many recipients were initiallyDistrust of
unsolicited messages
was common,
especially if no clear
motivation can be
discerned.
wary of our message and sought verification through other channels.
The citizen – letter group in particular led to questions about the
motivation of a private individual to spend money to notify the opera-
tors of websites about misconfigurations instead of simply writing an
email. When given no more information, some recipients tended to
assume commercial interests or bad intentions instead of altruism.
perception–action relationship inconclusive Interest-
ingly, distrust of a message did not appear to necessarily imply inac-




in the survey, this did not always translate into lower remediation rates.
Most strikingly, messages sent by citizen were deemed much less
trustworthy than those sent by uni-cs (cf. Figure 15), but still achieved
statistically identical remediation rates (p ≈ 1). Here, questioning the
motives of the sender may have actually increased remediation, as some
recipients may have seen it as a prelude to legal action. As we did
not collect data on this theory, it remains only one of several possible
explanations.
A similar effect could be observed for email and letter, which
had almost identical reported trust, but a difference of 11.2 percentage





the previous chapter, a possible explanation may be that the a priori
trustworthiness attributed to letters was higher than that of emails,
which may have made a “sketchy” letter still more trustworthy than a
similar email. Anecdotally, this is supported by comments from some
recipients that stated that they would not have trusted the message if
it had been an email. A competing (or compounding) explanation mayDifferent
mechanisms might
be at play here.
simply be that some emails were discarded as spam by automated
systems, a risk which letters do not face. Spam filters may thus make
up the difference in remediation rates. As we did not track the opening
rates of emails, we have no way to quantify this effect.
recipients desire support We received requests for individual






tempts with explanations and occasionally example code sometimes
required multiple rounds of emails and significant time investment,
but frequently led to successful remediations. Such a level of indi-
vidualized support is infeasible for very large notification campaigns.
However, the requests illustrate that detailed remediation instructions
and automated tools are helpful and important, as they are a resource
that recipients can be referred to. While we did not experimentally
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validate this, it is safe to assume that providing a tool with extensive
documentation about remediation reduced the amount of questions
we received. However, the survey showed that such a tool is definitely
appreciated by the recipients, with 87.2 % of respondents rating it as
helpful.
operators lack awareness Interestingly, 19.5 % of respondents
reported not knowing that Google Analytics was in use on their
website. This indicates that they were not actually using the analytics Lack of awareness is
a common problem.data that was being collected, an impression that is reinforced by
the surprisingly high number (36 % of remediating recipients) that
removed Google Analytics in response to our message, instead of
repairing the configuration.
This lack of awareness raises two interesting points: Firstly, our Misconfigured
services may have
been set up by third




experience with sites hosted on Wordpress.com shows that some
hosting services add their own tracking to their customers’ websites
without informing them (or giving them access to the data), which
raises questions of liability — legally, the operator is responsible for
any data collection on their website, even that added by their hosting
provider that is outside of their own control. Secondly, it shows that
a significant percentage of web tracking data appears to be collected
but never looked at by the operators, for example because it was set
up and then forgotten by a web designer, an explanation we received
from multiple recipients. This tracking could thus be removed without
negative impact on the website operator, thereby improving the overall
privacy and compliance posture of the website.
7.4.3 Comparison with Prior Work
After discussing our results, we now consider how they relate to prior We compare our
results with prior
work.
studies in this field.
awareness Many attempts to promote IT security and/or compli-
ance rely on outreach and awareness to promote desireable behavior
(e.g., installation of software updates, compliance to data protection






precondition for remediation in most cases. However, our results indi-
cate that awareness alone is not sufficient: 58.9 % of respondents in our
survey reported having been aware that the IP anonymization exists,
and 12.7 % even knew that they were not using it. These results are no
outlier in the field of notifications: Durumeric et al. notified about the
well-known and widely publicized Heartbleed issue. They found that
all recipients had heard about Heartbleed before the notification, and
many reported having already attempted to remediate, but had appar-
ently not remediated all machines [34]. This trend was also observed
by Li et al. who, notifying about a range of security misconfigurations,
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found that 46 % of recipients had already been aware of the issue and
16 % had previously attempted remediation [68]. Çetin et al. also found
that 40 % of notified operators of vulnerable DNS name servers had
previously attempted to remediate [17].
bounce rates As discussed in Section 6.4, only one study outside




a small-scale (N = 364) notification experiment with manual contact
channels [98]. They found bounce rates of 0 and 26.8 % for emails and
letters, respectively, but on a self-selected sample of recipients that had
not reacted to previous fully-automated notifications. In our own prior
study, described in the previous chapter, we observed bounce rates of
1.1 and 1.7 % for emails and letters, lower than the 5.8 and 3.5 % of
this study. This discrepancy shows that even with the same address
data collection methodology, there is still some variation in bounce
rates on different samples. Of course, the delivery rates still exceed
those of many previous studies using automated address collection,
which often found bounce rates exceeding 50 % [17, 18, 99].
Especially now that the WHOIS interface is no longer available for
many TLDs, automatically-derived email addresses (e.g., following
RFC 2142 [24] as used in previous studies [17, 98, 99]) will likely






lower bound of the expected delivery success of such notifications
on our sample, we briefly analyze our corpus of email addresses. We
find that while some of our collected addresses match these common
aliases — 41 % were of the form info@domain.tld and 0.8 % matched
{webmaster,hostmaster}@domain.tld — many did not: 21.1 % used a dif-
ferent prefix, and 37.1 % were hosted at an entirely different domain.







domains but were not listed in the imprint (our results only serve as a
lower bound). However, in a study focused on determining good con-
tacts for automated notifications, Soussi et al. found that the most-used
generic alias was only available for approximately 68 % of domains
in their sample [96]. This indicates that notifications may have to use
multiple different addresses, which may in turn trigger more aggres-
sive spam filtering. More work is needed to determine good address
data sources for automated notifications.







recipients that received a letter compared to an email, with reme-
diation rates of 60.3 and 49.1 % for letters and emails, respectively.
These remediation rates are higher than in the study described in the
previous chapter (59 and 40 %, respectively), although the difference
between the groups is smaller. We have no definitive explanation for
this discrepancy. It may be related to the different data sources used
for the two studies, to fundamental differences within the populations
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of websites with the respective issues (i.e., operators with information
leaks on their websites may be fundamentally different from those
with misconfigured Google Analytics installations), or to random
chance.
message sender The effect of the message sender has been the




messages that looked like they were sent by a human with those sent
by an automated system [98], Zeng et al. sent part of their messages
via the Google Search Console while others came from a university
email account [117], and Çetin et al. used the identities of a private
security researcher, a university, and a well-known organization in the
field of malware research [18]. All three studies reported only small
differences between the senders, which seems to conflict with our
results that show statistically highly significant differences between
the uni-cs and uni-law senders.






would be explainable through differences in name recognition / sender
reputation [18] (i.e., people may be more likely to trust a message sent
by Google than one sent by a private individual they never heard of).
However, these studies failed to show significant differences between
the senders, and such an explanation also cannot explain why the
citizen group should be as effective (or even more effective than) the
uni-cs group in this study.
It may be that the differences in effectiveness in our study, partic- A competing
explanation may be
the perceived ability




ularly as it is dealing with an issue of compliance, can thus not be
explained by name recognition or reputation, but instead by the per-
ceived ability and willingness of the sender to impose consequences for
inaction. While a computer science group at a university may be con-
sidered unlikely to pursue legal action against non-compliant website
operators, a private individual with unclear motivation for reaching
out is more of an unknown quantity. The same could be said for a
legal research team, to which the recipients may additionally attribute
a higher expertise in correctly determining questions of compliance.





transparency literature (cf. Section 2.4.2.2), according to which trans-
parency can only be effective if the stakeholders have a plausible way
to exert influence over the organization in question. The question of
consequences also factors into the factor of framing and incentives,
which we discuss next.





previously investigated by Zeng et al., who notified about issues with
TLS deployments. They used either a user focus (focusing on the impact
of the issue on the user) or a technical focus (focusing on the technical
background of the issue) [117]. They found no statistically significant
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differences between the two framings. If we follow the theory that
potential consequences are an important mechanism determining
(in)action, this result would be unsurprising, as the major consequence
of inaction (users will be unable to access the website) was described
in both messages.
This theory also implicitly underpins other previous studies, which
used incentives like browser warnings [69] or blocking the internet
access of users suffering from Malware infections until they remediate








quarantine actions with those of email notifications, finding quaran-
tines to be more effective [16]. These results suggest that direct and
explicit incentives for remediation may be a powerful motivator for fu-
ture notifications. Our results comparing the three different framings
indicate that legal requirements and regulations can serve such a role,
and preliminary work on using such arguments in more countries has
already been conducted by Diop et al. [29]. It also matches the results
of Çetin et al., who reported that phishing and malware sites were
cleaned up more quickly if they targeted banking credentials and thus
posed a higher legal risk for the hosting company [18].
trust and distrust Distrust by message recipients [15, 16, 98,
117] and a desire to verify the authenticity of the message [15, 16]
are commonly reported in previous studies. We also observed themEstablishing trust is




in our previous study on information leaks (cf. Section 6.3.3). Our
survey indicates that no one factor will increase the perceived trust-
worthiness of a message for every recipient. Conceptually, unsolicited
notifications need to differentiate themselves from spam messages —
however, spam and phishing messages have co-opted many of the
same methods that notification senders may want to use to increase
recipient trust, like using (forged) message senders with a presumably
high reputation, using professionally-designed message templates,
and giving incentives for (in)action. Thus, establishing trust remains a
hard problem in practice.
support tools Automated tools that help message recipients to
determine if their systems are affected by a misconfiguration and
contain instructions for remediation have been frequently requested
by recipients [17, 68, 69, 117]. However, only one study investigated theOne previous study
found that providing
a tool does not
increase remediation
rates.
effect of providing or withholding such a tool: Çetin et al. investigated
misconfigured DNS servers and provided a tool to verify if a server
is vulnerable. They found no statistically significant difference in
remediation rates between recipients that had been provided with the
tool and those that had not [17].
We did not repeat this experiment in our study. However, our results
(in particular our interactions with the recipients) indicate that pro-
viding a tool likely has other advantages: it simplifies supporting the
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(especially those asking for validation of their remediation), and (ac-
cording to the survey) may increase the perceived trustworthiness
of the message for some recipients. Thus, regardless of the effect on
remediation rates, it may be in the best interest of notifiers to provide
such a tool.
reminders Only two prior studies investigated the effectiveness




et al. reported a small effect [99], while Li et al. saw none [68]. Our
study comes to a different result: on average, reminders led 29.7 % of
recipients that had not already remediated to do so. In some experi-
mental groups, this number exceeds 40 % (cf. Table 11). Unlike Li et
al. [68], but similar to Stock et al. [99], we did not have the presence
of reminders as a varied experimental factor (i.e., there is no control
group of sites that received an initial message, did not remediate, and
did not receive a reminder). We thus cannot know what percentage of For us, reminders led
to more remediations,
but this part of the
experiment did not
have a control group.
these recipients would have remediated without a reminder, although
given the steep slopes in the survival rates after the reminders were
sent, it is likely that they had a major effect on remediation rates. This
discrepancy with prior studies remains unexplained, highlighting the
need for more research in this area.
summary Overall, we can confirm many results from previous
studies: recipient distrust is an important issue, automated scanning
tools are perceived as helpful, and awareness of an issue does not
necessarily lead to remediation. We highlight the importance of incen- We summarize our
core takeaways.tives for remediation, as were already used by previous studies [15,
16, 117], and show that legislation may provide such incentives. When
it comes to the effect of different senders and of reminders, our results
diverge from previous research. This highlights that many questions
in the field of effective large-scale notifications remain open for future
researchers to answer.
7.5 limitations




validity, which we discuss here.
internal validity Four issues limit the internal validity of our
study. The first of these issues consists of two types of self-selection in Our dataset had a
certain amount of
self-selection.
our dataset: address availability and survey responsiveness. Recipients
for which we could only find one type of address (i.e., only email
or only postal address) in the imprint were assigned to that group,
i.e., they self-selected for a specific treatment in the message medium,
but were spread equally between the groups for the other two varied
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factors. This self-selection affects 87 email and 152 letter recipients,
about 6 % of the total non-control dataset. The second type of self-
selection is in survey participation, where it is likely that respondents
skew towards higher trust in the messages, as those that distrust the
messages may be less likely to respond to a survey.
The second issue that may affect validity is of a technical nature: our
compliance scanner cannot automatically interact with cookie consent
systems. Thus, any tracking that occurs only after a cookie consentWe may falsely






banner is confirmed cannot be automatically detected, which may lead
to false negatives if a non-compliant Google Analytics system is hidden
behind a consent system. These cases would have been detected as a
removal of Google Analytics from the website. We manually visited a
subsample of 50 websites that our system detected to have removed
Google Analytics and found no such false negatives (cf. Section 7.3.1.3),
but did not check all websites.
The third issue is the incorrect set of reminders we sent to part of the
letter – uni-law group. We cannot quantify the effect of this mistakeThe incorrect
reminder messages
have an unknown
impact on the study.
and have thus refrained from a detailed analysis of the reminders.
However, the major trends were already visible before the reminders,
and the unaffected groups give many indications that the reminders
were generally effective. It is also likely that some recipients received
messages from more than one experimental group, as a single web
design agency may have been hired by multiple website owners that
were assigned to different experimental groups. We received a smallA small number of
recipients may have
received messages
from more than one
group.
number of indications that such leaks between the groups took place.
In these cases, observer effects may impact the results, as the recipients
may suspect that they are part of a scientific study and thus change
their behavior.
The fourth and final limitation of the internal validity comes from
the fact that we used three different senders, which required the






identical configurations (for example, the uni-law server was lacking
Sender Policy Framework (SPF) and DomainKeys Identified Mail
(DKIM) records) and reputations, this may have led to differences
in message delivery due to spam filters — a problem that previous
studies also encountered and were unable to control for [18, 117]. We
are hopeful that these differences did not make a large difference for
the notifications, as we observed similar bounce rates for the different
servers, and the rate at which CheckGA was accessed was highest for
uni-law, the server with the most incomplete configuration.
To gain more insight into the diversity of recipient email servers,
we conducted a small analysis a few months after the end of the study.
The 1337 recipient email addresses use 516 different second-levelRecipients were
spread over many
different mail servers.
domains. The average mail provider handles 2.5 of these addresses
(median: 1), and even the most common providers like Outlook.com
and Google only handled 108 and 70 addresses, respectively. As the
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messages were sent over a timeframe of 5 days using three different
senders, we hope that the impact of spam filtering will be limited.
external validity There are two major limitations to the exter-
nal validity of our study. Firstly, our sample is likely not representative
for the overall population of websites, either in Germany or world-
wide. However, the more important limitation is our focus on German
websites. It is unknown if these results can be transferred to other






consequence of our experimental focus on compliance as a factor:
compliance is, by its very nature, rooted in local law, as are the ex-
pectations of website operators about the likelihood of being targeted
by enforcement action. Any message making use of a compliance
argument thus needs to consider the specifics of the local situation.






countries and legal systems are involved. Any notification campaign
attempting this at larger scales would be well-advised to partner
with local organizations that are familiar with local laws and practices.
Several prior studies have already made use of such local organizations
[60, 68, 69].
7.6 conclusion
In this chapter, we described the results17 of a notification experi-
ment involving 4594 recipients that operate 4754 distinct websites that
used Google Analytics without the legally mandated anonymization
function enabled. We observed an overall high effectiveness of our We described our
third notification
study, which had a
large effect on the
notified websites.
notifications: the overall remediation rate was 56.6 % for notified sites,
compared to 9.2 % for the control group. The results highlight the
importance of using a good framing of the issue, and replicate the
increased notification effectiveness obtained from the use of letters
instead of emails that we already found in the previous chapter.
Our results show that the use of legal obligations as an argument
for remediation can increase remediation rates by almost 20 percent-
age points compared to the worst-performing argument. Interestingly, Legal obligations
have proven to be a
potent argument.
this effect was obtained despite the fact that none of the notifica-
tion senders actually had any legal power to directly impose fines
for non-compliance. These results highlight the potential benefits of
collaborating with legal experts on notification campaigns — a collab-
oration that also proved invaluable in deflecting complaints and legal
threats by a small number of disgruntled notification recipients.




recipients’ trust in notification through a survey with 477 respondents,
which highlighted a number of formal and content-related factors that
17 The used messages, code and data underlying the study can be found on Zenodo:
https://zenodo.org/record/4075131 (last accessed 2021-07-15).
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influence the perceived trustworthiness of a message. The survey also
showed that almost a fifth of respondents were unaware that Google
Analytics was active on their website. This indicates that a significant
fraction of tracking data is never used — an interpretation that is also
supported by the 36 % of remediating recipients that chose to remove
Google Analytics completely instead of activating the anonymization
function, and some even chose to take their website offline. Thus,
a secondary effect of our notifications was to motivate recipients to
disable unmaintained systems and services on their website, which
improves the overall security and privacy posture of the web.
Part IV
C O N C L U S I O N S
We synthesize the practical experience of conducting our
three notification studies into a set of recommendations for
future studies in this area. Afterwards, we conclude with a
discussion of the main results of this dissertation.

8
L E S S O N S F O R N O T I F I C AT I O N C A M PA I G N S
While conducting the studies described in the previous chapters, we
learned many important lessons about the do’s and dont’s of large-





research in this area, we document these lessons here to allow others
to benefit from our experience and avoid making the same mistakes.
We begin by discussing the technical issues of medium- to large-scale
internet scanning before moving on to the challenges of sending large
amounts of notifications. We then discuss best practices for interacting
with and supporting notification recipients before closing with the
topic of follow-up messages like reminders. However, first of all,
we will highlight a central concern that applies to all aspects of a
notification study: research ethics.
research ethics Notification studies are likely to be classified as




the study design includes deceiving the notification recipients about
the intention of the messages (e.g., by not disclosing that they are part
of a study to avoid observer effects). The study design should include
provisions on lifting this deception after the study has ended (which
can be combined with a survey of recipients, if desired), and also plan
for a notification to members of the control group to allow them to
remediate as well. Researchers should familiarize themselves with the
processes for ethical review and seek approval as early as possible to
avoid delays caused by missing ethics approval. For further reading on
ethical aspects of large-scale measurements and online data research,
we refer to the works by Vitak et al. [111]. The companion paper to
this chapter [72] also contains a more detailed discussion.
8.1 internet scanning
Many notification studies begin with a data collection phase, which
frequently requires large-scale scanning of internet system to detect
the issue(s) at the heart of the study. We first discuss the consideration Notification studies
begin with a data
collection phase.
for the design of a data collection stack before proceeding to some
lessons we learned for the data collection process itself.
We explicitly do not consider the choice of the initial dataset of Selecting a list of
scannable systems is
out of scope for this
chapter.
systems to be scanned, for which we have no special experience.
1 This chapter contains references to both Open Source and commercial services. We
included services based on familiarity and did not receive any compensation, financial
or otherwise, for including them.
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However, we do point out that the most common data source for web
scans, the Alexa Top Million websites, has been criticized as unstable
and potentially unrepresentative [64, 94], and an alternative exists that
is, according to its authors, better suited for some use cases [64].
8.1.1 System Design
Large-scale scanning requires the development of two different soft-
ware components: the actual detection software (if no pre-existingLarge-scale scans
require a detection
software and a test
harness.
software can be used for this) and a test harness that runs the detec-
tion software on a large list of targets, saves the results in a database,
and gives insight into the current state of the scans.
choosing a detection software Depending on what kind ofThe choice of
detection software
depends on the issue
at hand.
misconfiguration should be detected, different types of scanners are
required. For example, to simply test if a file at a specific path exists
and contains a certain string, a simple script can be sufficient (cf. Sec-
tion 6.1.3), while an issue that requires the evaluation of JavaScript may
need a complete browser environment to be detected (cf. Section 7.1.3
— two ready-made systems for this purpose are OpenWPM [38] and
PrivacyScanner [87], the latter of which was developed by Pridöhl et
al. as part of the PrivacyScore project described in Chapter 3). The
use of an instrumented browser is a significantly more complex and
resource-intensive process, but is often the only way a modern website
can be automatically evaluated, as they frequently rely on JavaScript
for large parts of their functionality. Other studies may be able to use
existing tools, in which case they should make themselves intimately
familiar with the use and limitations of the tool.
knowing the error classes In both cases, the researcher needs
to consider how the detection software behaves in a variety of possible
error cases. What happens if the network connection is severed in theMany types of errors
can occur during the
scanning process and
need to be handled.
middle of a test? If the target is unreachable? If the machine running
the scans runs out of disk space? Does the tool stop with an error?
Does it have a retry counter? Does it freeze and has to be stopped
manually? The test harness should be adapted to handle and log these
cases. Particular attention should be paid to how the system behaves
if multiple scanners are run in parallel on the same machine, as some
systems may unintentionally begin sharing state between instances
(browser profiles, temporary files, ...).
include test cases We recommend operating one or more test
systems where the correct result of the scan is known.2 These systems
2 An example of a public system of this type is https://badssl.com/, which hosts test
cases for many types of broken TLS configurations that should be rejected by clients.
Last accessed 2021-01-12.
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can be used during development to test the system. However, they can




should be included as
test cases.
if a previously working system has stopped working. Additionally,
the scans could also include a dead man’s switch — a target that expects
to be accessed once per scan interval, and will send a notification if it
is not, as this may indicate that the scans have stopped working. Such
a service is offered by several companies like Healthchecks.io3, Dead
Man’s Snitch4, or PushMon5, which often include a free service tier
that should be sufficient for such a study.
preparing for unknown errors It is almost inevitable that
new error classes will appear once the system begins large-scale scans.
It is thus a good practice to enforce specific expectations of the behavior Not all error types
will be known in
advance.
of the scanning system to be able to detect these new errors. Among
other things, this includes the output format and the expected duration
of a scan (to detect and handle deadlocks / livelocks). Deviating
behavior should be reported (use of a tool like Sentry6 is recommended
to collect errors and uncaught exceptions during development and in
production), with affected results being marked in the database for
later inspection and debugging.
plan for scheduled and one-off scans Many studies re-
quire (at least) two phases of scanning: An initial one-off scan of a very Both one-off and
scheduled scans
should be supported.
large dataset, followed by regular scans of a smaller set of systems
that are part of the study. Both of these use cases must be supported
by the scanning infrastructure.
distributing the scans While not strictly necessary, running
redundant copies of the scanning infrastructure on different machines




of our experiments, we encountered problems with a misconfigured
IDS appliance that led to one of the four scheduled daily scans re-
producibly failing for most websites due to timeouts. Such mistakes,
which would usually lead to missing data, can be compensated if the
same data is collected from more than one point of origin at the same
time. Checking for disagreements between the results of the different
scanners can also be a good method to detect further errors in the
scanning stack.
3 See https://healthchecks.io, last accessed 2021-01-11. Transparency note: I received
a free upgrade to the Business tier under the Open Source support program of the
service (https://healthchecks.io/faq/#free-for-open-source, last accessed 2021-
01-11). Healthchecks.io is Open Source and can be self-hosted or used as a commercial
cloud service.
4 See https://deadmanssnitch.com/, last accessed 2021-01-11. Dead Man’s Snitch is a
commercial service.
5 See https://pushmon.com, last accessed 2021-01-11. PushMon is a commercial service.
6 See https://sentry.io, last accessed 2021-01-11. Sentry is Open Source and can be
self-hosted or used as a commercial cloud service.
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scan often If feasible, we recommend scanning each target more
than once per day. Firstly, doing so gives a more detailed and fine-
grained view of when a website remediated. Secondly, having moreScans should be
performed frequently. results is helpful when a scanner may occasionally return incorrect
results (e.g., due to connection issues) — in these cases, having more
than one scan per day allows the researcher to fall back on the other
scans to determine the state of the target system. Finally, some systems
may show cyclic behavior that is only revealed when considering
multiple scans per day. For example, in our Google Analytics study,
one website switched between a day and night version depending on
the time of day, with the misconfiguration being present on only one
of the versions (cf. Section 7.2.4).
backups It goes without saying that automated, regular, off-site
backups are an important part of any data collection system. This is
doubly true if the scanner is operated on third-party machines whichThe system should be
protected against
data loss.
may be deactivated without prior notice if the provider receives abuse
notifications or has automated filtering systems of their own that may
interpret the scans as outgoing attacks.
identifying the scanner Researchers should carefully consider
if and how the scanner should identify itself as part of a research
project. Potential methods include the use of a custom user agentIf the scanner should
identify itself as part
of a research project
depends on the
details of the study.
(for website scans) and the use of a custom reverse DNS entry for
the IP(s) of the scanning machines. This may reduce the amount
of abuse notifications from recipients that interpret the scans as an
attack. However, it may also introduce observer effects (i.e., notification
recipients may be able to identify that they are part of a scientific study,
which may change their behavior). Which of these two possibilities is
more important depends on the study design and invasiveness of the
scans, and is left up to the researcher to decide.
8.1.2 Data Collection
The question of which data should be collected is important enough to
warrant its own section. We begin with some general remarks beforeWe discuss what
data to collect. proceeding to more specific data collection recommendations and
considerations that apply to the area of websites, as these were the
subject of our own studies.





searcher would know which data they will need to collect for their
evaluations before writing the first line of code. However, experience
has shown that during the evaluation of the data, new questions may
appear that require new data points. If this data has not been col-
lected, such questions remain impossible to answer. We thus argue
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that researchers should follow a strategy of “when in doubt, collect it.”
This includes the identity of the scanning machine (if more than one
is used), the IP address of the scanned machine, response status codes
(where applicable), the complete output of any tool that is being used,
extensive log files including timestamps for each scan, and (where
applicable) the data the results have been derived from (like the source
code of scanned websites, network traces, etc.). For additional best
practices for scientific code, we refer to the article by Benureau and
Rougier [9]. Best practices for data collection are given by Bajpai et
al. [6] (on general networking research), Cui et al. [25] (on large-scale
scanning), and Durumeric et al. [33] (on port scans).
Of course, in practice the benefits of saving the data need to be
weighted against the cost in terms of complexity and storage space,





database backups that are unintentionally published online, avoid
downloading and saving the entire database, and download only
the first few thousand bytes that allow validating the file format,
as described in Section 6.1.3). Ethical aspects of data collection are
discussed by Vitak et al. [111]. Marcia Hoffmann wrote about the legal
aspects of scanning for Rapid77.
begin data collection early At some point, the researcher There is frequently
some time between
the initial scans and
the beginning of the
study.
will need to begin conducting regular scans of all websites in the
dataset to monitor the effects of the notifications. Frequently, there are
a few days or even weeks between the first scan (which determines
which websites are in the final dataset of notified websites) and the
day the first notifications are sent.
We recommend beginning the regular data collection as early as
possible, even before the notifications are sent. Having one or two Beginning the data
collection early can
be advantageous.
weeks of scans before the notifications are sent serves two purposes:
firstly, it can help increase confidence in the stability and correctness
of the data collection system, as it can reveal previously-undiscovered
bugs before they can impact the more important measurements after
the notifications are sent. Secondly, if the dataset shows that notified
and unnotified websites show the same behavior for the weeks pre-
ceding the first notification, it can serve as a further proof for the
representativeness of the control group. If the groups already show
significantly different behavior at this point, it may be an indicator that
the strategy behind the group assignment needs to be reconsidered.
web-specific issue 1 : forwarding When scanning websites,
researchers should be mindful of HTTP forwards, which may change





of issues: either two domains in the dataset can forward to the same
7 See https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2013/10/30/legal-considerations-for-
widespread-scanning/, last accessed 2021-05-17.
148 lessons for notification campaigns
website (leading to two seemingly-distinct scans giving the same
result), or a single domain may forward to more than one domain over
time, leading to different results over time. The latter is more common
than might initially be expected, due to the existence of so-called traffic
services (cf. Section 7.2.7).
This issue needs to be addressed on three levels. First and mostA scanning system
needs to implement
support for following
such redirects, if this
is desired.
importantly, the scanning system needs to actually support forwards.
This is trivially achieved when using an instrumented browser for the
scans. Less sophisticated systems like downloading scripts will follow
some types of redirects (HTTP 3XX redirects8) but not others (those
triggered by JavaScript’s window.location property9 or HTML meta
tags10).
Second, the researcher needs to decide if their scanning system
should keep using the domain from the initial dataset (e.g., the Alexa
Top Million or Tranco toplist [64]), or follow all forwards once, save
the final URL, and then keep using this URL for all future scans. TheResearchers need to




former is more representative of a user that keeps visiting a specific
domain by typing it in by hand (and thereby following all redirects
every time they visit the website), while the latter reduces the impact
of traffic services and thus leads to more consistent results, at the cost
that a website relaunch may invalidate the URL and lead to scans of
error messages instead of the newly restructured homepage.
Third, in both cases, the scanning system should log the final URL
after following all redirects and associate it with the obtained results
in the database. Depending on what data is collected for the study, theThe final URL after
all forwards should
be logged in the
database.
researcher also needs to consider how to handle data collected from
intermediate pages that may have triggered more network requests
than a simple redirect. For example, when conducting a study of
tracking and advertising code on websites, a website may contain a
message “this website has moved, you will be redirected in 5 seconds”
which will redirect the visitor after a specific timeframe, but already
contain tracking or advertising code. Should this code count towards
the results or not? Depending on the answer, the data collection
process needs to be adapted.
The case of two websites forwarding to the same final domainDifferent domains
can forward to the
same target, biasing
the dataset.
also needs to be considered in the evaluation, as it may otherwise
give undue weight to the operator of a single website. Accordingly,
8 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_HTTP_status_codes#3xx_
redirection for a list of 3XX status codes, last accessed 2021-01-11.
9 See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Window/location for
details on the window.location property and https://www.w3schools.com/howto/
howto_js_redirect_webpage.asp for instructions on redirects using it. Last accessed
2021-01-11.
10 See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTML/Element/meta for de-
tails on the meta tag and https://www.w3docs.com/snippets/html/how-to-
redirect-a-web-page-in-html.html for instructions on redirects using it. Last ac-
cessed 2021-01-11.
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a deduplication step should take place, ideally before sending the
notifications but at the latest during the evaluation of the results.
web-specific issue 2 : dynamic and hidden content Spe-
cific features of a website may be gated behind interactive content.





which may hide the presence of tracking and advertising code until
the message has been confirmed. If such data is relevant to the study,
cookie consent banners present a major challenge, as there is no stan-
dardized method for interacting with them that can be expected to
be compatible with all websites. Researchers should be aware of this
limitation of automated scans.
web-specific recommendation : use the internet archive
In some cases, it may be desireable to be able to “go back in time”
to check what a website looked like at a specific point in time. For Sometimes,
determining what a
website looked like at
a specific point in
time can be
important.
example, during the Google Analytics study, several recipients claimed
that they were compliant and had never been non-compliant. In such
cases, having an impartial source that contains the state of the website
in question at a specific point in time can be valuable, if only to ensure
that the detection systems did indeed work correctly and the system
operator is incorrect.
The Internet Archive is a non-profit organization that maintains the
Wayback Machine, a system that collects snapshots of websites over time




question can be detected from a manual inspection of the source code
of a website, it may be advisable to submit each scanned website to
the Wayback Machine with each scan to have an archived copy of the
website at that point in time. Websites can be submitted for inclusion
into the Wayback Machine with a simple GET request11. Alternatively,
researchers can run their own website collection system12.
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ture for regular scans is in place, the next step is the preparation of
the notification messages. We first discuss preparations for sending
messages, and then highlight a few failure modes of the deliveries
that make attributing undeliverable messages challenging.
11 There does not seem to be official documentation on this, but you can simply send
a GET request to https://web.archive.org/save/[some-url] and the URL will be
added to the Internet Archive. Please set a HTTP user agent that identifies who
you are and has a way to contact you as a courtesy to the operators of the Internet
Archive.
12 See https://github.com/webrecorder/pywb for an Open Source project that mirrors
the functionality of the Wayback Machine. Last accessed 2021-01-11.
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8.2.1 Preparing Messages
We will not discuss the collection of address data, as this can vary
depending on the notification campaign. Instead, we assume thatCollecting address
data is out of scope
for this chapter.
addresses have been manually or automatically collected, and discuss
the question of preparing and delivering the notifications. For a survey
of possible automated channels for address collection, we refer to
Soussi et al. [96].
the golden rule : automate everything If the planned noti-
fication campaign includes over 50 recipients, we highly recommendA high level of
automation is
recommended.
automating as many steps of the process as possible. What exactly
is automated in what way depends greatly on the goals and varied
factors of the notification campaign. It can be as simple as using a
plugin for a mail client to generate many messages from the same
pattern or as complicated as a custom web-based system that can send
emails and receive responses.
As an example: Our final notification study, featuring the Google
Analytics misconfiguration, used a Thunderbird plugin13 to generate
the emails from a template, and a custom Python script that filled




the templates, introduced while debugging, led to incorrect reminder
messages being sent for one group. This highlights that even with a
high degree of automation, mistakes still happen, and manual sanity-
checking of the output is necessary. For emails sent from an automated
system, a test server that accepts emails and shows them in a web
frontend may prove helpful. Examples include MailHog14 and Mail-
Slurper15.
emails : check the basics When sending email notifications,
researchers should make themselves familiar with the typical email
security and authentication methods like DKIM and SPF, and ensure
that the email server they are using has implemented them. AnecdotalThe configuration of
the mail server can
influence delivery
rates.
experience shows that even large universities may not have properly
configured their email servers, which may increase the chance that a
message is dropped as spam by the recipients’ mail server.
If the researchers have control over the email server they are using,Some services send
notifications if a mail
server is listed on
spam lists.
they may also want to sign up for email server reputation monitoring
systems like the Microsoft Junk Mail Reporting Program16 and regu-
13 See https://addons.thunderbird.net/addon/mail-merge, last accessed 2021-01-11.
Mail Merge is Open Source.
14 See https://github.com/mailhog/MailHog, last accessed 2021-01-11. MailHog is
Open Source and self-hosted.
15 See https://mailslurper.com/, last accessed 2021-01-11. MailSlurper is Open Source
and self-hosted.
16 See https://mail.live.com/mail/services.aspx, last accessed 2021-01-11.
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larly checking spam blocklists like SpamCop17 and Spamhaus18. This
can give an indication if the mails are being filtered as spam or not.
emails : patience is a virtue We recommend spacing out the
sending of emails instead of sending them all in one big burst. Firstly, Sending emails
spread over a longer
timeframe has
several advantages.
some mail servers will enforce such rate limiting anyway, and so error
messages can be avoided by proactively slowing down. Secondly, while
many spam filters work based on proprietary algorithms, common
wisdom holds that big bursts of almost-identical emails raise red flags
for spam filters. Slowing the messages down a little (by sending one
every 30 seconds) may help alleviate such filtering. It also has another
advantage when it comes to delivery failures, which we discuss in the
next subsection.
8.2.2 Delivery Failure Modes
Often, researchers are interested in which messages were delivered Emails have many
delivery failure
modes.
successfully and which were undeliverable (although spam filters that
discard without notice may make such statistics unreliable for emails).
Collecting this data can be more challenging than may be assumed
at first glance. We enumerate some of the challenges and potential
workarounds here.
delivery delays Some email servers may attempt to deliver a
message, fail, and then retry the delivery for a few days. Some email Delivery may be
retried for multiple
days before a failure
is generated.
providers, most notably Google, will retry for up to 3 days and give
daily updates about the continuing delay in delivery. This means that
even messages that were not returned as undeliverable may be silently
undelivered for a day or more, although email servers should give a
notification once they stop further delivery attempts.
undeliverable messages (bounces) If an email is undeliver-
able, most email servers will notify the sender. This notification can Bounce messages do
not follow any
specific standard.
either come from the sending email server (if the recipients’ email
server cannot be found) or from the receiving server (if the server
exists, but the email account does not, or it has exceeded the quota).
These responses (commonly called bounces) do not follow any stan-
dardized form. They can be as simple as a response to the message
that includes a full quote of the original messages. However, they can
also change many things about the original messages, including the
subject line and the email address.
In the worst case, a bounce messages may not be attributable based
on email address or subject line. In these cases, spacing emails to
be sent every 30 seconds can help narrow down the possibilities for
17 See https://www.spamcop.net/bl.shtml, last accessed 2021-01-11.
18 See https://www.spamhaus.org/lookup/, last accessed 2021-01-11.
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who sent the bounce based on timestamps. While they can be helpful,In some cases,




researchers should not assume that any automated heuristic will be
100 % successful in attributing bounces to their originating message.
Any automated system for this purpose should leave room for manual
intervention by the researcher. Alternatively, an automated system
could use custom email addresses for each sender. However, such
automatically-generated email addresses may impact the spam scores
and/or perceived trustworthiness of the messages and the tradeoffs
should be carefully considered.
non-bounce autoreplies Another challenge comes in the form
of automated replies that either state that a person no longer works atAutoreplies may
direct the sender to a
different contact
channel.
a company and the message will not be forwarded, or that redirect
to a web-based form. Researchers should decide in advance how they
want to handle these cases consistently: will they invest manual effort
to fill out forms or look for alternative contact details, or will they
count these messages as undelivered? What would this mean for the
results?
8.3 support tool
In our experience, it is very helpful to provide a tool that allows the
recipients to validate if their remediation attempts were successful.
Although the effect on remediation is reportedly low [17], it willWe discuss best
practices for
self-service tools.
likely reduce the amount of questions, and definitely make answering
them easier. We briefly discuss some of the lessons we learned from
operating such a tool for our two studies (cf. Chapter 6 and 7).
make the tool useful and usable This may seem like an
obvious point, but it bears repeating: the tool should have the look




does, how to use it, and what the results mean (otherwise it will cause
more support requests than it solves). If practical, it should contain
clear information on how the issue can be remediated. It is worth
investing time into these instructions — in the Google Analytics study,
we found some users of the tool had copy-pasted the remediation
code but not entered their own Google Analytics ID, leaving it at
the placeholder value (UA-XXXXX-Y) and rendering their analytics
system non-functional. Such mistakes may be preventable throughUnclear
documentation can
lead to mistakes by
the recipients.
better documentation. However, a previous study by Çetin et al. also
reported that recipients had trouble understanding how to use the tool
or used it incorrectly, even though clear instructions were prominently
presented on the tool page [17, p. 7]. Thus, the tool should also offer
helpful error messages when used incorrectly, and ideally try to predict
the most common types of usage mistakes and offer specific guidance
if these are detected.
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consider building a flexible tool Some recipients may want
to scan other sites under their own control. If knowledge of a mis- Consider allowing
the tool to scan
arbitrary sites.
configuration on a website does not result in immediate danger, re-
searchers should consider allowing the tool to be used on arbitrary
websites, instead of using custom links for each recipient that limit
them to their own website. This allows them to collect information on
other websites operated by the same party, which may be an interest-
ing dataset in its own right. It also reduces the amount of messages
asking the researchers to scan additional websites by the same opera-
tor, a phenomenon we observed in our second notification study (cf.
Section 6.3.3).
make the tool findable Some recipients (rightly) distrust links
from unsolicited messages. In these cases, the participants may instead
attempt to find the tool using search engines, and click through to it
from there. Researchers should ensure that the tool can be found by the Ensuring the tool




popular search engines by directly submitting it to their index19 and
ideally also linking to it from a university website, if this is compatible
with the purpose of the tool and the story told in the notification. Of
course, all of this is only possible if the tool can be used on arbitrary
websites and does not require a custom link, as discussed above.
collect the data When offering a tool, it should be used to
collect data as well. We recommend logging which systems were A tool can be a
valuable source of
research data and
should be treated as
such.
scanned when, by whom, and what the results were. This will allow
analyses such as: how many times did recipients use the tool before
they remediated? How long from the first to the last scan? What
other sites did they scan (if this is allowed by the tool)? Researchers
should think about different states the misconfiguration may enter
over time: is it possible that the first remediation attempt changes the
misconfiguration to a different variant of the same issue, and if so,
can this be detected? All of this can be interesting data to collect. This
data should be easily distinguishable from the automated, scheduled
scans to avoid mistakes in the later analysis.
be aware of alternatives to your tool There may be more
than one tool seeking to detect the issue in question. In our Google Other tools may
perform the same
checks and be used
by recipients.
Analytics study, we found that a different tool existed that purported to
detect the same issue, but was in fact returning faulty data and missing
certain instances of the misconfiguration. This led to questions from
notification recipients. Researchers should be aware of any alternatives
to their own tools, and ideally be familiar with the error classes of
these tools, if any are known.
19 Submitting websites to Google and Bing now requires an account with their Web-
master tools systems, see https://developers.google.com/search/docs/advanced/
crawling/ask-google-to-recrawl and https://www.bing.com/webmasters/
homepage, respectively. Last accessed 2021-01-12.
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have a private instance of the tool Naturally, having a
tool that can detect the misconfiguration can also be helpful for the
researcher. It can be used to check the current status of a misconfigu-Hosting a second,
private instance of




ration while answering a message from the operator of that system,
or allow easy comparison of the results of different tools. Any scans
conducted by the researchers should be kept separate from the data
collected from notification recipients to avoid contaminating the re-
search data. The easiest way to achieve this is to host a copy of the
tool under a different address that is only known to the researchers,
which either has logging completely disabled or logs to a different
database that will not become part of the analysis.
8.4 interacting with recipients
Our experience shows that many notification recipients will reach out
with a variety of intentions and questions, using a number of different




important step in making this part of the process as painless as possi-
ble. Nevertheless, if researchers are planning to respond to incoming
messages (which will likely have a large impact on remediation rates),
they should expect to invest significant time and effort into this part
of the study.
We strongly recommend building tools to make interactions with
recipients easier. In particular, when answering a phone call, it canIt is worth investing
in tools to aid in
interactions with
recipients.
be invaluable to have a quick tool that allows searching for a half-
understood domain name using fuzzy searching (for example, trigram
distance to the domain name and/or name of the recipient), especially
if the study design requires telling different stories to different groups
of recipients. The tool can also contain a link that easily starts a
scan of the target system using a private, researcher-only instance of
the self-service tool, so the researchers can more easily see what the
current status is, and act accordingly. The tool can also be used to
track incoming and sent messages (automatically or manually) if they
should be evaluated in more detail later.
8.4.1 Communication Channels




other communication channels, either because they believe them to be
more effective or because they distrust emails and want to verify the
messages using a different medium.
phone calls The most popular alternative medium is the phone.
Our second study (cf. Chapter 6) showed that not providing a phoneExpect to be called
on the phone if the
number is listed
somewhere.
number in the notification does not ensure that recipients won’t call.
Instead, they either searched for the sender on the website of the
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university and used the phone number provided there, called the
secretary of the research group (as this was the most prominently listed
phone number on the website), or even called the central switchboard
of the university and asked to be connected.
This experience taught us two lessons for the third study: firstly, we
warned all members of the research group that they may be getting
phone calls and who to forward these to. Secondly, we included a Colleagues should be
informed about the
study in advance.
phone number in the notification to reduce the impact on other people
in the group, with the rationale that if people were going to call either
way, they should at least directly reach the right person. This proved
to be mostly effective, although some still called other phone numbers
because they mistrusted the message. Giving specific time windows
for calls in the notification was only moderately successful, as about
half of the calls came outside the stated hours. Still, when giving a
phone number, we still recommend giving a time window for calls.
alternative email addresses Other recipients may prefer to
send an email, but distrust the sending email address, especially if it
is a function-specific account (i.e., notification@group.university.tld
instead of name@group.university.tld). These may seek out an alter- Responses may be
sent to different
email addresses.
native email address, frequently falling back on the email listed on
the university homepage. In some cases, they also found a private
email address from a blog or other sources. This also highlights that
anyone identified by name in the notifications should be aware of the
information that will be found if recipients enter their name into a
search engine, and consider how this information would change what
recipients think about the notification.




commended from an IT security perspective, it also implies that re-
searchers should never assume that all relevant email responses will
come to the intended email address (i.e., that used to send the email
or listed in the reply-to field). This has two implications. Firstly, it
means that identifying the sender of a response based on their re-
ply to a recipient-specific email address will not always work, and
secondly, any tool that is used to manage the communication with
recipients should allow for the manual addition of incoming emails
by the researcher, in case they use an email address not monitored by
the tool.
alternative recipients Some recipients take things a step fur-
ther and intentionally contact a different person at the same institution.
Examples include the head of the research group, the secretary, the Some recipients will
intentionally contact
other people at the
same institution.
general contact of the department, or the press office of the university.
From there, they were then usually forwarded to the researcher man-
aging the notification campaign, which was frequently only possible
because this researcher was identified by name and department in
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the notification message. This once again highlights that notification
campaigns can cause work for people outside the immediate study
team, and that such contacts should be warned in advance that they
may receive calls or emails about this study.
less-used channels Finally, we also observed a few atypical
channels that were only used by very few recipients. These includedOther channels, like
social media, may
also be used.
direct messages on Twitter and professional social networks like
LinkedIn or Xing. Anyone mentioned by name in a notification should
regularly check any accounts they maintain under their real name at
such networks.20
8.4.2 Requests for Help




help will likely be common. We briefly discuss a few considerations
for these cases.
have a help policy The first question is if the researchers should
attempt to help recipients or not. Helping them will increase remedia-Researchers should
decide in advance
whether to provide
this help, and do it
consistently.
tion rates, while not helping them will likely lead to resentment. This
question should also be considered under a scientific lense: would
helping the recipients distort the results (for example, because one
group has better access to help than another)? Or is it unethical not to
help, due to the high danger or complexity of the issue? Researchers
should decide on a policy for this before sending the first notification.




be that some recipients may reply to thank the researchers and claim
that they have remediated successfully while the scans show the issue
as non-remediated. Again, researchers should consider if they want
to correct these faulty claims or not, considering the potential biases
they may introduce weighed against the risk of non-remediation in
the process. If they do decide to correct the claims of these recipients,
they should be prepared to offer proof of their assertions and provide
more detailed instructions on remediation.
be prepared for unrelated requests Finally, some recipi-
ents seem to believe that offering support on one issue constitutes a
standing offer to help with any and all future issues with a system.
In the Google Analytics study, we were approached by one recipientRecipients may also
ask for help with
unrelated problems.
that asked if we could help them solve a PHP error their Wordpress
installation was showing, while other recipients asked for legal advice
20 Note that Twitter does not send mobile notifications for direct messages from people
you do not follow or have not messaged with before. Instead they show up in a
special section in the list of direct messages.
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or recommendations for alternatives to Google Analytics. In these
cases, a blanket refusal to help with anything unrelated to the study
may be an appropriate policy, although it led to annoyance or disbelief
from some recipients in our study.
8.4.3 Positive and Negative Reactions




cation experiment are very positive or very negative reactions, which
each have their own risks associated with them. Again, we briefly
discuss our experiences.
gratefulness and gifts In our studies, many recipients ex-
pressed their gratitude for our help. While this is generally positive, Some recipients may
offer gifts or
payments as thanks,
which can lead to
ethical and legal
problems.
some also offered us gifts or payment. In these cases, researchers
should be aware of the potential consequences of accepting gifts or
payment for actions done as part of their job. In Germany, accepting
gifts may constitute Vorteilsnahme, which can be reason for termina-
tion of the work contract and, in extreme cases, prosecution. We thus
strongly recommend refusing all gifts that do not come in the form of
formal donations to the university.
In some cases, recipients did not even ask if they could send us a gift,
and instead simply sent an unsolicited package containing anything
from free postcards to branded mugs or bags and phone holders. Such Such gifts may also
be sent without prior
warning.
unsolicited gifts pose an even greater challenge, as simply returning
them is not always possible. In such cases, it may be advisable to
discuss the matter with whoever is responsible for internal compliance
and/or corruption prevention in the organization.
misunderstandings and threats The other side of the coin




ents interpreted the message as spam or scam messages, or even legal
threats or defamatory, and threatened to send a cease-and-desist letter
to university unless the messages stopped. In these cases, working
with legal experts becomes even more important, as this can give
certainty that the study does not break any laws. Nevertheless, the
Google Analytics study led to an uncomfortable phone call with the
chancellor of one involved university because of legal threats a website
operator had made, and another set of calls with a company that had
felt attacked by our messages and was complaining to our university,
with which it had a cooperation agreement. Researchers should be pre-
pared for such situations and be ready to defuse misunderstandings
and remove participants from future notifications.
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8.5 reminders and follow-up
Several studies have used reminders to increase remediation rates,We discuss reminder
and follow-up
messages.
and our Google Analytics study showed that they can be effective.
However, reminders and follow-up messages need to be used with
care, as they may quickly exhaust the patience of recipients.
the first follow-up In our third study, the first reminder led
to significant improvements in the overall remediation. Some peopleThe first reminder
can lead to additional
remediations.
reported that they either did not receive or did not trust the initial
message, and only acted upon the reminder. On the other hand, other
recipients became annoyed with the reminder and complained that
they did not know why we kept contacting them. Overall, the reminder
seems to have had a more positive than negative effect, so we would
advise to consider sending a single reminder message.
the second follow-up The second follow-up we sent was the
final debriefing message that contained the information that the mes-
sages were part of a scientific study, and contained a link to a survey.





cipients that told us that they had already remediated and that we
should stop contacting them. This indicates that several recipients had
stopped reading the message in detail, and started recognizing it based
on the design and subject line, an effect that parallels the concept of
habituation in psychology [88]. Stock et al. also reported that while their
first reminder message was effective, the second no longer had any
measurable effects on remediation [98], rendering further reminders
pointless. We thus advise against sending more than three messages
in total, as we would expect the negative reactions to increase with
each message. We also recommend explicitly stating that the message
is the final one the recipient will receive.
8.6 conclusion
This concludes our recommendations and lessons learned for future
notification studies. Of course, as with any set of recommendations,We hope this
incomplete list of
recommendations
can be helpful for
others.
the list is incomplete. However, we believe that explicitly formulating
this knowledge can help to put future notification studies on a more
solid basis, and avoid others having to re-learn the same lessons again
and again. For further reading in this topic area, we once again refer
to the best practice papers by Bajpai et al. [6], Cui et al. [25] and
Durumeric et al. [33] for technical and methodological considerations.
Vitak et al. [111] discusses the ethics of large-scale scans, as does the
8.6 conclusion 159
companion paper to this chapter [72], and Marcia Hoffmann wrote
about the legal aspects for Rapid721.
21 See https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2013/10/30/legal-considerations-for-
widespread-scanning/, last accessed 2021-05-17.
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C O N C L U S I O N
In this dissertation, we have presented our work in detecting and
driving remediation of security and privacy issues in multiple internet




systems for websites and email newsletters, respectively, and then used
the data and technology of these systems to conduct three notification
studies to evaluate different methods of promoting change.




overview of the challenges of ensuring the privacy and security of sys-
tems and whole ecosystems, considering the perspective of outsiders
(i.e., scanning systems and notification studies) and insiders (i.e., the
perspective of system administrators and the economic incentives of
organizations). This knowledge informed the rest of the dissertation
and allowed us to approach our research with an interdisciplinary
perspective.
In Part ii, we presented two transparency tools, PrivacyScore and
PrivacyMail, that perform automated privacy and security analyses in




have been received with interest by the users, sometimes observing
over 500 visitors per day. They have also contributed to making the
internet safer — data collected by PrivacyScore led to the detection
and remediation of a vulnerability in a popular online shop system
used by hundreds of pharmacies (cf. Section 3.5). PrivacyScore and
PrivacyMail have served as the basis for several student theses and
lab projects in our research group as well as at least four papers [54,
82, 93, 97] and one thesis written at other universities. They are also
suitable for answering further research questions from a wide variety
of different areas, from quantifying the presence of specific tracking
technologies to performing user studies.
The technology of PrivacyScore also served as the basis for the three








mon goal was to determine which methods can be used to incentivize
system operators to make changes to their websites, investigating sev-
eral factors like the message medium, the sender and framing of the
message, and ranking the website’s privacy- and security aspects in
comparison to their peers and competitors. We found that the presence
of such competitive rankings changes the responses of the recipients,
but did not lead to large differences in how the websites were changed.
This effect may have been an artifact of the used platform, as other




studies have successfully leveraged competition in other areas [47,
104, 105, 118]. Changing the framing of the message achieved mixed
results: more detailed explanations of the dangers of an information
leak increased remediation for some issues, but decreased it for others,
whereas framing an issue as one of compliance rather than a privacy
issue significantly increased remediation rates. Contrary to previous
studies, we also observed the sender of the message having an impact
on remediation rates, and saw that reminder messages likely led to
increased remediation rates. The most effective single change is a
switch from email messages to letters, however, such a change may be
impractical in some environments, as it requires manual address data
collection and investment in postage.
Based on our results, in combination with the previous studies in the
field, we believe that one major factor in whether website operators
remediate any misconfigurations is their fear of the consequences
of inaction (i.e., the sender has leverage in the terminology of the




of compromise, legal requirements, loss of customers, etc.), and it may
also lead to undesired reactions (e.g., threatening to sue if their website
is not removed from a public ranking) if such actions are perceived
to be the “cheaper” solution to the problem. Notification messages
should also endeavor to avoid causing too much worry, as notification
recipients may overreact (e.g., shut down their entire website instead
of making a minor change) or experience significant psychological
stress. Future research should take these results into consideration
when planning new studies.
We believe that the field of security and privacy notifications still has
many open questions left — questions that are easier to answer when





with a collection of
best practices.
overview of relevant aspects from other fields given in Chapter 2,
we also included a dedicated chapter in Part iv of this dissertation,
in which we share our experiences with preparing and conducting
such studies. We highlight best practices and potential pitfalls in the
different steps of conducting a notification study, ranging from the
collection of the initial datasets and the preparation of the notification
messages to more specific topics like the use of support tools, interac-
tions with the recipients, and how to follow up if the first messages
were unsuccessful. We hope that sharing our experience can allow
future studies to start from a more solid foundation and avoid having
to re-learn all the hard-won organizational and technical lessons of
our studies.
Part V
A P P E N D I X

A
C O M P E T I T I O N
This appendix contains supplementary material for the competition
study described in Chapter 5.
a.1 example notification message
Below, we provide the text of the solicitation messages sent to the
health insurance companies. As the messages for the two groups only
differ in one sentence, we only show one version and highlight the
differences with bold print in the text. We first provide the German
version and then an English translation.
a.1.1 German Version
[Anrede],
mein Name ist Nicolas Walter, ich bin Master-Student
der Technischen Universität Darmstadt mit Fachrichtung
Wirtschaftsinformatik. Zurzeit schreibe ich meine Mas-
terarbeit und führe in diesem Rahmen eine Studie zu
Privatsphäre-Einstellungen auf Internetpräsenzen von Kran-
kenkassen und Krankenversicherungen durch. Hierzu wür-
de ich Ihnen gerne ein Universitätsprojekt vorstellen:
Durch Zusammenarbeit von 6 Universitäten ist das Online-
Tool PrivacyScore.org (https://privacyscore.org/) entstan-
den, mit dem es möglich ist Websites auf verschiedene
Privatsphäre-Schwachstellen zu untersuchen. Wir unter-
suchen beispielsweise, wie gut Mail- und Web-Server ver-
schlüsselt sind, inwieweit Tracking eingesetzt wird oder ob
Schutz gegen verschiedene Angriffe besteht. Der Benefit
für Unternehmen liegt darin, dass diese Informationen da-
zu genutzt werden können, die Privatsphäre für Kunden
proakiv zu verbessern.
Wir haben auch Ihre Unternehmenswebsite getestet. Im
Vergleich zu Ihren Wettbewerbern befinden Sie sich auf
Platz [X] von 154, was die Privatsphäre-Einstellungen an-
betrifft. Der nachfolgende Screenshot zeigt ein paar Scan-
resultate und Ihr Ranking: [Screenshot]
Alle Scans und Endergebnisse zu Ihrer Unternehmens-





Das Gesamtranking finden Sie unter folgendem Link:
[LINK]
Für meine Studie, wäre ich Ihnen dankbar, wenn Sie
mir zu den folgenden Fragen eine Rückmeldung geben
könnten: Wie ist Ihre Haltung (aus Unternehmenssicht)
gegenüber dieser Bewertung? Würden Sie Änderungen an
Ihrer Webseite hin zu einer Privatsphäre-freundlicheren
Version in Betracht ziehen?
Ich freue mich auf Ihre Rückmeldung und verbleibe mit
freundlichen Grüßen,
Nicolas Walter
PS: Ich würde ich Sie bitten diese E-Mail an eine zustän-
dige Abteilung weiterzuleiten, passend wäre möglicher-
weise die IT-Sicherheit oder der Datenschutz.
a.1.2 English Version
Dear [...],
my name is Nicolas Walter and I am a Master’s student
of the Technische Universität Darmstadt with a major in
Business Informatics. I am currently conductng a study for
my master thesis regarding privacy settings on the websites
of health insurance companies and health insurers and I
would like to introduce a university project.
In cooperation with 6 universities, the online tool Privacy-
Score.org (https://privacyscore.org/) has been developed,
which enables to examine websites for various privacy
vulnerabilities. We examine, for example, how well mail
and web servers are encrypted, to what extent tracking is
used, or whether there is protec on against various attacks.
Companies can benefit as they can use this information to
proactively improve privacy for customers.
We have also tested your company website. Compared
to your competitors, you are ranked [x] out of 154 in
terms of privacy settings. The following screenshots show
some scan results and your ranking: [SCREENSHOT RE-
SULTS]
All scans and final results of your company’s website
can also be viewed here: [LINK]
[SCREENSHOT RANKING]
The overall ranking can be found under the following
link: [LINK]
For my study, I would be glad if you could answer the
following questions: what do you think about such an
assessment from a company’s point of view? And would
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you consider to adapt your website in order to enhance the
privacy settings?
I am looking forward to your feedback and remain with
kind regards
Nicolas Walter
PS: Could you please forward this e-mail to a responsible




S E C U R I T Y N O T I F I C AT I O N S
This appendix contains supplementary material for the security notifi-
cation study described in Chapter 6.
b.1 example notification messages
Figure 16 shows an anonymized example letter in the original Ger-
man version. In the following, we provide translated versions of the
explanations of the different vulnerability types that were used in the
letter. All messages started with the following text:
To Whom it may concern,
we are contacting you because you are listed as the re-
sponsible person for the website in its imprint. Within the
context of a research project we found multiple vulnera-
bilities on your website http://www.example.com about
which we would like to kindly advise you. The vulnera-
bilities stem from files that are publicly accessible, either
unintentionally or by carelessness, and reveal sensible in-
formation. The following addresses are affected:
It was followed by a list of URLs and the relevant explanations,
listed below. The message then closed by stating:
In the interest of your websites security we advise you to
remedy those vulnerabilities as soon as possible. Further
information on our project, your vulnerabilities, assistance
in remediation and a status check for your website is avail-
able at: [URL with token]
I will be happy to assist you with any further questions.
With kind regards,
Max Maass
The message signature contained the name, fax number, email and
postal address of the sender. We now provide the individual text
blocks that describe the different vulnerabilities.
b.1.1 SSH Key
baseline At this address anyone can download an access key
which can presumably be used to log in to your website and get full
access. Please consult an expert for the next steps, because we can not
determine the full impact of this problem.
169
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Figure 16: German example notification letter, anonymized for release (translation provided below).
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attack This vulnerability was only observed once and thus does
not contain a version with attack scenario.
b.1.2 TLS Key
baseline At this address anyone can access the private key to your
websites transport encryption. Because of that we have to assume that
the encryption can actually be abrogated. Please deactivate the access
to the key, renew the key as well as your encryption certificate and
revoke the old key.
attack This vulnerability was only observed once and thus does
not contain a version with attack scenario.
b.1.3 Database Backup
baseline At this address, anyone can download a backup of your
database. Although we did not review its content in detail, it is very
likely that its contents are not intended for public consumption.
attack An attacker can likely extract the list of users from that
backup and can possibly extract the passwords. This may grant them
full access to the website and allow them to manipulate the content,
which can lead to defamation.
b.1.4 VCS
baseline The availability of this file indicates that the source code
of your website is publicly accessible. While we did not verify those
contents in detail, we assume that it contains content that is not meant
to be publicly accessible, such as login and contact data or internal
configuration files.
attack Depending on whether an attacker discovers information
like login or contact data, she can in some circumstances acquire full
access to your website or impersonate you with the help of the contact
data to gain access to further information by fraud.
b.1.5 Server-Status
baseline At this address anyone can see which pages on the
website are currently accessed from which IP address using which
parameters. This means that in doing so you illicitly disclose the
identity and activities of your visitors.
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PHPInfo phpinfo.php, test.php, info.php
attack Using this information an attacker can trace who visits
your website and learn about visit duration and links clicked. In the
worst case she thereby learns the so called “Session ID”, which enables
her to seize the role of a visitor and impersonate them.
b.1.6 Server-Info
baseline At this address anyone can retrieve information about
software modules in use as well as their versions and internal configu-
ration details of your server which should not be public for security
reasons.
attack With the help of such version information an attacker
can very easily determine whether outdated software with known
vulnerabilities is in use. If this is the case, she can exploit those easily
and in the worst case gain access to the server.
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b.1.7 PHPInfo
baseline At this address anyone can access information about the
software in use as well as internal configuration details, which should
not be publicly accessible for security reasons.
attack With the help of such version information an attacker can
easily determine whether outdated software with known vulnerabili-
ties is in use. If this is the case, she can exploit them with ease and in
the worst case gain access to the server.

C
C O M P L I A N C E
This appendix contains supplementary material for the notification
study described in Chapter 7.
c.1 google analytics misconfiguration
Activating IP anonymization for Google Analytics is a non-trivial
process. It has to be activated explicitly and by the website operator
through a change in the source code of the website. The exact required
changes depend on the used Google Analytics library, as the system
can be embedded in multiple different ways. Listing 1 shows a number
of potential mistakes that can be made when activating IP anonymiza-
tion using the analytics.js library. The setting string is case-sensitive
and named inconsistently between the different versions of the library,
and using an incorrect string will not raise any errors (attempt 2 in the
listing). Finally, the setting needs to be activated at the right time in
the program flow: after the tracking ID was set (attempt 1), but before
the tracking requests are sent (attempt 3). Thus, despite trying three
times to activate IP anonymization, the code from Listing 1 would re-
sult in a website operating without anonymization. Such errors led to
significant confusion from the notification recipients, which required
detailed explanations to remedy. Part of the remediation instructions
given by the self-service are shown in Figure 17.
Listing 1: Examples of erroneous IP anonymization configurations for Google
Analytics using analytics.js
1 ga(’set’, ’anonymizeIp’, true); // Attempt 1
2 // Error: must be done after configuring the tracking ID
3 ga(’create’, ’UA-XXXXX-Y’, ’auto’);
4 // Configure the tracking ID
5 ga(’set’, ’anonymizeIP’, true); // Attempt 2
6 // Error: must be spelled ’anonymizeIp’
7 ga(’send’, ’pageview’);
8 // Send the pageview
9 ga(’set’, ’anonymizeIp’, true); // Attempt 3
10 // Error: must be done before sending the pageview
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Figure 17: Part of the instructions on activating IP Anonymization, as given in the self-service tool.
c.2 behavior of co-owned websites
In the methodology section, we note that we assume that a notified op-
erator in charge of more than one domain will likely remediate either
all or none of their websites. We thus decided to introduce a weighing
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mechanism to reduce the impact of such correlated remediations on
the overall results (cf. Section 7.2.7).
Here, we briefly attempt to investigate the veracity of this assump-
tion. In total, our dataset contained 88 recipients that controlled more
than one website. Of these, 77 (87.5 %) had indeed remediated either
all (40) or none (37) of their websites at the end of the study timeframe
(this count includes operators from the control group). Of the 40 fully
compliant recipients, 34 (85 %) needed a timespan of less than 2 days
between the first and last remediation. These results indicate that
while not every website operator fulfilled the assumption of correlated
remediations, a large majority did, and the impact of the remaining
operators on the overall results should be small.
c.3 example notification messages
This section contains a translated version of the different messages
that were sent to recipients. It is quoted verbatim from the online
supplementary material for the paper [73], with minor adjustments to
formatting. An example letter from the uni-cs – gdpr+fine group is
shown in Figure 18.
University Groups
Dear Madams and Sirs,
we are contacting you because you are listed in the imprint of the
following website[s] as the responsible party: [single URL or list of
URLs]
As part of a research project, we have recently inspected your web-
site, and found that you are using Google Analytics without anonymiz-
ing the IP addresses of your visitors.
privacy only Due to the lack of anonymization, you are violating
the privacy of your visitors, as the full IP address is saved by Google.
This allows Google to collect more data than absolutely necessary. The
full IP addresses can be used by Google to create more precise profiles
of your visitors.
To improve the privacy of your users, we recommend activating the
IP Anonymization feature, or to use your own web analytics system,
like the free web analytics software "Matomo".
gdpr and gdpr+fine only Operating the website[s] with this
configuration is not compliant with the law.
There is a violation of Art. 6 Para. 1 lit. f GDPR, as the interests of
the website visitors predominate when weighing up the interests. You
have not pseudonymised or anonymised the IP address of the website
visitors. This configuration of the Google Analytics tool violates the
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Figure 18: German example notification letter from the uni-cs – gdpr+fine group, anonymized for
release (translation provided below).
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principles of data minimization, storage limitation and the use of
pseudonymization or anonymization.
gdpr+fine only Such an infringement may be punishable by a
fine in accordance with Art. 83 DSGVO.
Sanctions are regulated in Art. 83 and Art. 84 DSGVO. According
to this, the supervisory authorities can impose fines in the event of
violations of data protection law. These fines must be effective, propor-
tionate and dissuasive in each individual case (cf. Art. 83 (1) DSGVO).
In the event of infringements of the principles governing processing
pursuant to Art. 5 DSGVO (principles governing the processing of
personal data) and Art. 6 DSGVO (lawfulness of processing), fines
of up to € 20 million or, in the case of a company, up to 4 % of the
total annual worldwide turnover achieved in the previous financial
year, whichever is the higher, may be imposed (Art. 83 para. 5 lit. a
DSGVO).
all framings To check your Google Analytics configuration, the
University of Bamberg provides the tool "Check Google Analytics",
which is operated by the Privacy and Security in Information Systems
group (https://www.uni-bamberg.de/psi/). This tool also contains
information on how the issue can be remediated.
If you have any questions, you can find my contact information in
the signature of this email. Be advised that the phone calls are only
taken Thursday, from 9-11 am.
Sincerely, [Name of the sender]
[Email signature: name, affiliation, address, phone number]
Private Sender
Dear Madams and Sirs,
when visiting your website[s], I noticed that you are using Google
Analytics without anonymizing the IP address of your visitors. This
applies to the following site[s]: [single URL or list of URLs]
privacy only Due to the lack of anonymization, you are violating
the privacy of your visitors, as the full IP address is saved by Google.
This allows Google to collect more data than absolutely necessary. The
full IP addresses can be used by Google to create more precise pro-
files of your visitors. This supports Google in its highly questionable
tracking practices, which I absolutely reject.
To improve the privacy of your users it is recommended to activate
IP Anonymisation or to use your own analysis system such as the free
web analysis tool "Matomo".
gdpr and gdpr+fine [Identical to the university groups.]
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all framings To check your Google Analytics configuration, the
University of Bamberg provides the tool "Check Google Analytics",
which is operated by the Privacy and Security in Information Systems
group (https://www.uni-bamberg.de/psi/). This tool also contains
information on how the issue can be remediated.




This section contains a translated version of the survey that was
sent to notification recipients. It is quoted verbatim from the online
supplementary material of the paper [73].
1. Dear Participant,
Thank you for participating in this 5-minute survey. By doing
so, you are supporting a research project of Technische Uni-
versität Darmstadt, Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg, and
Goethe Universität Frankfurt on data protection. Further in-
formation on data protection in this survey can be found here:
[link to information on the study and on data protection]
O I have read the notes to the study and agree to participate
in the study. I agree that the data collected in the course
in the study may be evaluated for scientific purposes and
stored and published in anonymised form. I am aware that
my participation is voluntary and that I can stop the trial
at any time and without giving reasons.
O I do not agree
2. We sent you this notification at the beginning of July. Did you
read this notification?
[ Picture of a Notification ]
3. What was your first impression of our notification?
The notification makes a trustworthy impression.





On the basis of the notification I could understand the problem
of the missing IP Anonymization.
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4. Please briefly describe which aspects of the notification led




5. Please briefly describe which aspects of the notification led to




6. Have you fixed the problem of missing IP anonymisation of
Google Analytics on your website before 27.09.2019?
O Yes
O No
O I don’t know
O Page was completely shut down
7. Since the problem of missing IP Anonymization has already
been solved on your website: which of the following state-
ments best applies to you?
O I fixed the problem myself without help.
O I fixed the problem myself with help.
O I have forwarded the problem/issue to colleagues in my
organization
O I have asked my external service provider to fix the prob-
lem.
O I have hired a new service provider to fix the problem.
O Other: ................................................
8. Can you imagine what could be reasons why you did not acti-
vate the IP anonymisation of Google Analytics on your web-
site until 27.09.2019? Multiple answer possible
Problem was not known
Lack of knowledge on how to solve the problem
Missing time
Problem has no priority
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Notification did not seem serious to me
Other: ................................................
9. Did you know BEFORE we notified you that you were using
Google Analytics on your website?
O Yes
O No
10. Had you heard about the IP Anonymization feature BEFORE
we notified you?
O Yes, and I knew the purpose
O Yes, I didn’t know exactly what it was
O No
11. Did you know BEFORE we notified you about the missing IP
Anonymization of Google Analytics on your website?




12. During our study (July to September 2019), various media re-
ported a verdict of the regional court Dresden reports, which
states that the activation of IP anonymisation at Google Ana-
lytics is necessary for legally compliant operation. Which of
the statements apply to you? Multiple answer possible
The judgement was decisive for activating IP Anonymiza-
tion.
The IP Anonymization was activated INDEPENDENTLY of
the judgement.
I haven’t heard about the verdict yet.
Other: ................................................
13. In our notification we referred you to the CheckGA tool of
Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg.
[ Picture of the tool ]












O O O O O O O
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14. Which of the following check tools are known to you or have






Qualys SSL Check O O O
Webkoll O O O
Mozilla Observatory O O O
HTBridge O O O
Immuniweb O O O
Other: ................... O O O
15. Would you like to receive future notifications about privacy
issues on your website?
O Yes
O No
16. In which way would you like to be informed about data pro-










How many employees does your company or organization have?
.......
19. Who in your organisation is responsible for maintaining the
website?
O Employees in the organisation (please indicate how many
employees are responsible for this) .......
O Website support by an external agency
20. Is there anything else you would like to tell us? For example,
something that we should consider for future notifications.
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21. Interest in research results/future study participation
Note: Your e-mail address will be stored separately from all other
information in this survey.
Yes, I would like to be informed about the results of this
study.
Yes, I would like to be informed about further studies.
Many thanks for your participation! We would like to thank you
very much for your assistance. Your answers have been saved, you can
now close the browser window.
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